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Introduction 
The last two decades of the 20th century had witnessed changes in social, political and 
economic life. Advances in technology have globalised trade and financial markets. In 
the early 90s a substantial number of emerging markets started to develop financial 
industries. Some Central European transitional countries, such as Hungary and the 
Czech Republic, have already achieved positive results in establishing financial 
institutions. However, there are some countries, such as Ukraine, where the 
development offinancial institutions has been slow. One of the advantages of being an 
emerging financial industry in a glob ali sed financial market has been seen in the number 
of chances to obtain technical and financial assistance. However, the disadvantage is 
the constant necessity to protect the emerging industry from possible abuse and 
misconduct. That is why a safe business environment created by the state is a green 
light for the positive reforms outcome The question is whether or not the official 
devotion to reform the system would be 'positive' or 'substantial enough' to provide 
some positive outcome to lay the foundation for sound financial institutions. What is 
the role of the traditions and general culture in reforming the state, and financial sector 
in particular? How crucial is it to know the level of corruption inside the system? The 
answers to these questions tend to be subjective. Further, the questions and their 
answers may be meaningless if they are separated from their social and political 
contexts. 
For more then a decade now Ukraine has been involved in an attempt to achieve 
economic stability, develop its own financial institutions, reform the legal system. All 
reforms have been conducted under the umbrella of transition towards democracy. But 
in reality, how close is the country to the sound success in economic and legal 
reforms? The avoidance of the political reforms is intentional here, because mere 
consideration of the economic reforms in Ukraine will necessarily bring the issue of the 
political reforms. 
FollOwing research is an attempt to understand the relationship between the law, the 
economic and financial reforms, and law enforcement mechanisms. It tends to be that 
these three components stay closely linked. To achieve success in reforming financial 
system in a country, there is a need to have a sound legal background and certain legal 
mechanisms to enforce the good law in books into practice. What tends to poison this 
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almost ideal ingredients of success is certain political pressure, or its opposite, lack of 
political will. Ukraine presents a unique example where at the beginning of the reforms 
the country's potential was named as the greatest among the former Soviet Union 
Republics, however, ten years after, and the country was named as 'a disaster'. There 
are a lot of facts to blame, such as hyperinflation, broken trade links, unstable 
legislation. However, what will be argued in this study is that the absence of political 
will to conduct reforms, and the presence of private interests in a big politics of 
managing the whole society have lead to the establishment of the 'ill' financial 
institutions, unable to react to the problems of economy, but able to cover easy money 
gained by means of big and corrupt deals. 
Has this situation been known to the West? The answer is yes, and for many years. The 
abuse of the financial system has always been considered as a lucrative business. BCCl 
scandal in the early 90-s and more recent Bank of New York involvement in the money 
laundering case had been shadowed by scandals around financial crimes conducted by 
the representatives of such world-wide multinational companies as Enron and 
WorldCom. 
The difference between the cases of financial crime conducted by Ukraine Bank and . 
the Bank of New York, is that while the last one received a great publicity and shamed 
the guilty parties, and promised to tighten the regulatory requirements. The Ukraine 
Bank case had avoided publicity, investigators keep searching guilty parties, and can 
hardly name them for political reasons. 
There are two general aims of this study: the first is to study economic crime 
phenomenon in broad terms, attempting to provide a theoretical framework to 
understand the causes of economic crime problems in Ukraine; the second aim is by 
conducting an expert study to identify the most important problems with regard to the 
development of financial institutions in the country and the disruption caused by 
economic crime. 
Four hypothesis have been studied in the present work. The first one is that the success 
in democratic reforms can be judged according to the success achieved in financial 
reforms, addresses rather global issues faced by societies in transition. The following 
three hypothesis are: grand scale financial crime is associated with high level state 
officials or politicians; high quality of the law in books provides high quality financial 
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services, and high quality law on corruption provides better detection and preventative 
measures. 
To address these issues the following chapters have been designed. Chapter 1 
discusses the methodological issues of the study, provides the basic review of the 
definitions employed in this work, defends the choice of the expert case study, and 
discusses the issues of reliability of the state statistics in Ukraine and its use in the 
secondary data analysis. The study of the current situation in Ukraine is presented in 
Chapter 4, after the search for definitions of white-collar crime and economic crime in 
Chapter 2, and discussion of the role of the financial institutions in the economic 
development of the country in Chapter 3. Chapter 2 and 3 provide the foundation for 
the following discussion of the problems faced by transition Ukraine. Chapter 2 
discusses the complexity of the phenomenon of white-collar crime, and economic 
crime, shows the examples of empirical studies conducted by the researchers in 
developed economies, contrast the 'white -collar' crime phenomenon in Western 
democracies and 'red-collar' crime phenomenon in the Former Soviet Union. Chapter 
3 studies the relationship between economic development and financial institutions in 
the country. It starts by elaborating on the advantages found in white-collar type of . 
crime, and continues with the financial market and economic development of advanced 
and transitional counties, and the modem day type of white-collar crime. 
Considering this information as a background, Chapter 4 studies the period of 
transition Ukraine has experienced in a decade followed after the country gained its 
independence in 1991. The core of this chapter is three case studies. Case study 1 
presents the results of the expert interviews conducted in the UK and Ukraine during 
spring -summer 2001. There are two groups of experts who constitute the general 
sample of expert study. The first group of respondents was formed from experts who 
are responsible either for the introduction of the new legislation in the financial area or 
enforcement agency, investigators and prosecutors. The second group consists of 
those experts who actively operate in the area of financial market. In total 24 experts 
were interviewed. Case study 2 provides some insights into the banking industry in the 
country. Case study 3 examines the enforcement issues in regard to the anti-corruption 
legislation in the country. It is hoped that these three studies provide some necessary 
insights and integrity into the current problems of the development of financial 
institutions in the country. 
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Chapter 5 discusses the international response to the problems of economic crime. It 
should be said, that this is the most challenging chapter, as it provides the discussion, 
which was almost unthinkable when this study began. The attack on the USA of 11 th of 
September 2001 had lead to the dramatic changes introduced by the US government 
and regulatory agencies. These changes have addressed not only international terrorism 
and its finances, but foreign corrupt officials and their infiltration into the international 
financial system. 
It has to be said that studying the emerging financial institutions in transitional 
countries especially in the time of changing international financial regulations have 
proved to be a very interesting but at the same time a very challenging topic. Since the 
beginning of this study a number of new regulations have been introduced in Ukraine, 
the new Criminal Code was adopted in September 2001. From the 'no one knows 
jurisdiction' Ukraine has become known as 'non-co-operative jurisdiction' due to the 
publication of the analysis conducted by the Financial Action Task Force. Continuing 
threat of international terrorism had dramatically changed the approach the developed 
economies employ to regulate the international financial market. So that the new 
question arises, would Ukraine be able and be willing to adapt its financial regulations 
to the standards required by the international community? While this study attempts to 
answer some stated questions the life brings a set of other questions to think about. It 
was important to decide when to stop reflecting to the new changes. The study 
conducted is based on the information collected by the end of summer 2002. 
4 
Chapter 1. The methodology of the research 
1.1 The aim 
This research aims to study the economic crime phenomenon in transition countries. 
Recent studies suggest that emerging financial markets are vulnerable to different 
types of illegal conduct (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development & 
The World Bank, 2001). The main focus of this study is the experience of one 
country- Ukraine. It is assumed that for a transition country, such as Ukraine, it is 
important to achieve sustained economic development. To do so, the country should 
establish some powerful financial institutions able to allocate resources and provide 
productivity enhancing investments. The development of independent financial 
institutions is also one of the indirect indicators used to estimate the level and 
achievements of democratic reform in the country. 
This research has two main aims. The first is to study the economic crime 
phenomenon in broad terms, attempting to provide a theoretical framework to 
understand the causes of the economic crime problems in Ukraine. The second aim is, 
by conducting an expert study, to identify the most important problems with regard to 
the development of financial institutions in the country and the disruption caused by 
economic crime. To pursue this task, a two-staged project was designed. The first 
stage is the expert study, aiming to understand the general situation in Ukraine and to 
select an area for more specific study. The second stage is comprised of the study ofa 
selected type of financial institution in the country (case study: banking in Ukraine), 
and the study of the socio-economic environment (case study: corruption and law 
enforcement). Both studies are presented in the main body of this work. 
To fulfil the main aim of the second stage, the following topics should be considered: 
current trends in illegal economic activity; the most vulnerable sectors of the financial 
market in Ukraine; the group of perpetrators; and the impact of economic crime on 
the development of the financial market in Ukraine. 
1.2 Introduction to the basic concepts 
1.2.1 Economic crime 
This section will briefly describe the terminology employed in the research. The 
following definitions can not cover all aspects of the problem studied, but 
nevertheless they proyide some basic understanding of the concepts used. 
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The present study considers economic crime as a latent social phenomenon, which is 
difficult to discover, investigate and prosecute. The official statistics represent only a 
small proportion of crimes committed in the economic area. There is no easy answer 
to the question as to what the real scope of the problem is. 
What does economic crime mean? There is no consensus in the academic world as to 
what should be defined as economic crime. " ... it includes fraud, ... activities which 
tend to undermine the integrity and efficacy of the economic institutions of the 
state"(Rider, 1990). Such activities may include "corruption (government and 
corporate), customs and excise fraud, future and derivatives fraud, insurance fraud, 
fraud in international trade. Tax evasion and the misuse of tax havens, underground 
banking and money laundering" (Ledeneva, 2000, p.4). The present author will 
analyse the term economic crime according to its three main components: tax evasion, 
corruption and money laundering. These components are connected to each other and 
sometimes one can not exist without the other. 
1.2.2 Corruption 
Corruption has many definitions, and all of them centred around private profit or 
private gain. For example, the World Bank and Transparency International define 
corruption as the abuse of public office for private gain and the misuse of public 
power for private profit, respectively. The Council of Europe (1998) explains 
corruption as bribery and any other behaviour in relation to persons entrusted with 
responsibilities in the public sector, which violates their duties that follow from their 
status as public officials, private employee, independent agent and that is aimed at 
gaining undue advantage of any kind for themselves or for others. 
The scope of corruption depends on a number of indicators, such as the government 
involvement in economic activity and the decision-making process, the transparency 
and clearly written laws and regulations of a country, and, the last but not least, the 
wages of public servants (Tanzi, 1998). 
1.2.3 Money laundering and tax evasion 
In criminology, the term money laundering is generally defined as an activity aimed 
at concealing unlawful sources of sums of money. The juridical terminology can be 
taken from the 1998 UN Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotics Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances. Money laundering can be considered as "the concealment 
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or disguise of the true nature, source, location, disposition, movement, rights with 
respect to, or ownership of property, knowing that such property is derived from an 
offence" (United Nations, 1998). 
Money laundering can be distinguished according to legitimate and illegitimate 
pUrposes. The illegitimate purpose is "to avoid detection by tax investigators or 
criminal law enforcement agents" (Chaikin, 1998) and the legitimate "to conceal 
funds from public competitors, social, religious, or other institutions - for such 
reasons as maintaining confidentiality or privacy, preserving a reputation or 
competitive advantage- so that no criminal conduct is involved" (Ibid., p.470). Illegal 
money laundering presents a danger to the society because it allows criminals to 
consolidate power and penetrate the legitimate economy. It is also considered a 
lifeblood of organised crime and inevitable tool with the help of which the 
underground economy can grow (Chaikin, 1998). 
Money laundering has three main stages: placement, layering and integration. 
Placement may help to the physical disposal of the bulk of cash proceeds by means of 
traditional financial institutions, like banks or non-regulatory financial business like 
exchange houses (Savona, 1997). In 1984, the US President's Commission on 
Organised Crime warned that 'every financial institution, including banks, savings 
and loans institutions, currency exchanges, and casinos, should assume that it is a 
potential target for use by organised crime in money laundering schemes' (The US 
President's Commission on Organised Crime, 1984). "Layering helps separating 
illicit proceeds from their source by creating one or more layers of financial 
transactions designed to interrupt any audit trial" (Savona, 1997). Integration is the 
final step of money laundering, there the criminally-derived wealth is introduced into 
the legitimate economy ''without arousing suspicion and with an apparently legitimate 
Source" (Savona, 1997). 
Money laundering is a very complex phenomenon itself. It includes a great number of 
violations of different regulations and rules. It is also connected to tax evasion and 
corruption, and is sometimes called the 'blood supply' of the last two offences. It is 
actually the means with which to conduct an illegal act. 
One of the aims of this research is to study the impact of economic crime on the 
financial market. At this point of research, we need to establish our working 
definitions regarding the financial sphere. What do we understand by such a broad 
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definition as the financial market and which sectors of the financial market do we 
need to consider? 
1.2.4 The financial market 
In a simple explanation, the financial market is the 'place' to raise capital and match 
those who want capital with those who have it. It sounds like a very simple task. A 
well-functioning financial system will have" ... high domestic savings, private 
investment and growth in a market economy, channelling domestic savings into fixed 
investment and imposing financial discipline on enterprises" (Fries, 1996, p.57). 
In this study, the following sectors will represent the financial market: commercial 
and savings banks; insurance companies; trust companies and investment funds; the 
money market! foreign currency exchange market; the stock and bond market; and the 
central bank. 
The tenn "emerging market" entered the vocabulary of the investment world as a 
reference to identify the development of stock markets. It was first used by the 
International Finance Corporation when work on the concept of country fund and 
capital market development in the less- developed regions of the world had begun 
(Mobius, 1996). 
"Emerging stock markets can be variously defined. On the one hand, 
'emerging' implies that change is underway, that a market is growing in size 
and sophistication in contrast to a market that is relatively small, inactive, and 
gives little appearance of change. Alternatively, emerging market in any 
developing economy, no matter how well developed the stock market itself 
may be, with the implication that the stock market's potential to emerge 
further is strongly linked to the economy's overall potential"(IFC, 1994). 
There are a lot of different perspectives with which to consider the definition 
'emerging market'. Some researchers employ the definition in reference to stock 
market development, while others refer to it as markets which represent less than a 
certain percentage of all the world's stock market capitalisation. For example, an 
emerging market can be identified as a market which represents less than 3 percent of 
the world's stock market capitalisation. Also, it is possible to use such an indicator of 
market development as the number of companies listed (Mobius, 1996). Mobius 
considered markets to be 'emerging' either because they have low or middle per 
capita incomes, or they have undeveloped capital markets, or they are not 
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industrialised (Ibid., p.l 0). In 1992, Ukraine and all the former USSR countries were 
added to the list of 'emerging'markets. 
1.3 Research hypotheses 
The objective of this research is to understand the current state of economic crime in 
different sectors of the financial market in Ukraine. This is a descriptive study, which 
aims to produce the actual hypotheses during the expert interviews. However, even at 
this stage it is possible to state some research hypotheses. As Sarantakos writes, 
hypotheses "help to rationalise the research process by concentrating on the 
important aspects of the research topic by avoiding peripheral and less significant 
issues" (Sarantakos, 1998, p.137). 
The general hypothesis is that the level of the success of democratic reform in 
transition countries can be judged according to advances in the transformation of the 
financial institutions. The more specific hypotheses are: grand scale economic crime 
is associated with state officials and politicians; high quality of the law on statutes is 
associated with a high level of development of financial institutions; and high quality 
law on corruption is associated with better preventative measures, and a substantial 
increase in the number of cases considered. 
The consideration of the results of the expert study and the analysis of the statistics 
will show whether the research hypotheses are accepted or rejected. 
1.4 Methods of data collection 
To answer the questions stated in the aim of the study, a variety of methods of data 
collection are used. A review of the current studies in the area provides valuable 
information about economic crime problems in different countries and at different 
times. An expert study on Ukraine allows discussion of different aspects of white-
collar crime in the country and provides the research with insights into the economic 
crime phenomenon. 
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1.4.1 The search for reliable data 
Of course, the picture created by this study is far from complete. The problem that 
surrounds most of the criminological research is that one can never be sure what 
percentage of crime went undetected. This is a particularly difficult problem for 
research conducted in the area of white-collar crime and economic crime. As one 
respondent said, "I am pretty sure that almost all our [Ukrainian] officials are 
involved in illegal economic activity, but how to prove it and how to know exactly 
what they do?" The difficulties of detecting and prosecuting white-collar crime are 
doubled in a system where corruption is endemic. 
1.4.2 Expert study 
The major source of information for this study is an expert group interview. The 
experts' interview was chosen as a method to collect opinions of knowledgeable 
experts. This work presents official data, such as data collected by different 
government and semi-government agencies and the reports of some regulatory bodies. 
In order 'to bring life' to all of these sources the expert study is conducted. 
The advantages of expert focus group interview are: 
• It provides data from a group of experts who have been involved in the 
area of financial regulation or who have experience of working in different sectors of 
the financial market and have an understanding of the insights of economic crime 
problems. 
• The researcher-mediator has an opportunity to interact directly with the 
experts to obtain deeper levels of meaning and identify some important connections. 
• It is quick and cost effective method of data collection which can function 
as a excellent addition to traditional crime statistics. 
The use of the questionnaire surveys has long been discussed in social science 
(Clinard & Quinney, 1973; Reiss & Biderman, 1980; Aromaa & Lehti, 1999). The 
author believes that such surveys may contribute relevant data, and improve and 
update statistics. "Survey results should not be interpreted in a vacuum, but should 
rather be validated by means of other information to the extent that this is possible" 
(Bergqvist, 2001, p. 136). 
There are two groups of experts who constitute the general sample of the expert 
study. The first group of respondents was formed from experts who are responsible 
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either for the introduction of new legislation in the financial area or the enforcement 
agency, investigators and prosecutors. For example, in Ukraine this group was drawn 
from the following organisations and professionals: the Association of 
Entrepreneurs; corporations/private business; enforcement agencies, including the 
police, the prosecutor's office, lawyers and concerned departments of the National 
Security Service; representatives of local and national government who sit on the 
committees on financial development or related to economic crime matters; deputies 
of local and supreme councils who sit on the committees on financial development or 
related to economic crime matters; and the NGOs concerned. The second group 
consists of those experts who actively operate in the area of financial market. In 
Ukraine this group consists of representatives from players in the financial sectors, 
including commercial and savings banks, insurance companies, trust companies and 
investment funds, the money market! foreign currency exchange market, the stock 
and bond market, and the central bank. 
To select the respondents for the expert study the purposive sampling has been used. 
"In purposive or judgmental sampling the investigator does not necessarily have a 
quota to fill from within various strata ... but neither does he or she just pick the 
nearest warm bodies as in convenient sampling. Rather, the researcher uses his or her 
own judgement about which respondents to choose, and picks only those who best 
meet the purpose of the study" (Bailey, 1982, p., 99). Therefore, one of the 
advantages of this type of sampling is that it is possible to use one's skills and 
knowledge to create the sample and to choose respondents. 
1.4.3 Access 
The present author was fortunate to participate in the project on legislative drafting in 
Ukraine carried out by the Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, University of London, 
where, during summer 2001, the author met a group of senior civil servants from 
Ukraine. The author conducted a few interviews that summer, and later on, went back 
to Ukraine, where people whom the author knew from the project introduced the 
author to some experts. The interviews with the representatives from the financial 
market were conducted during the author's field trip to Ukraine in spring 2001. The 
author fonner colleagues from the Kharkiv National University helped to arrange 
some of the interviews. 
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1.5 Sample size 
Usually, the size of the sample depends on the size of population studied. There are 
no general rules warning how to develop the sample size of the general population, so 
it was rather difficult to estimate the sample size for our expert study. The present 
study aimed to conduct 25 interviews. This is considered to be a reasonable number 
given the time frame and the cost constraints involved. 
1.6 Questionnaires/lnterview schedules 
The interview schedules have been employed as an instrument of data collection. The 
difference between an interview schedule and a questionnaire is in the way of filling 
in the form, in that in last instrument it is the researcher who fills in the form. 
1.6.1 The interview schedule's construction 
The interview schedule consists of an introductory statement and three parts I. The 
first part is an introduction in which there are four questions. The first question 
identifies the job profile, the second is about the political platform or political ideas 
which the respondent follows, and the last two questions ask to name the most 
popular types of economic crime in the country and any personal encounters with 
economic crime. The present author believes that it is essential to ask the last two 
questions in the beginning as it will, first of all, give the respondent a clear idea of 
what types of economic crime we are talking about and, secondly, enable the 
researcher to obtain information about the respondent's personal encounters with 
economic crime. 
Table 1. Questionnaire: the introduction. 
1. Introduction Type of question 
1.1. Job profile open-ended 
1.2. Political ideas 
1.3. Most popular fin. crimes closed-ended with 'other' 
1.4. Personal encounters response cateKOlY included 
The second part of the interview schedule is about economic crime and the financial 
sector. This is the main part of the interview where the present author hopes to obtain 
valuable information about the most 'corrupt' sectors of the financial market. The 
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section starts with the introductory question "Which sector of economy may be 
named as the most affected by economic crime?". This question is a very important 
one for countries in transition. Recent studies suggest that some sectors of the 
economies of transition countries have been monopolised or ruled by corrupt 
officials (Panchenko, 2000). The second question is the key to the questionnaire as it 
aimed to identify the sectors of financial markets most affected by economic crime. 
The nature of the identified economic crimes is explored in the third question ("Please 
specify the exact nature of economic crime which occur in the operations of the 
institutions below"). To help our respondents a table was created. In the first column 
is a list of financial sectors and in the second column possible types of economic 
crime are provided. In the fourth question, respondents are asked to identify the 
impact of economic crime on the development of each sector of the financial market. 
In order to do so, the same table as in previous question is used. This is an attitude 
question for which we designed a scale ranging from positive to negative impact. 
Each scale of response is given a number which must be inserted into the right-hand 
column. Our response scale can be generalised in the following way: 
'Waking up' the functioning of the sector (positive impact)/ prevents the future 
development (negative impact)/ no real impact at all. 
The section ends with a question asking the respondents to summarise the general 
• f 
Impact of the identified crimes on the development of financial market. 
Table 2. Questionnaire: Economic crime and financial markets. 
2. Economic crime and financial Types of question 
market 
2.1. Sectors of economy and economic closed with 'other' response category 
crime included 
2.2. Sectors of financial market and 
economic crime 
2.3. Nature of economic crime open-ended 
2.4. Impact of economic crime attitude ~uestion (an attitude scalel 
2.5. General impact open-ended 
The final section of the questionnaire pays specific attention to the problem of 
regulation of the financial sector. The section starts with a question about the 
underlying motivation to conduct economic crime. The second question is about the 
adequacy of the existing regulatory framework. This is a filter question. By answering 
I See appendix 1 for the actual questionnaire. 
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'yes', the respondent goes to the next question (4.3.) which is about the reason for the 
existence of economic crime, and by answering 'no', he or she skip Question 4.3. and 
goes to Question 4.4. which is about the adjustments which need to be made to 
improve the existing framework. Question 4.5. is about the nature of the existing 
framework and is a filter question as well. If the respondent thinks that the existing 
regulatory framework is over-constrained then the next question is "What 
relief/liberalisation needs to be implemented to improve the existing regulatory 
framework?". If the respondent thinks that the regulatory framework is under-
constrained, then the next question is "What additional regulation/strengthening 
should be introduced into the regulatory framework? 
Table 3.Questionnaire: Regulation and financial market. 
3. Regulation and the financial Types of question 
market 
3.1. The underlying motivation closed with 'other' response category 
included 
3.2. The adequacy of the existing closed filter question, 
framework if 'yes'-3.3.; if 'no'-3.4. 
3.3. The reason for economic crime closed with 'other' response category 
included 
3.4. Need for restructuring Closed 
3.5. Over or under constrained closed filter question, 
if 'over' -3.6.; if 'under' - 3.7. 
3.6. Relieflliberalisation o~en-ended 
3.7. Additional regulation/strengthening open-ended 
1.7 Secondary data analysis 
The study employs a wide variety of sources of information. The analysis includes 
such sources as government reports, reports of different financial agencies, as well as 
reports provided by the World Bank and IMF. The Ukrainian official financial 
statistics bulletins have been studied to find out data on the development of different 
sectors of the financial market in the country. This is a valuable source of information 
which will be employed to cross check the data obtained from the case studies. The 
statistics published monthly by the National Bank of Ukraine is employed in the case 
study on banking. 
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1.7.1 Reliability of the official data 
The use of official statistics in social research has been discussed for over a long 
period of time (May 2001; Bulmer 1984). The reliability of official statistics is a 
major issue in developed countries with long democratic traditions. There are three 
perspectives in considering official statistics: realist, institutionalist and radical (May, 
2001). The realist perspective considers official statistics as objective; for 
institutionalists, official statistics are a useful tool to measure the 'organisation's 
behaviour or the discretionary actions of individuals within them, rather than the 
phenomenon itself' (May, 2001, p.81); the radical perspective argues that statistics 
are useful to generate ideas about the dynamics and structure of society (Ibid., p.81). 
The credibility of official statistics in the former Soviet Union are a subject for 
another study. During the Soviet period, statistics were often 'abused' in order to hide 
negative tendencies in society, for example, drug use and violent crime, and 
underline only those tendencies which were in line with official ideology of that time. 
In order to show a better performance from hospitals doctors, low level statistics 
would be manipulated in a way which was beneficial for them and then submit their 
data to the next stage where, again, the data would be 'corrected' according to the 
results expected. This tradition is still alive and it is difficult to change people's 
practices in just one decade, even though the general situation and ideology have 
changed. The same issue exists with official financial statistics. Not only does the 
country need to change attitudes towards the collection of data, but also there is a 
need to establish new agencies responsible for data collection. However, the major 
concern is not in finding an agency to collect the data, but in the consistency of the 
data collected. The problem experienced by many former Soviet Union countries is 
that with the introduction of new legislative acts, and in some cases even the whole 
Criminal Code, a lot of new 'corpora delictis' emerged (Fituni, 2000). Fituni argues, 
that due to certain changes in Russian criminal law, a significant part ofpre-1997 
statistical data became incompatible with later figures (Fituni, 2000, p.20). In 
Ukraine, with the development of the banking industry in the beginning of the 90s, 
the question as to who would collect statistics on banking and how was very serious. 
Now, When we look back to the decade of the 90s, it is obvious that comparison of 
reSUlts from different years presents a serious problem. The National Bank of Ukraine 
started collecting statistics on banking in the early 90s employing one set of 
indicators. By 1996, the indicators had changed to adapt statistics to some 
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international standards. Official statistics on insurance companies is still a big 
problem. There is no single agency responsible for data collection. To resolve this 
problem, many researchers compare official data with estimates provided by experts 
working in the field or use some indirect indicators (see Chapter 4.5 Shadow 
economy in Ukraine for a discussion of the indirect measures of the unofficial 
economy). 
Taking into consideration a number of difficulties arising in regard to the use of 
official statistics in transition countries, the adoption of the institutionalists' approach 
towards statistics appears to be the answer. This research will use official statistics, 
understanding that they represent only the 'tip of the iceberg' (May, 2001, p.,81). 
To summarise, this section has identified the main elements of the present research. 
Particular attention has been given to the methodological issues of the expert study 
and the questionnaire employed during the study. The expert study is conducted to 
single out the problematic sectors and to narrow the topic of the research to the 
consideration of some specified sectors of the market. 
In next two chapters, the author discusses the theoretical issues relating to economic 
crime and the financial market. Chapter 2 deals with the interdisciplinary approach 
towards understanding the essence of economic crime and tries to elaborate on the 
framework in order to consider the phenomenon from the perspective of a transition 
country. 
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Chapter 2. An interdisciplinary approach to the phenomenon of economic 
crime 
2.1 Complexity of the study of economic crime 
Economic crime is a complex phenomenon. A number of disciplines should be 
considered in order to understand it. Among them are those such as psychology, 
sociology and criminology. An interdisciplinary approach helps to find answers to 
such questions as how white-collar criminals differ from other criminals and what are 
the most effective preventative measures? In the present research, we are also 
interested in how economic crime criminals from advanced countries differ from their 
'colleagues' in transition countries? 
A micro perspective on deviant behaviour employs a variety of explanations made 
under the sociological, psychological and criminological theories of crime. 
Sociologists, criminologists and psychologists have been trying to explain criminal 
conduct for a long time. The lines dividing their explanations are difficult to establish 
because these three disciplines are interrelated. Sociology looks at social classes, 
culture and organization, attempts to identify causes of criminality in social structures 
and cultural factors. However, this can be done through psychological explanations 
of personality and psychological process at the individual level (Blackburn, 1983, p. 
87). It is known that if singled out, the explanations proposed by the above theories 
may be exposed to limitations. To study white-collar crime with a specific 
Criminological theory is to reduce significantly the level of understanding of the 
problem. White -collar crime includes some hidden elements which limit the 
understanding of the cause. What is known to general public, the cases which have 
been publicised - may be just the tip of the iceberg: just a small proportion of the 
crimes committed. The methodology of studying such types of crime as white-collar 
crime presents some serious issues. For a long time, researchers focused on the 
offenders known to authorities, and rarely made an attempt to research the causes of 
the "socially advantaged" crimes. 
From the macro perspective, the social schools attempting to study deviant behaviour 
can be divided into the classical, neo classical, positivist, and anti-positivism schools. 
Positivism dominated views on crime and criminals in the 20th century. Positivists 
believe in methods employed by natural sciences, in the so-called "unity of scientific 
methods" (Taylor, Walton, and Young, 1973, p. 11). They argue that it is necessary to 
focus on the individual offender, rather than on the criminal act. According to the 
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positivists, low social class position necessarily leads to poverty and inequality. That 
is why they argue that the low social class's position is one of the major social 
Sources of criminality. This perspective explains criminality amongst the poor, but 
says little about criminality among privileged class. Opposing the positivists, the 
classical school of criminology focuses on offenders' conduct and considers it the 
conduct of free will (Beccaria, 1963). According to the classical school, all men are 
liable to commit crime, so it is important to focus on the seriousness of the crime and 
determine punishment proportionally. Critical criminologists criticised positivists for 
their attempt to exclude the social arrangement and the environment from the study, 
and for treating people as passive agents (Taylor, Walton, and Young, 1973). 
Gottfredson and Hirschi argued that invention of the concept of white-collar crime 
had two desirable consequences: it falsified poverty-pathology theory, and it revealed 
the criminality of the privileged classes and their impunity to the law (Gottfredson 
and Hirschi, 1990, p.181). 
2.2 The general theory of crime and white-collar offenders 
It has always been tempting to create a general theory of crime, to be able to explain 
all sorts of criminal conduct employing one theory. Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990) 
introduced a self-control theory as an attempt to consider the main causes of criminal 
behaviour, suggesting that low self-control in interaction with criminal opportunity is 
the major cause of criminality. They argued that those people with a lack of self 
control do not have an understanding of guilt, so they hurt people. They describe 
criminals as people lacking normal abilities to regulate themselves and who sustain 
opportunities to commit crimes. So, white-collar criminals are people with low self-
control and inclined to follow momentary impulse without consideration of the long-
term costs of such behaviour (Gottfredson and Hirschi, 1990, p.190-191). This may 
happen due to the unsuccessful socialization and the failure to learn self-control. 
Studies conducted in different countries found that about 25% of the variation in self-
reported delinquency and crime could be explained by lack of self-esteem (Ellis and 
Walsh, 2000, p.323). Such variables as attachment to the family, school performance, 
strong belief in conventional values and religious belief, and employment are among 
the variables employed to explain criminality. For Gottfredson and Hirschi there is no 
distinction between the offender perpetrating a "crime in a suit" and a "crime in the 
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street" as the offenders in both cases are likely to have similar characteristics 
(Gottfredson and Hirschi, 1990, p.200). 
The general crime theory has received wide attention and criticism. Grasmick, Tittle, 
Bursik, and Arneklev critically assessed the core elements of the proposed theory, by 
conducting a study which measured self-control and opportunity for crime. The 
authors supported the idea that fraud can be predicted by using a combination of both 
low self- esteem and opportunity for crime. However, regardless of the level of self-
control, the opportunity to commit crime was a significant factor (Grasmick, Tittle, 
Bursik and Arneklev, 1993, p.24). The absence of effective crime-prevention 
situational factors had been named as one of the disadvantages of the theory 
(Krambia-Kaparadis, 2001, p. 22). It has been argued that general crime theory 
employed a number of explanatory elements which are utilised to explain how crimes 
are possible, namely, "opportunity, a suitable target, a free-thinking but basically self-
interested hedonistic individual lacking self-control and making free-choice" 
(Krambia-Kaparadis, 2001, p. 22). However, the theory's explanatory power had 
been described as moderate and in case of serious criminality, even incomplete (Ellis 
and Walsh, 2000, p. 326). 
2.3 The psychological theory of crime 
Traditionally, psychology has been concerned with the individual aspects of crime, 
attempting to answer such questions as who becomes a criminal and why. Blackburn 
noticed that most of the early psychological research on criminals was conducted by 
prison physicians (Blackburn, 1983, p. 32). In the USA at the beginning of the 20th 
century, researchers mainly focused on the causes of juvenile delinquency, 
correlation between intelligence and crime, and psycho-dynamic theory (Ibid., p. 32). 
Blackburn considers three general psychological theories from psychoanalysis 
(Blackburn, 1983, p. 136). Psychoanalysis claims that failure to create the following 
conditions can cause criminality : first, successful socialization which depends on the 
success of social values transmitted through childhood; second, a developed parent-
child relationship; third, a normal family relationship avoiding unconscious conflicts 
(Blackburn, 1983, p. 116). The theory of personality created by Eysenck (1977) 
considered three sets of propositions. First, the descriptive model of personality, 
which relates to three dimensions, Neurotic -Stability, Psychoticism-Superego, and 
Extraversion-Introversion. On the basis of these three models, Eysenck argues about 
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the biological basis of personality. The third element is a socialisation theory. 
Eysenck's theory predicts different levels of criminality depending on which 
characteristics are the best suited to the individual (extroverts, individuals who are 
high on neuroticism and psychoticism tend to show high levels of criminal 
behaviour). Cognitive -development theories deal with socialisation and moral 
development. Children construct moral judgements through their experiences of 
social interaction and these may later affect their judgement on what is right and 
wrong. Reckless (1967) suggested that good concept of self is an obstacle to deviant 
acts, "the self factor can explain selective resistance to deviant patterns or veering 
away from the street comer and delinquency" (Reckless, 1961, p.446). The impact of 
positive concept of self was mainly studied in cases involving juvenile delinquency. 
Cressey conducted a study of criminal violation of financial trust, interviewing those 
convicted on financial fraud charges (Cressey, 1953). Cressey's theory suggested 
consideration of three self-factors: a concept of self, awareness and rationalisation. 
Rationalisation has a special place in this theory. According to Cressey, it is necessary 
and essential to criminal violation of trust. People do not invent rationalisation 
techniques, but use those available in their culture. The way people rationalise their 
activity may be linked to the manner in which trust is violated and the socio-
economic position of violators (Cressey, 1953, p. 137). 
"Trusted persons become trust violators when they conceive of themselves as 
having a financial problem which may is non-shareable, are aware that this 
problem can be secretly resolved by violation of the position of fmancial trust, 
and are able to apply to their own conduct in that situation verbalisations 
which enable them to adjust their conceptions of themselves as trusted persons 
with their conceptions of themselves as users of the entrusted funds or 
property" (Cressey, 1953, p.30). 
Cressey's findings are considered to be controversial because of the methodology he 
had chosen. The respondents selected for the interview were in prison, the place 
where white-collar criminals were less likely to be. 
Kaplan (1980) considered the importance of self-esteem to prevent criminality. The 
self-esteem motive is defined as the personal need to maximise the experience of 
Positive self-attitudes and to minimize the experience of negative attitudes (Kaplan, 
1980, p.8). It is suggested that self-esteem derives from competence and confidence 
20 
in achievements, and acceptance in social relationships. Failures in these areas may 
lead to self deregulation and subsequent criminality (Blackburn, 1983, p.199). 
Social psychologists consider a number of self-factors, such as self-concept, image, 
understanding of limited opportunities, norm erosion and neutralisation (or 
rationalisation). All these factors are named as possible determinants of a tendency 
towards or away from criminal behaviour (Reckless, 1967). For example, Rose-
Ackerman stressed the importance of the self-control factor. "There is one human 
motivator that is both universal and central to explaining the divergent experiences of 
different countries. That motivator is self-interest, including an interest in the well-
being of one's family and peer group. Critics call it greed. Economists call it utility 
maximisation" (Rose-Ackerman, 1999, p.2). Criminologists call it corruption and 
grand corruption. 
2.4 The sociological theory of crime 
Most sociological theories of crime focus on criminality and attempts to find social 
and cultural factors which predetermine criminality. The social environment and sub-
cultural theories are represented by the "differential association", "social learning", 
"strain", "labelling", and "disorganisation" theories. 
The term 'white- collar crime' was introduced into social science by Edwin 
Sutherland more than half a century ago. His primary concern was 'crime in relation 
to business' (Sutherland, 1940, p.,38). Sutherland examined the criminal behaviour of 
70 of the largest US companies and 15 public utility corporations (Sutherland, 1949). 
He felt there was a lack of an integrated approach between sociology and economics. 
"The economists are well acquainted with business methods but not accustomed to 
consider them from the point of view of crime; many sociologists are well acquainted 
with crime but not accustomed to consider it as expressed in business" (ibid., p.38). 
According to Sutherland, white- collar crime in business mainly focuses on "the form 
of misrepresentation in financial statements of corporations, manipulation in the stock 
exchange, commercial bribery, bribery of public officials directly or indirectly in 
order to secure favourable contracts and legislation, misrepresentation in advertising 
and salesmanship, embezzlement and misapplication of funds, short weight and 
measures and misreading of commodities, tax frauds, misapplication of funds in 
receivership and bankruptcies" (ibid., p.40). 
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Sutherland was also among the first sociologists to stress the financial cost of white-
collar crime, "the damages this type of crime imposed on social institutions, the 
creation of distrust and social disorganisation on a large scale" (ibid., p.42). He 
applied the definition to those' respected', 'socially' accepted and 'approved' and 
'looked up to'. Sutherland also stressed the importance of such an issue as the 
implementation of the criminal law that apply to the lower and upper class criminals. 
"The crimes of the lower class are handled by policemen, prosecutors, and judges 
with penal sanctions in the form of fines, imprisonment, and death. The crimes of the 
upper class either result in no official action at all, or result in suits for damages in 
civil courts, or are handled by inspectors and by administrative boards or 
commissions with penal sanctions in the form of warnings, orders to cease and desist, 
occasionally the loss of a license, and only in extreme cases by fines or prison 
sentences. Thus, the white- collar criminals are segregated administratively from 
other criminals and largely as a consequences of this, are not regarded as real 
criminals by themselves, the general public, or the criminologists" (ibid., p. 45). 
Sutherland wrote this in 1940 and his major concern was the moral one, namely the 
inequality of those people from privileged and disadvantaged backgrounds, those 
who represent the low and the upper classes. He noted that "although the concept of 
'status' is not entirely clear, it seems to be based principally upon power" (Sutherland, 
1949, p., 224). 
The differential association theory proposed by Sutherland can be summarised in the 
following propositions. First, that criminal behaviour is learned, similar to any other 
types of social behaviour, and it is not inherited. Second, criminal behaviour is 
learned through the internalisation and acceptance of "definitions favourable to 
violations of law relative to definitions unfavourable to law violations (Ellis and 
Walsh, 2000, pp. 340). Third, the more the individual has contact with others who 
violate the law, the more chances that the individual will adopt the law violations 
shown by others to himselflherself. The principle of differential association lies in 
fact that an individual becomes delinquent because of "an excess of definitions 
favourable to violation of law over definitions unfavourable to violation of law 
(Sutherland and Cressey, 1969, p.430). According to this theory, social 
disorganisation can lead to high crime rates. This learning theory had been criticised 
for the extensive use of vague psychological assumptions about human learning 
(Blackburn, 1983, p.90) . However, some authors suggest that this theory may be 
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useful in explaining the white-collar offences (Krambia-Kapardis, 2001). For 
example, differential association theory is useful in understanding such misconduct as 
an intentional victimisation a company by someone who illegally obtained a position 
of trust within the company. In this case, the association with other criminals helps to 
acquire necessary skills in committing fraud (Ibid., p.37). 
2.5 Neutralisation technique theory 
One reason why offender who has conventional values fail to prevent deviant conduct 
may be found in what Sykes and Matza called techniques of neutralisation (Sykes and 
Matza, 1957). There are five techniques of neutralisation: the denial of responsibility, 
the denial of injury, the denial of the victim, condemnation of the condemners, and 
appeal to high loyalties. An illustration of neutralisation is provided by the beliefs that 
some businessmen in transition countries described as association with their tax 
evasion, such as "everybody does-it", or "it's not a major crime compared to what our 
officials do". 
2.6 Control theory 
In the context of this theory, control is a restraining factor, presented in the individual 
in the form of norms, such as authority of social institutions, like family and schools 
(Blackburn, 1983, p. 91). Hirschi suggested that the following four correlated 
elements of the bond are essential to "grow" the law-obedient citizens: attachment to 
others, commitment to conventional goals, involvement in conventional pursuits, 
belief in the moral validity of conventional values (Balckburn, 1983, p.91). The 
theory suggested by Hirschi was concerned with general criminality, and not with 
specific offences. There is a disagreement among the criminologists as to whether it is 
Possible to explain grand scale economic crime by employing this theory (Krambia-
Kapardis, 2001, p.39). 
2.7 Situational crime prevention 
Clarke (1980) argues that when considering criminal conduct emphasis should be 
made on choices and decisions made by the offenders. This would allow change of 
the preventative options, for example, to increase the risk of being caught. "It would 
be better for the burden of crime reduction to be gradually shifted away from the 
Criminal justice system, which may be inherently selective and punitive in its 
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operation, to preventative measures, whose social cost may be more equitably 
distributed among all members of society" (Clarke, 1980, p.144). Applying this 
theory to the understanding of white-collar criminals conduct, one could argue that 
the creation of severe penal sanctions and peoples understanding of these sanctions 
could work as a crime reduction mechanism. 
2.8 Examples of empirical research on white-collar crime 
Gibbons (1979) noted that "in many areas of sociology it is possible to list a 
considerable number of important contributors ... , but in criminology, Sutherland 
stands virtually alone" (1979, p., 65). The majority of social science researchers agree 
that Sutherland opened a new research area for social science, however he "did not 
establish a 'school' or research tradition" (Punch, 1996, p.,51). Sutherland's study 
was followed by only a few scientific investigations. Among them being a study of 
business violation of price (Clinard, 1952), the study of the wholesale meat industry 
(Hartung, 1950), interviewing embezzlers incarcerated in federal prisons (Cressey, 
1953). 
In the mid 50-s and 60-s researchers focused less on the moral concern and the 
attention shifted towards the consideration of 'occupational crime', the study of crime 
in industries. It was suggested that general culture can be a cause of crime. Taff and 
England (1964) argued that firstly, "our society involves the relative tolerance, 
acceptance, and even the approval of explorative behaviour of either the white-collar 
crime type, or that of the non-criminal exploiter"; secondly, "organised businessmen 
are not inclined to be specific in defining the right ways to conduct business"; thirdly, 
"socially dangerous people (causers of the causes)- these dangerous people are those 
who, not necessarily technically criminal themselves, nevertheless create conditions 
which result in crime or serve as examples consciously or unconsciously imitated by 
the potential criminal" (Ibid., p., 17). 
Leonard and Weber (1977) studied criminogenic market forces in the area of auto-
makers and dealers and suggested that "insufficient attention has been focused by 
SOCiologists on the extent to which market structure- that is, the economic power 
available to certain corporations in concentrated industries- may generate criminal 
conduct"(1977, p., 134). According to the economic literature market structure 
involves such aspects as: 
1. "seller concentration, or market share of the leading producers; 
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2. buyer concentration, or market share of principal buyers; 
3. product differentiation, or extent to which the product can be distinguished 
in the customer's mind through refinements, advertising, and so forth; 
4. entry barriers- e.g., costs of capital, patents, economics of sale, advertising 
expenses; 
5. price elasticity demand; 
6. growth rate of demand." (Ibid., p.134) 
Leonard and Weber argued that 1,3, and 4 are the most important issues. 
Their concern was the concentrated market structure which could generate 'excessive 
power in the hands of a few corporations' leading to engagement in 'unethical activity 
against the public'. They suggested that 'competitive forces rather than government 
[should] do the regulations'. The term 'conditioned crime' was introduced to identify 
'a crime stimulated by conditions over which the dealer has little control'. 
The classical definition of white-collar crime suggested by Sutherland had been the 
subject of discussion and criticism for almost half a century. Sutherland definition had 
been considered as very restrictive in terms of offender class. "The requirement that a 
crime cannot be a white-collar crime unless perpetrated by a person of 'high social 
status' is an unfortunate mixing of definition and explanation" (Braithwaite, 1985, p., 
3). One of the major developments in the white-collar crime study was the shift of the 
focus from the characteristics of offenders to the characteristics of offences. Edelhertz 
(1970) formulated the alternative definition of white-collar crime. He defined it as "an 
illegal act or series of illegal acts committed by non-physical means and by 
concealment or guile, to obtain money or property, or to obtain business or personal 
advantage" (1970, p., 7). According to some authors (Edelhertz, 1970, Edelhertz and 
Rogovin (1980), Braithwaite, (1985» this neutral to social standing definition is a 
crucial point for public policy. Braithwaite argued that "it is unacceptable for the state 
to target enforcement that is contingent on the status of the offender" (Braithwaite, 
1985, p.,18). 
Reiss and Biderman (1980) avoided the use of the word 'crime' and introduced the 
definition of white- collar law violations. "White- collar law violations are those 
violations of law to which penalties are attached and that involve the use of a 
violator'S position of significant power, influence, or trust in the legitimate economic 
or political institutional order for the purpose of illegal gain, or to commit an illegal 
act for personal or organisational gain" (Reiss and Biderman, 1980, p., 4). Punch 
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(1986) argues that such a definition has a few advantages over the previous ones. It 
helps to open up the area of private law, takes into consideration acts committed on 
behalf of the organisation and not only for personal gain (Punch, 1986, p., 55). 
The research conducted by Clinard and Yeager (1980) studied illegal corporate 
behaviour and difficulties involved in attempts to control such behaviour. The study 
involved 582 of the largest publicly owned corporations in the USA and examined 
legal violations brought by twenty-four federal agencies. Clinard and Yeager 
observed that 'corporate violations are exceedingly difficult to discover, to 
investigate, or to develop successfully as legal cases because of their extreme 
complexity and intricacy' (1980, p., 6). They define corporate crime as 'any act 
committed by corporations that is punished by the state, regardless of whether it is 
punished under administrative, civil, or criminal law' (1980, p., 16). 
Braithwaite (1985) discussed the advantages of white-collar crime division into 
occupational and corporate crime. "Occupational crime consists of offences 
committed by individuals for themselves in the course of their occupations and the 
offences of employees against their employers ... Corporate crime, in contrast defined 
as "the offences committed by corporate officials for the corporation and the offences 
of the corporation itselr' (Braithwaite, 1985, p., 19). Braithwaite argued that "while 
useful theories of white-collar crime have proved elusive, influential corporate or 
organisational crime theory is a possibility" (Braithwaite, 1985, p., 19). Tonry and 
Reiss (1993) argued that organisations 'are central offenders in many violations of 
law', organisations are responsible for creating climates 'where collective deviance is 
an acceptable answer to perceived institutional dilemmas (Tonry and Reiss, 1993, 
p.,1-5). 
Clinard and Yeager (1980) study of illegal corporate behaviour showed the 
difficulties related to the disclosure of illegal conduct. Clarke (1990) examined the 
characteristics of business crime and identified its major factors, which again proved 
the complexity of the phenomenon. Among such factors are: a) business crime takes 
place in the business environment and hence in a private context; b) business 
offenders are legitimately present at the scene; c) business offences are political 
because of their essentially contested character' and this can lead to protracted 
struggles in the public realm involving the mobilisation of considerable and powerful 
resources by the contending parties; d) there is fundamental ambiguity about business 
crime which is 'profound and pervasive'; e) it raises in acute form debate about the 
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balance between the 'private interest' and the 'public good'; 'the danger of unfettered 
private enterprise is that it generates into greed, ruthlessness, and deceit to the 
oppression of those insufficiently cunning, skilled, wealthy or powerful to protect 
themselves, and so polarises the haves from the have-nots' (Clarke 1990, p., 20-31). 
The list can be continued. It is possible to add such factors as the complexity of 
evidence and the location of offences. 
2.9 Red-collar crime: an application of the known theories to the realities 
of post-soviet countries 
The term "red-collar" crime was introduced by American researchers in the beginning 
of the 80-s to refer to crimes committed by those who occupy important positions in 
Soviet countries (Los, 1986). Party members, top-level state officials, ruling elite 
were among those who could potentially constitute the group of 'red-collar' 
criminals. Despite the fact that large scale bribery and embezzlement of state property 
were punishable by death in Soviet Union, these types of crimes were well practised 
in different republics. 
The majority of corruption cases reported involved officials and politicians from the 
Caucasian and Central Asian republics. For example, "in 1979, only a few years after 
the thorough reorganisation of the hierarchy of the Azerbaidzhan Republic, heads of 
three ministries were dismissed from their posts" (Los, 1986, p.4). In 1984, a 
plenary session of the Uzbekistan party pointed out that favouritism, personal loyalty 
and mercenary motives are present among some party members (Ibid., p. 5). 
The reason to prosecute corruption in a few selected republics was rather political. It 
gave high officials chance from one side to at least claim that corruption is tackled, 
and from the other side, it would not uncover the prevalence of corruption throughout 
the USSR. 
A widespread corruption was described by Simis, a former defense lawyer in Moscow 
for underground business (Simis, 1982). He writes that in the 1970s the Soviet 
Judicial system had been ravaged by two parallel scourges: dependence on Party and 
State authority and corruption. The author traced these roots of corruption in the 
judicial system from the end of the Second World War, when "a people's judge's 
monthly salary would just about cover the cost of dinner in a commercial restaurant" 
(p.69). According to Simis, at that time the prosecutor's offices and the judges were 
all trading in justice simply to obtain additional sources of income to live a decent 
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life. At the beginning of the 1960s, when the "anti-bribe raid" began, there were some 
courts in Moscow where not a single former people's judge or public prosecutor 
remained, since it had been necessary to replace whole corrupt groups with a 
completely new group (Simis, 1982). 
Los identified three types of red-collar crime, such as top-level corruption, crime 
against the central plan, and crimes against the principles of state production (Los, 
1986, pA). The Soviet type of economy was characterised by the lack of incentives, 
and ineffective organisation of production processes. These had been considered as 
opportunities for the introduction of illegal incentives and increased productivity 
(Los, 1986, p. 14). Sometimes greater productivity was achieved by simply 
improvements introduced to the organisation of production process. Surplus goods 
could be sold privately at a big profit due to the use of free state resources and black 
market prices. Los considered illegal parallel enterprises as "the most feasible 
solution to the profit -seeking habits of many executives in communist countries" 
(Ibid., p.1S). Widespread use of the double record keeping was named as one of the 
socio-economic factors which makes such operations possible. To survive in a Soviet 
system enterprises were inevitable involved in illegal efforts to 'neutralise' control 
agencies, and to use them as a tool to cover parallel economy. 
The decade of the 80-s witnessed two different approaches to tackle corruption and 
criminalisation of officials in the country. One was introduced by Andropov in early 
80-s, as more stress on discipline, responsibility and organisational improvements. 
This was done with the help of KGB files on corrupt state officials. In the middle 80-s 
Gorbachev proclaimed that it was a right time for 'perestroyka' and 'glasnost'. His 
method of tackling corruption mainly consisted in replacing 'old' political mode. Los 
notes that "the official reason for many of the publicised dismissal are vague and 
seem to be applied quite mechanically. They include nepotism; mismanagement; 
carelessness; lack of vigilance, principles or modesty; political immaturity; and 
violations of socialist legality , norms of party life, or Leninist norms" (Los, 1986, 
p.18). It is clear that in the system where corruption is endemic, any officials may be 
charged with such violations. Los named Gorbachev approach as ''wholesale'' 
approach (Ibid., p.18). It was clear, that without the system restructuring the simple 
replacement of people is meaningless. 
Kurkchiyan (2000) analysis the 'second economy' in the USSR and argues that "by 
taking part in the second economy people grew accustomed to the practice of 
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informal problem-solving. They cultivated a tradition of bypassing officialdom ... a 
psychological condition of general alienation from the state became widespread" 
(Kurkchiyan, 2000, p., 88). 
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, all the newly born independent countries 
started their own way towards the development of the democratic societies. This 
period is known as 'transition', meaning transition from the socialist-communist 
towards liberal capitalism forms of social organisation. Kurkchiyan writes "the move 
to the new system was not gradual, but sudden in its velocity and revolutionary in its 
impact" (Kurkchiyan, 2000, p.,88). The transition experience varies dramatically 
from country to country. Research on political, social and economic indicators 
suggest that in Central Europe reforms have been conducted in an 'orderly and clean 
manner', while in other countries, such as countries of the former Soviet Union (with 
the exception of Baltic countries), transition had the form of 'chaos and 
disintegration' (Fatic, 1997, p.2). 
Part of the explanation of this chaotic and disintegrative transition can be found in the 
following facts. As it has been said, in communist countries, and especially, those of 
the former USSR, members of the communist party, the so-called elite and their 
supporters enjoyed a number of privileges. This group was able to use the system to 
collect benefits which were almost prohibited to the ordinary people. This inequality 
in the distribution of benefits and goods created the special group of population, 
namely the ruling elite or oligarchy. It must be said that this group lived under their 
own strict rules. For example, the distribution of privileges was conducted according 
to the job position, if you are a member of the district council you would get only a 
certain amount of the privileges, and the senior your position the more benefits you 
get (from extra food provision at the very low level to the state paid car with the 
driver and luxury apartments). After the collapse of the USSR, the official ideology 
had changed. But what did it mean in practice? 
Fatic (1997) writes: 
"Liberalism requires initial equality and respect for the privacy of individuals. 
Liberal political economy does not call for any redistribution of resources on 
the basis of their origin and the circumstances of their acquisition (as long as 
this was legal), but rather for the respect of existing differences, equalisation 
of the terms of competition, and a gradual redistribution, according to the 
principles of economic efficiency. This means that those who had the 
resources from the beginning - and they were very few compared to the 
mainstream population, which was impoverished and politically victimised 
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under communism- are free to use their resources in accordance with the 
newly discovered and established rules of the market ... " (Fatic, 1997, p.156). 
Based on the above presented theories, there are at least three components which 
should be addressed to provide the theoretical framework to understand the rise of 
white-collar crimes in transitional society. First is the existence of a group of crime 
prone individuals. At the beginning of the 90-s this group was presented by two 
subgroups: those, whom Los named 'red-collar' criminals, namely party officials, 
politicians, directors of big state enterprises, who kept their jobs after the regime 
change; and those businessmen who were unable to operate legally under the previous 
regime. The second, and the major component is opportunity. Lack of general 
knowledge of the financial market mechanisms, lack of legislative framework to 
operate in a new business environment, all these factors have opened a new horizons 
for a big scale 'criminal projects, like banking, privatisation, certain areas of 
entrepreneurial activity (see chapter 4). Neutralisation of the criminal action, or 
rationalisation is the third component: 'If everyone does it why not me'. While this 
technique justifies the spread of the economic crime amongst the general population, 
it can also be employed when addressing the grand scale financial crime. As the 
Ukrainian expert interviews suggest (Chapter 4), every level of the official hierarchy 
blames the level above in gaining more from illegal conduct. 
During the chaotic early years of transition former communist elite and their 
supporters acquire control of large companies. This may be seen as the classical 
example of the abuse of the job position, neglect of the rule oflaw, and intentional 
deterioration of the economic situation in the country. It may be argued that the 
previous ideology allowing the redistribution of the privileges according to your 
plaice in the hierarchy had been changed by the ideology of the 'absolute power', and 
may be summarised in the proverb 'what the power is for ifit is not to be abused'. 
The case study on corruption presented in Chapter 4 provides more detailed answers 
to the question raised. 
The ruling elite and those who conduct illegal business had (and still have) a 'big 
cover' which is the judiciary system. Simis (1982) argues that the judges in the USSR 
created a very special legal tradition of 'dependent judgement' - judgement according 
to the standards imposed by the government. Fatic argues that "when the over 
regulated communist system gave way to liberal and capitalist societal arrangements, 
the judicial institutions found themselves in the position of not being able to cope 
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with the new duties, especially with their independence acquired overnight" (Fatic, 
1997, p.15l). 
How could all these facts be helpful in our understanding of the causes of the current 
rise of economic/white-collar crime in Ukraine? First of all, it has to be understood, 
that white-collar crime is not a new phenomenon in the country. For a long time party 
officials abused the system and enriched themselves using illegal means. This 
philosophy of 'absolute power' had survived the transition and became a slogan for a 
modem day politicians or a state official. They socialise and 'grow up' politically to 
become 'old faces' under the new masks. Control theory suggests that to become a 
law obedient citizen, among the other factors, one need to have commitment to 
conventional goals, belief in moral validity of conventional norms. Obviously, 
transition from the communist ideology to the liberal-democratic is a difficult time. 
Norms and values can not be changed just overnight, especially when one could never 
be sure who is right and who is wrong, and what constitutes the illegal conduct. 
Second, high level of economic crime amongst the senior officials can not be kept in 
secret from the ordinary citizens. So, that for general population there are two ways to 
resolve the moral problem: revolution or 'peaceful rebellion'. In a peaceful rebellion 
approach, ordinary citizens separate themselves from the 'state' and live their own 
lives, not counting on the help of the government, but rather trying to avoid its 
obligations and regulations. By creating this cover known in criminology as the 
neutralisation techniques, like denial of responsibility, the denial of injury, ordinary 
citizens adopt their own approach as to how to avoid regulations imposed by those 
whom they seen as corrupt and irresponsible. A very simple example is the denial of 
the responsibilities for tax evasion. In the system which does not care for ordinary 
citizens and creates unjustifiably complex regulation, business people at any level do 
not feel guilty by breaching the taxation regulations. They would know, that those at 
the top do the same on the bigger scale, and do not care, so why should they, ordinary 
businessman be committed to what has to be conventional norm. As suggested by 
Fatis (1997) "only by accepting a certain moral and cultural order, constituted by a 
certain order of values, the law becomes possible as a normative framework within 
which the relationships of legitimate mutual expectations between members of 
society are constituted, and which gives meaning to what is these days increasingly 
called "the social capital of trust" in the institutions (Fatis, 1997, p.l). 
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Social trust is a very important concept, which reflects the advances in different areas 
of life. Economists consider trust as a carefully calculated long-term interest, which 
brings different groups of people together and results in the voluntary contracts. The 
efficient functioning of the modem economies is dependent on social trust. It has 
been argued that the level of development of economy reflects the level of trust in the 
society. Fukuyama finds a possible explanation of corruption in a system with narrow 
radius of social trust, where different standards of behaviour would apply to different 
groups of people (Fukuyama, 2001). In such system, the 'transaction cost', the cost of 
legal agreement, can be substantial. Transition societies, such as Russia and Ukraine 
have 'weak voluntary associations' because people do not trust one another. The 
primary form of kinship has substituted the voluntary associations of people. 
What are the differences between the class of white-collar criminals in transition and 
developed economies. The author suggests that the major difference is in the 
probability of being shamed and punished for what you have done. It means less fear 
to abuse the system, especially then the system is under-regulated in such 
fundamental areas as business law, protection of contracts, trade practices regulation. 
2.10 A brief summary of the development of the theoretical framework 
To clarify the development of white- collar crime theory let us summarise the 
findings according to the historical perspective. It all started in the beginning of the 
20th century with the Marxist focus on class structure and neglect of the ruling class 
crime. Late 1930s- 40s may be identified as the decade of the Sutherland white -collar 
crime theory. 1940-70s domination of American studies, attachment to "who" and 
"why" questions and a weak public interest to the problem of white-collar crime. 
1970s- early 80s a new string of publications as a reaction to Watergate scandal and 
foreign officials bribery (USA). Mid 70s -mid 80s were observed as the 'Theoretical 
Reorientation' and focus on organisational and corporate crime. The mid 80-s British 
and Australian studies of white-collar crime had their emphasis on "how" question. 
The mid 80-s also experienced the establishment of the international treaties and 
organisations aiming to study and prevent white- collar crime. 
Although economic crime has been considered as an important element in white-
collar crime it is only after the so-called theoretical reorientation h~d taken place, and 
the focus of attention had been redirected from the social characteristic of offender to 
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the characteristic of offence, that the economic crime phenomenon had actually 
started to be defined as the major component in white-collar crime. 
The white-collar offending includes a broad range of criminal conducts. There are 
many factors that may contribute to white-collar offending. The explanations 
presented by one single theory is not the answer. The environment, socio-cultural 
aspects of the society where the crime is committed should always be taken into the 
consideration. Such factors as weak society's values, advances in technology used by 
criminals, socio-economic instability named by many as reasons in increased number 
of economic crimes (Krambia-Kapardis, 2001, p. 41). It is rather impossible to single 
out one factor which can cause the white-collar criminality. In explaining it, one 
should take into consideration, the personality, environment, and situational factor. 
The next chapter considers economic development and its relationship to financial 
institutions in the country. It starts by elaborating on the advantages found in white-
collar type of crime, and continues with the financial market and economic 
development of advanced and transition counties, and the modem day type of white-
collar crime. 
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Chapter 3. White-collar crime and financial market 
3.1 The white-collar crime advantages 
Why does white-collar crime present such a danger to the society? Based on the 
Sutherland's concept of white-collar crime, there are three basic factors to explain the 
different treatment of white-collar and street criminals. First, is that judges view 
white-collar offenders "as offenders whose social standing is similar to their own", 
and that is why they are reluctant to prosecute them. Second, white-collar criminals 
have more resources to invest in legal defences. Third, for a long time laws have been 
formulated in such a way as to exclude white-collar crime (Calavita, Pontell, Tillman, 
1997, p.149). Recent studies addressed these problems in an attempt to find the best 
possible solution to the problem (Shapiro, 1984; Posner, 1981; Gurney, 1985). 
Shapiro studies securities violations in the USA, writes that "upper status offenders 
are less vulnerable to criminal prosecution, but must defend themselves frequently in 
civil and administrative proceedings. Lower statues wrongdoers who collaborate with 
their bosses are treated more like the bosses than like lower status perpetrators acting 
alone. The data suggest that any apparent discrimination against lower status offender 
in prosecutorial discretion is more readily explained by greater access to legal options 
than by social standing" (Shapiro, 1984, pp. 361-362). The study suggest that 
misrepresentation of the numbers of white-collar ranks offenders occur because of the 
existence of 'other' legal options, which divert this group from criminal process. This 
is exactly the same problem that Sutherland stated more than half a century ago. 
Shapiro suggests that "arguments that attribute the leniency accorded white-collar 
offenders to class bias misunderstand the structural source of leniency" (Ibid., pp. 
361-362). 
Posner argues that the best way to punish the white-collar criminals is to fine them. 
"In a social cost-benefit analysis of the choice between fining and imprisoning the 
white-collar criminal, the cost side analysis favours fining because, as we shall see, 
the cost of collecting a fine from one who can pay it is lower than the cost of 
imprisonment. On the benefit side, there is no difference in principle between the 
sanctions (Posner, 1981, p. 409). Coffee criticised this point of view and argues that 
"the threat counts more than penalty" (Coffee, 1980, p. 468). According to Coffee, 
imprisonment is a best deterrent, while fines would generally lack the deterrent value. 
The important issue in regard to the fining white-collar crime is to keep the criminal 
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justice system in balance. Meaning, "a system that fines the rich and jails the poor 
risks the appearance of institutionalising bias" (Ibid., p. 469). 
Some studies suggest that there are factors which distinguish cases selected for 
enforcement (Gurney, 1985, p. 622). Gurney named three factors- type of defendant, 
type of victim, and number of victims (Ibid., p. 622). It tends to be that both offence 
and offender characteristics are related to the decision to prosecute cases of white-
collar crime. On the contrary, Calavita, Pontell, Tillman suggest that the resulted 
leniency toward white-collar offenders can be attributed to the "neutral" systemic 
features of the crimes themselves and the criminal justice process (Calavita, Pontell, 
Tillman, 1997, p. 150). 
To summarise, one of the biggest advantages of the white-collar offenders is the 
knowledge of inside information, which enables them to 'hide' their offences within 
the organisation, and to be engaged in the cover up activity at the minimum degree. It 
would make the investigation difficult if not impossible. This advantage together with 
the ability to hire the best possible legal aid makes this types of crime extremely 
complex for the criminal justice system. 
3.2 White-collar crime and financial market 
The early development of the City of London registered many cases of frauds, 
including insider dealing. White -collar criminals regard financial markets as a low 
risk high reward activity (Rider, 1996). Nowadays, most financially advanced 
countries have developed legal systems that regulate different forms of manipulation 
and fraud in their markets. However, as it has been discussed in the previous part, the 
reality is that the vast majority of wrongdoers in the financial market will never be 
prosecuted, much less sent to prison (Calavita, Pontell, and Tillman, 1997; Rider, 
1996). Despite the measures undertaken, last decade has experienced an increase in 
the number of crimes committed in different financial sectors. " ... it is clear that in 
recent years both traditional and other forms of organised crime have increasingly 
moved into "white-collar crime" and in particular securities fraud and other related 
activities" (Rider, 1996, p., 378). The activities may range from false statements and 
inducement to deal to sophisticated schemes and market manipulations. For example, 
bankers can permit overdrafts or provide unsecured loans at low interest rate to 
friends or family members; pension funds or investment companies can invest in 
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business in which they have financial interest; government officials can direct 
business to finns with which they are connected (Shapiro, 1984). 
The savings and loan crisis of the 1980s in America was named as one of the worst 
financial disaster of the 20th century (Calavita, Pontell, and Tillman, 1997) "The 
estimated cost to taxpayers, not counting the interest payments on government bonds 
sold to finance the industry's bailout, is $150 to 175 billion" (Ibid., p.1). It is 
suggested that such large scale fraud was possible due to a series of white-collar 
crimes and political influence as a critical ingredient (Calavita, Pontell, and Tillman, 
1997). In the research conducted to study the savings and loan crisis in America, 
Calavita, Pontell, and Tillman identify three basic types of insider abuse: hot deals, 
looting, and covering up. According to the authors, hot deals provide "both the cash 
flow from which to siphon off funds and the transactional medium within which to 
distinguish it. ... "Looting" refers to the more direct siphoning off of funds by thrift 
insiders and is thus more like traditional fonns of crime than are the business 
transactions involved in hot deals ... The most straightforward, but probably least 
Common way to loot was simply to remove deposits from the thrift and stash them 
away ... In some cases the cover-up came in form of deals ... wherethe primary purpose 
of the transaction was to produce a misleading picture of the institution's state of 
health" (Calavita, Pontell, and Tillman, 1997, pp.48-65). 
The collapse of the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) in the early 
90-s underlined the importance of strong regulatory framework to tackle money 
laundering in banking. BCCI was a Luxembourg based bank operating in over 72 
countries, at one time was the seventh largest private bank in the world, with stated 
capital of $ 1.5 billion and stated assets worth over $ 20 billion. 
Among the specific offences admitted by BCCI were such as: "seeking deposits of 
drug proceeds and laundering drug money; seeking deposits from persons attempting 
to evade US income taxes; using 'straws' and nominees to acquire control of US 
financial institutions; lying to regulators and falsifying regulatory documents; and 
creating false bank records and engaging in sham transactions to deceive regulators" 
(Performance and Innovative Unit, 2000, p. 25). Bhala (1994) considers the 
implication of the BCCI scandal on the international banking and gives the following 
examples of the illegal conduct by the BCC!. BCCI covered up a loss of $633 million 
resulting from poor trading in the foreign exchange and derivative products markets. 
Bhala noticed that it occurred in the London office ofBCCI (Bhala, 1994, p.8). BCCI 
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manipulated its account to cover up loans to one of its principal customers, that 
amounted to 60% of BCCI's capital during 1977-81 (Ibid., p8). 
The BCCI scandal stimulated the discussion and the actual legal initiatives to cover 
the existing loopholes in legislation and regulatory practices. In response to the BCCI 
scandal the US regulatory authority adopted The Foreign Bank Supervision 
Enhancement Act (FBSEA) of 1991, aiming to strengthen the rules according to 
which foreign banks must play. 
More recent example, is the Bank of New York case, where between 1995 and 1999, 
some $ 7 billion was transmitted via an illegal banking network through accounts at 
the Bank of New York. Most of funds came from Russia from persons attempting to 
evade Russian state customs duties and taxes (Performance and Innovative Unit, 
2000). 
It is difficult not to mention the current war against white-collar crime in America, 
involving the world biggest multi-national companies- Enron and WorldCom. 
A national team of 230 prosecutors is responsible for W orldCom, "which 
allegedly disguised deteriorating results through massive accounting fraud; 
the important bits of Adelphia, a publicly owned firm whose founding family 
helped itself to riches; and ImClone, a biotechnology start~up run by a 
Manhattan socialite whose alleged insider trading ensnared Martha Stewart , 
America's doyenne of soft furnishing. More cases may follow, including 
Sunbeam, a bankrupt home-appliance company whose former boss, Al 
"Chainsaw" Dunlap, has been accused of cooking the books (The Economist, 
2002, p.67). 
As on September 2002 the list of the indictments published by The Economist (The 
Economist, 2002, p.68) includes the following. In August 2002 a senior executive in 
Enron's finance department pleaded guilty to money laundering and conspiracy to 
commit wire fraud. A former chief financial officer of WorldCom charged with one 
count of conspiracy to commit securities fraud, one count of securities fraud, and five 
counts of making false fillings. In June 2002 a former chief executive of Tyco was 
charged with evading sales taxes on six paintings worth about US$ 13.2 million. In 
August 2002 a former chief executive of ImClone Systems was indicted on charges of 
insider trading, bank fraud, forging a signature and destroying records to obstruct a 
federal investigation. The list can be continued. 
3.3 White collar crime and countries in transition 
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As it has been said, white-collar crime exists in different forms, from simple bank 
fraud to the cases involved corruption and insider dealing. The newly-born financial 
market systems in transition countries have presented the 'new business world' with a 
variety of opportunities to misconduct. Rapid political an economic changes have 
provided those who are in search for the loopholes in legislation with an excellent 
opportunity to expand illegal business, and, for example, to conduct illegal money 
transfers. The widespread corruption in some of the transition countries in Eastern 
Europe has been a helpful tool to create "a friendly environment" for money -launders 
(Adamoli, 1999; Osyka, 2001). For example, Shelley (1999, p. 1) writes that: 
After nearly six years of independence, total foreign investment in Ukraine is 
a paltry $1.4 billion, and some $15-$20 billion is believed to have left the 
country illegally, at least partly in response to corruption and organised crime. 
As reported by BBC News World (2000): 
Former Ukrainian Prime Minister Pavlo Lazarenko has been indicted in the 
United States on charges of laundering $1l4m he allegedly stole while in 
office. Mr Lazarenko is being held in a US federal prison pending resolution 
of a Swiss extradition request. 
The US Attorney's Office for Northern California said a federal grand jury had 
indicted Mr Lazarenko, 47, on one count of conspiracy to commit money 
laundering, seven counts of money laundering and 23 counts of transporting 
stolen property. 
If convicted on all counts, he could face a sentence of up to 370 years in 
prison. Mr Lazarenko, previously a close associate of Ukrainian President 
Leonid Kuchma, once paid $6.7m in cash for a California estate. 
The Ukrainian authorities accuse Mr Lazarenko of having profited by buying 
and selling natural gas contracts when he was Ukraine's energy minister, and 
of having siphoned off millions of dollars from state programs as prime 
minister in 1996-97. 
Research on transition countries suggests that a large proportion of economic crime is 
committed by or with the help of high-level public officials and politicians 
(International Bank for Reconstruction and Development & The World Bank, 200 I; 
Shelley, 2000). This has detrimental effects on a developing free-marked economy 
(Jain, 1998; Mauro, 1995; Tanzi, 1998) and undermines the integrity oflegal, 
political, and economic institutions within the nation (Coulloudon, 1997; Johnson, 
McMillan, and Woodruff, 1999; Radaev, 2000), thereby threatening the healthy 
development of newly born states. Corruption decreases trust and confidence in 
government institutions, and recent studies suggest that this directly undermines 
economic growth within a state (Raiser, 1999; Rose-Ackerman, 1999). Research 
conducted on the economics of corruption shows that countries experiencing high 
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levels of corruption have a lower Gross Domestic Product and rate of Foreign Direct 
Investment than less corrupt nations (Mauro, 1995; Tanzi and Davoodi, 1997). Tanzi 
and Davoodi (1997) found that corruption motivates government leaders to increase 
public investments, which does not necessarily add to economic welfare. This is a 
special case in countries where governments playa large role in the economy. 
Researchers also found out that public investment as a ratio of GDP is strongly 
related to a corruption index. There is also a link between the quality of investment 
and corruption. "Corruption reduces growth by increasing public investment while 
reducing its productivity"(Ibid., p.20). 
Mauro (1995) linked macro-economic performance to an index of corruption. The 
researcher examined indices developed by Business International to measure the 
institutional efficiency. The results of the study proved that corruption significantly 
lowers the levels of investment in an economy. Corruption may affect the collection 
of taxes in some countries. The author suggested that corruption of tax officials might 
result in decline of total revenues and grants of the government. 
Further, the economic costs of the corrupt privatization process in the transitional 
countries have been tremendous. Describing Russia, Fituni (2000) states that "The 
money our oligarchs paid at the auctions was, more often than not, interest-free 
credits from Central Bank, i.e. they were buying expensive enterprises virtually for a 
song" Fituni (2000, p. 25). 
Till the beginning of the 1990s insider dealing was not illegal in most European 
countries. Bhattacharya and Daouk (2000) considered insider dealing and stock 
markets around the world. To measure insider dealing on the stock market 
Bhattacharya and Daouk examined the cost of equities and its variation using 
different approaches. They concluded that it is not the introduction of insider dealing 
laws what matters, but the enforcement and the first successful prosecution. 
The impact of corruption and especially grand corruption on the economic 
development of the country has been a subject for discussion since the mid-90s. The 
World Bank provides comprehensive recommendations as to how to prevent 
corruption inside the banking sector in developing economies, especially in regard to 
the World Bank projects countries. Aguilar, Gill and Pino (2000) stated that 
corruption affects macroeconomic stability, it discourages investment, including 
foreign direct investment. As a consequence it raises the cost of doing business; 
reduces competitiveness of domestic enterprises in the international market. 
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Corruption by foreign officials is the focus of the study conducted by The Society of 
Advanced Legal Studies Anti-Corruption Working Group. According to the report, 
the scale of the wealth reported to have been acquired in cases of grand corruption is 
staggering and can even threaten economic development and stability of the whole 
country. The World Bank estimated that the sums distributed world -wide each year 
in 'pay-offs' or 'bribes' total US$ 80 billion. The negative influence corrupt foreign 
officials may pose on the development of the country has been studied from such 
perspectives as: impact on economy or private business relationships (when the 
business environment is too risky and the level of corruption is high, so that unless 
the bribe is offered there is no reason to compete for contracts); negative impact on 
the country's relationships with other country (illegal immigrants); negative impact 
on public safety (illegal drug trafficking, fraudulent immigration) (MacLaren, 2000, 
p.3). Based on the Canadian experience, MacLaren suggested, that it is essential to 
develop an ethical position in relationship with other countries and international 
organisations. 
It is recognised that white-collar crimes present a danger to the developed and 
financially advanced countries. In case of transition countries where the legal system 
is under the constant development, financial institutions are in new born stage, and 
political is unstable, white-collar crime has found a fertile soil to grow. 
3.4 Financial markets and economic development 
The central question addressed in this research is the impact of economic crime on the 
development of financial markets in transitional countries. First of all, we need to 
answer why the financial market plays such an important role in the economic 
development of modem countries. 
The relationship between economic prosperity and the development of fmancial 
intermediaries can be considered from two perspectives: traditional and new. The 
neo-classical or traditional view paid little attention to the role of financial 
intermediaries in long-term economic growth. The traditional view was that financial 
markets are simply the "handmaiden of history" (King and Levine, 1992, p.1S6). 
Financial intermediaries were considered simple channels to direct household savings 
into business investment. However, in the 1960s, researchers acknowledged the 
importance of effective resource allocation and the role the financial intermediaries 
could play (Roubini, 1996, p. 194). 
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The new view discusses the primary importance of the financial intermediaries in the 
development of economic growth in a country (King and Levine, 1992). The main 
idea of the new view is to show a relationship between the efficiency of the financial 
system, the quantity and efficiency of the allocation of resources to entrepreneurs and 
the amount of productivity-enhancing investment in intangible capital (Roubini, 1996, 
p. 194). To show the importance of financial intermediaries, King and Levine 
established the following model representing sustained economic development. 
Sustained economic development involves at least three parameters: entrepreneurship, 
intangible capital investment, and financial intermediation. At the centre of their 
theory is an entrepreneur willing to undertake some innovative economic activity 
(Ibid., p.lS8-160). King and Levine interpret the innovative economic activity very 
broadly. 
"The key aspects of our view are as follows: 
1. There is an entrepreneur who seeks to undertake an innovation, which requires 
finance of investment. 
2. Entrepreneurs are heterogeneous: some ideas that are efficient for society to 
undertake, others do not. Evaluating the desirability of ideas is feasible at some cost, 
but it is essential that the process of evaluation not reveal too much information about 
the nature and character of the ideas. Otherwise the ideas might be appropriated by 
competitors. 
3. Much of productivity-enchanting investment involves construction of an intangible 
capital good. By the nature of this asset, (i) it is difficult for a third party to evaluate 
the efficacy of the investments; and (ii) it serves as poor collateral, because it is 
embodied in an entrepreneur and a team of managers and production workers. 
4. The returns to intangible capital good are quasi rents that are determined by (i) the 
size of the market; (ii) the rates of innovation of competitors; (iii) taxation and public 
regulation" (King and Levine, 1996, p.lS9). 
In such a system, financial intermediaries play an essential role as a tester to 
distinguish the creditworthy of entrepreneurs. In other words, quality evaluation of 
entrepreneurs' innovations depends strongly on advances in financial services. 
Efficient resource allocation would be followed by increased productivity and growth 
by means of "physical capital accumulation, improvements in the types of intangible 
capital, and human capital development" (Ibid., p.160). The difference between rich 
and poor countries may be presented in the following three propositions: rich 
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countries have more savings in liquid assets per dollar ofGDP, they do more lending 
per dollar ofGDP, and they tend to allocate their lending to private companies (Ibid., 
p.170). 
By employing a multivariate regression analysis, the above mentioned authors 
showed the importance of well developed financial institutions to the economic 
prosperity of a country. King and Levine examined the empirical importance of the 
different measures of financial intermediation to the rate of per capita GDP growth, 
and the effect of financial indicators on physical capital accumulation and proxy for 
productivity growth. The results suggest that by measuring the financial intermediary 
services it is possible to predict economic growth (King and Levine, 1996, p.182). 
A cross-country study conducted by Eschenbach, Francois, and Schuknecht (2000) 
examined a sample of 93 countries found out that there is a strong positive 
relationship between financial sector openness, and between growth and financial 
sector competition. The researchers paid specific attention to the role of international 
trade in services, 'a causal chain linking financial sector openness, financial sector 
performance, and growth performance' (Ibid., p.l06). Eschenbach, Francois, and 
Schuknecht (2000, p.l04) writes 
"Our results suggest that moving from a closed to a relatively open financial 
services regime is correlated with significant pro-competitiveness pressures, 
and ultimately with large differences in growth rates (0.7 percent for a typical 
developing country). Because it is the developing countries in our sample that 
tend to be closed, this points to a significant potential growth bonus for 
developing countries who move from closed regimes towards regimes 
comparable (in terms of openness) to those of the OEeD countries". 
What are the implications of these findings for the development of transitional 
countries? It has been suggested that countries with well-developed banking systems, 
which allocate substantial resources to the private sector experience better economic 
growth over the future decades. In this case the development of the financial market is 
essential: it increases the rate of capital accumulation and the efficiency of resource 
allocation. For transitional economies it is important to generate growth. The most 
efficient way to achieve this goal is by establishing financial market institutions. 
Understanding the difficulty of transition King and Levine write "a major policy 
challenge will be to encourage the development of healthy, private-sector oriented 
financial institutions, uncontaminated by the bad debts of deteriorating state-owned 
enterprises, while political pressure force some financial institutions temporarily to 
42 
finance loss-making enterprises during the transition" (King and Levine, 1996, 
p.186). 
To improve resourse allocation, transitional countries should make the difficult choice 
between emphasis on the development of stock market or banks. Stock market- and 
bank-oriented systems have existed for many years, however different countries have 
different experience and priorities. History knows examples of different modes, such 
as 'Anglo-Saxon', 'Franco-German-Japanese' and 'market socialist'. During the 
Industrial Revolution in the UK in the nineteenth century, new industries were mainly 
financed through the London Stock Exchange. While almost at the same time, 
Germany favoured bank finance. Allen suggests that countries in which stock market 
financing was prevalent reacted to progress and changes more rapidly (Allen, 1996, p. 
102). "Banks will be a good way to provide financing in traditional industries such as 
agriCUlture where the technology is well known and there is a wide consensus on how 
things should be done .... Countries that will have a significant stock market will be 
those with a significant amount of technological innovation in the sense of developing 
entirely new industries and those industries with a significant amount of 
concentration" (Allen, 1996, p.l02). 
Transitional literature discusses the advantages and disadvantages of the policy 
choices made by countries with emerging markets. Coffee underlines the importance 
of the securities market development in transitional countries. Among the arguments 
in defence of the development of a strong securities market are "companies in 
economies without strong securities markets necessarily become more dependent on 
bank financing, ... [companies] become more vulnerable to a downturn in the business 
cycle", stock market development is an essential element in building corporate 
governance mechanisms, gaining experience in firms' investment and management 
(Coffee, 2001, p.7). However, experience shows that not all transitional countries are 
able to develop stock markets. In some small countries, the development of stock 
markets will be very costly. Claesssens, Djankov, and Klingebiel argue that such 
countries should start the development of their financial system with the banking 
industry. By concentrating on the expansion of the banking system, the country would 
promote the development of the small and medium-size enterprises and, in the long 
term, the economic growth of the country (Allen, 1996; Claessens, 1996; Claesssens, 
Djankov, and Klingebiel, 2000). 
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All transitional countries strive to achieve sustained economic development. For the 
purpose of present study it is essential to recognise the importance of the advances in 
financial institutions development. Transitional countries such as Ukraine are in bad 
need for the quality investments into the economy. It tends to be that one of the best 
way to achieve sustained economic development lies in establishing transparent 
financial institutions able to allocate resources and provide productivity enhancing 
investments. 
Next section will briefly consider the development of financial institutions in 
transition countries. 
3.5 Financial market and countries in transition 
Since the beginning of the 1990s, the focus of attention has been centred on the 
development of financial markets in transitional countries. First of all, because the 
development of financial market is essential for economies in transitional countries. 
Well functioning market unable companies to raise money for investment quicker and 
with low cost involved. Second, well functioning financial market, with transparent 
structure and access to information, is one of the indicators to measure the 
development of corporate governance, and to some extent, even democracy. There are 
three basic measures to analyse the development of financial market in transition 
countries: market capitalisation, market turnover and the existence of institutional 
investors (Claessens, Djankov, Klingebiel, 2000; Coffee, 2001). 
3.5.1 Market capitalisation 
The most typical indicator used to measure securities market's development maturity 
is "the ratio of market capitalisation to Gross Domestic Product" (Coffee, 2001, p.l0). 
Table 4. Market capitalisation in transition countries and comparator economies, 
1994-2000. 
Market CapltaUzadon In Transldon Countries and Comparator Economies, 1994-2000 
Percentage of GOP, mid period 
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Country 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 March 
2000 
Armenia 0 1 
Azerbaijan 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Bulgaria 0 1 0 1 8 6 5 
Croatia 3 3 15 21 15 11 13 
Czech 14 30 31 24 21 19 25 
Republic 
Estonia 0 2 10 11 28 31 36 
Hungary 3 5 12 33 29 31 34 
Kazakhstan 0 0 0 I 2 5 
Kyrg 0 0 5 7 3 3 
Republic 
Latvia 0 3 6 6 6 8 
Lithuania 2 II 18 10 12 11 
Macedonia 0 0 0 0 0 I 1 
Moldova 0 0 0 2 6 22 19 
Poland 3 4 6 8 13 18 21 
Romania 0 0 0 2 3 2 2 
Russia 2 5 9 8 7 25 19 
Slovak 8 7 12 9 5 4 3 
Republic 
Slovenia 4 2 4 9 13 11 12 
Ukraine 0 0 0 0 2 3 4 
Uzbekistan 0 0 0 0 6 6 
Brazil 27 24 24 30 27 
Egypt 8 10 16 23 28 
Germany 23 22 27 36 45 
Korea, 44 42 34 22 24 
Rep.of 
Mexico 45 39 31 33 29 
Portugal 15 17 24 34 57 
Thailand 92 82 66 44 29 
Turkey 19 14 15 25 17 
UK 116 119 137 146 161 
USA 74 82 101 122 151 
Source: S. Claessens, S. Djankov, and D. Klingebiel, "Stock Market in Transition Economies, World 
Bank Financial Sector Discussion Paper 2000 No.4, 21. 
As Table 4 shows market capitalisation is low in almost all transition countries. Only 
a small numbers of countries had managed to achieve market capitalisation 25% or 
more (Estonia and Hungary). Most of the transition countries have a market 
capitalisation to GDP ratio of 11 %, with Armenia and Azerbadijan at the bottom of 
the list and Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Czech Republic on top of the list. 
3.5.2 Market turnover 
Market turnover defined as the value of trading over market capitalisation (Coffee, 
2001, p.l 0), is an important indicator to measure the effect of stock markets on 
growth (Claessens, Djankov and Klingebiel, 2000, p. 3). 
Table 5. Market turnover in transition countries and comparator economies, 1994-
2000. 
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Market Turnover in Transition Countries and Comparator Economies, 1994-2000 
Percentage of market capitalisation, mid-period 
Country 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 March 
2000 
Armenia 0 2 2 7 5 15 8 
Azerbaijan 0 0 4 12 2 l3 10 
Bulgaria 0 8 1 1 2 4 6 
Croatia 8 8 l3 10 5 5 7 
Czech 26 33 50 47 37 61 81 
Republic 
Estonia 0 0 59 78 108 44 21 
Hungary 22 17 42 76 112 103 93 
Kazakhstan 0 0 0 2 2 2 3 
Kyrg 0 2 8 2 6 2 2 
Republic 
Latvia 8 12 15 35 24 21 19 
Lithuania 0 37.3 9 18 16 l3 7 
Macedonia 0 0 3 24 41 45 36 
Moldova 0 0 12 81 173 81 62 
Poland 177 72 85 78 54 62 69 
Romania 2 7 2 73 66 58 45 
Russia 367 7 11 20 11 27 40 
Slovak 96 69 134 109 74 48 25 
Republic 
Slovenia 68 71 82 31 35 28 22 
Ukraine 0 5 11 6 4 12 19 
Uzbekistan 0 3 19 12 3 2 4 
Brazil 76 47 61 85 70 64 54 
Egypt 19 11 22 33 22 38 47 
Germany 98 109 123 l37 145 152 167 
Korea, 72 97 109 171 183 223 288 
Rep.of 
Mexico 44 31 42 40 28 32 35 
Portugal 36 48 59 57 96 114 127 
Thailand 60 41 36 39 70 86 89 
Turkey 87 221 l39 128 141 167 193 
UK 78 78 37 44 53 62 73 
USA 70 85 92 104 106 117 141 
Source: S. Claessens, S. Djankov, and D. Klingebiel, "StockMarket in TrnsitionEconomies, 
World Bank Financial Sector Discussion Paper 2000 No.4, 21 
As the Table 5 shows, market turnover is highest in Hungary (93%), CzechRepublic 
(81 %), and Poland (69%). Market turnover is less than 5% in most ransition markets 
of Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgy Republic and Uzbekistan). Claessens, Djankov, 
and Klingebiel, comment that stock markets in transition economies are dominated by 
a small number of firms. In a lot of countries turnover concentrations are above 80% 
(Claessens, Djankov, and Klingebiel, 2000, p.3). 
3.5.3 Institutional investors 
"The development and particularly the liquidity of a stock market depend on the 
development ofa class of well-governed institutional investors" (Claessens, Djankov, 
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and Klingebiel, 2000, p.l 0). There are three types of institutional investors: 
investment fund and mutual funds, pension funds, insurance. 
Table 6. Assets held by institutional investors in transitional and comparator 
economies (June 2000). 
Assets Held by Institutional Investors in Transitional 
and Comparator Economies (June 2000) 
Percentage of GDP 
Country Investment funds Pensions funds Insurance Total 
Armenia 4 0 0 4 
Azerbaijan 0 0 0 0 
Bulgaria 5 0 1 6 
Croatia 2 0 2 4 
Czech 8 2 9 19 
Republic 
Estonia 5 0 3 8 
Hungary 12 4 3 19 
Kazakhstan 2 3 1 6 
Kyrg 2 0 0 2 
Republic 
Latvia 5 0 1 6 
Lithuania 6 0 0 6 
Macedonia 4 0 0 4 
Moldova 4 0 2 6 
Poland 8 2 5 15 
Romania 8 0 0 8 
Russia 2 1 1 4 
Slovak 6 0 4 10 
Republic 
Slovenia 5 0 4 9 
Ukraine 0 1 0 1 
Uzbekistan 0 0 0 0 
Brazil 16 10 1 27 
Chile 5 40 13 58 
Germany 28 13 32 73 
Korea, Rep. 20 2 16 38 
Mexico 4 3 2 9 
Portugal 21 11 10 42 
Turkey 3 1 1 5 
UK 60 101 89 250 
USA 129 90 43 262 
Source: S. Claessens, S. Djankov, and D. Klingebiel, "Stock Market in Transition Economies, 
World Bank Financial Sector Discussion Paper 2000 No.4, 21. 
As Table 6 shows institutional investors are small in transitional countries. Only 
Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland have institutional investors assets at average 
18% ofGDP. In most of the countries the institutional investors assets account only 
for 7% ofGDP. 
The analysis conducted by Claessens, Djankov, and Klingebiel shows that such 
factors as low inflation, good shareholder protection, and the size of institutional 
investor assets are important in explaining high rate of market capitalization share to 
GDP. Opposite to this, the underdeveloped stock markets in transition economies can 
47 
be explained by such variables as "unstable macroeconomic environment, weak 
minority shareholders rights, and limited asset based of institutional investors" 
(Claessens, Djankov, and Klingebiel, 2000, p. 12). "Market capitalisation is positively 
correlated with ratios of private credit to GDP in transition economies. Low ratios of 
private credit to GDP indicate that basic financial sector infrastructure is lacking in 
transition economies" (Ibid., p. 12). 
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3.5.4 Banking in transition 
Table 7. Structure of banking system in transition and comparator economies, 1995 
Data on Structure of Banking System in transition and comparator economies, 1995 
Country No of No of Share of Recap ita Employme M2/GDP Currency 
banks State assets of lizations nt 100.000 (%) M2(%) 
Owned top five 
Comm banks (%) 
ercial 
Bank 
Albania 8 3 100 y 838 45 37 
Armenia 37 5 85 n 227 23 42 
Azerbaijan 197 4 n 140 26 64 
Belarus 52 7 75 n 323 11 25 
Bulgaria 34 10 90 Y 624 65 14 
Croatia 47 19 70 y 854 21 24 
Czech 58 1 69 y 316 74 10 
Republic 
Estonia 16 1 70 Y 1940 20 44 
Hungary 41 3 63 y 176 43 26 
Kazakhstan 167 4 90 n 317 11 58 
Kyrg. 17 3 90 n 189 11 78 
RepUblic 
Latvia 40 3 55 y 207 30 43 
Lithuania 27 3 70 n 890 17 42 
Macedonia 40 3 97 y 571 25 22 
Moldova 27 4 85 n 223 8 51 
Poland 73 5 66 Y 614 31 26 
Romania 28 7 74 Y 1349 15 30 
Russia 2561 1 33 n 392 15 42 
SlovakRepu 
bli 
3 2 79 Y 2085 67 13 
Slovenia 34 2 70 Y 1678 37 10 
Ukraine 217 2 70 n 254 16 37 
Uzbekistan 35 29 95 n 128 79 26 
United 530 29 4140 90 3 
Kingdom 
France 419 43 3211 63 6 
Source: Claessens, 1996, Banking in transition countries, Washington, DC: The World Bank. 
(As explained by Claessens, re-capitalization refer to formal re-capitalization programs; employment is 
the number of employees in the whole financial sector, M2/GDP is domestic currency component of 
broad money (M2) only; CurrencyIM2 (%) cash holdings as a share of domestic currency broad 
money (M2) (Claessens, 1996». 
The existing number of banks in one country reflects the choice of the policy toward 
the banking reforms. Researchers distinguished two different approaches to banking 
in transition: new entry and rehabilitation (Claessens, 1996). The new-entry approach 
Can be characterised by the liberal entry of new banks. The approach can be 
illustrated by Russia and Ukraine where it resulted in a rapid grow in the number of 
banks, in Ukraine from 5 in 1989 to 217 in 1995 and 194 banks in 2000. Claessens 
suggests that the choice of policy was not always deliberate (Claessens, 1996). For 
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example, after the collapse of the Soviet Union the political and economic instability 
created a very liberal environment for the entry of the new banks. On the opposite to 
the new entry approach, rehabilitation is associated with more limited entry, re-
capitalization and institutional development of existing state banks (Claessens, 1996, 
p.2). It is also suggested that banking reforms in transition countries are related to 
initial conditions and macro-economic development (Ibid.). Legal and enterprise 
reforms play an essential role in progress in banking reform (Ibid., p.3). Established 
legal system is an essential component of the strong banking system. Bad loan 
problems and absence of new lending opportunities prevent the advances in the 
banking sector (Ibid., p.5). 
3.5.5 Analysis 
The benefits of the well-functioning stock market should first of all be considered as 
companies ability to raise capital at lower costs. Companies are also less dependant 
on bank financing, they operate in a less risky environment. Uncertainty and 'bad' 
environment result in failure to raise necessary capital. Haque, Hauswald and Senbet 
(1999) proposed the following explanations to understand the lack of recourses in 
transition countries. Graph 1 presents their theory on institutional failure and under 
investment (Haque, Hauswald and Senbet,1999, p., 6). Ifwe consider three inputs in 
economy: labor J, institutions I to deal with the resolution of conflicts of interest, and 
capital K. Then asymmetric information enter the picture through uncertainty about 
the state of legal, economic and financial institutions in this economy. It leads to the 
fact, that outsiders, who are in this case foreign investors can not assess the state of 
institutional reforms, or institutional development, which can be , as presented on the 
graph as high as (Ig) and as low as (Ib). 
In order to see how failure to provide institutional reforms may lead to the lack of the 
capital mobility, the authors add 'inference problem (non-observability), in the form 
of external shocks e (Ibid., p.6). As a result potential investors unable to comprehend 
if the country under consideration has sufficient institutional infrastructure. So, that 
willing to invest the amount Ka for institutional development la (as in perfect 
economic environment) the investors fear that output realization Ybg= Y(lh. Kg. J) 
+ e would lead to insufficient returns on capital. In the absence of legal guarantees 
and political instability such investors would come to the pessimistic assessment of 
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the return potential. So that if investment opportunities which would lead to the 
output level Y(Ig. Kg. J) exist somewhere else investors would rather look for that 
opportunity. This would be resulted in investors willing to supply funds Kb, which is 
estimated to be failure to raise sufficient capital. Haque, Hauswald and Senbet (1999) 
argue that the capital shortage is not "a cause of underdevelopment, but a symptom 
for deeper structural problems that revolve around failed institutions and 
malfunctioning financial system. Indeed, it is precisely an environment characterized 
by uncertainty, informational imperfections, and incentive problems among 
contracting parties that requires the financial system to perform tasks beyond mere 
capital mobilization" (Haque, Hauswald and Senbet, 1999, p., 7) 
Graph 1. Institutional failure and underinvestment. 
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The difficulties emerging with the creation of financial market in transition 
countries are most often associated with weak law and regulations, slow progress on 
private sector development, a limited supply of institutional development, as well as 
macroeconomic uncertainty (Claessens, Djankov, and Klingebiel, 2000). 
It is suggested that "before considering equity markets, transition economies should 
focus on improving and enforcing creditor rights to foster their banking system 
development. This will also be the most effective way to foster the development of 
small and medium-size enterprises, a key source of economic growth" (Claessens, 
Djankov and Klingebiel. 2001, p.12-13). 
Coffee suggested that one should start establishing capital market with creation of a 
strong legal protection to minority shareholders. It is important to create "a strong 
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system of securities regulation that can both provide essential information and deter 
the common forms of fraud and misappropriation that appear to have caused market 
crashes in Russia, Czech Republic, and other transitional economies (Coffee, 2001, 
p.9). Among the factors that can explain the underdevelopment of the financial sector 
Coffee named such factors as macroeconomic and political instability, legal 
underdevelopment. The effectiveness of legal institutions makes a big difference in a 
creation of effective market. " ... even if "legal effectiveness" is a subjective and 
largely non-quantifiable variable, because financial economists have found that the 
overall effectiveness of legal institutions has a much higher correlation with both 
equity and credit market development than does the quality of law on the books. 
Ultimately, it is far easier to specify legal protections that should be adopted to 
protect shareholders and creditors than to recommend means by which to make a 
disreputable judiciary or governmental agency honest, credible and effective" 
(Coffee, 2001, pp. 14). To prevent the criminalization of the capital market, and 
securities market in particular, Coffee suggested introduction of the three principal 
reputational intermediaries. These intermediaries are independent auditors, 
underwriter and "outside directors who stand to profit very little from corporate fraud, 
but who may have liability if they fail to exercise adequate care" (Coffee, 2001, p.22). 
Coffee also argue that it does not really matter if the country managed to develop 
securities market, the need to establish the securities statute still remains. "One 
obvious reason is that investor fraud and the mass marketing of irresponsible 
investment scheme can produce real social unrest" (Coffee, 2001, p.27). 
Krkoska (2001) analysed foreign direct investments in transition countries as an 
important source to finance capital formation. It is suggested that "improvements in 
the investment climate helping to attract higher FDI inflows will translate into higher 
gross fixed capital formation, which in turn leads to greater economic growth" 
(Krkoska, 2001, p.18). 
Pistor, Raiser and Gelfer developed and analysed two groups of indices. The first 
group was designed to analyse shareholders and creditor rights in transition 
economies, and the second group consisted of the measures of the effectiveness of 
legal institutions in transition economies. The three variables were used to identify the 
effectiveness of legal institutions: rule of law, effectiveness of corporate and 
bankruptcy law, and the enforcement index (Pistor, Raiser and Gelfer, 2000). The 
study concluded that the obstacle for the successful reform is seen in 'legality', or the 
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absence of effective legal regulations (Pistor, Raiser and Gelfer, 2000, p. 25).The 
regression analyses conducted by these authors show that "legality has overall much 
higher explanatory power for the level of equity and credit market development than 
the quality of law on the books" (Ibid., p.25) The transition toward the market 
reforms requires changing of the role of government, reducing the direct level of 
government involvement in economic activity, and creating the fundamentals for the 
rule of law system. "The lack of confidence in the rule of law reflects the extent to 
which this transformation has remained partial, as governments continue to play to 
vested interests, often those that have benefited from asset redistribution during the 
initial transition" (Ibid., p. 25). 
To summarise, the analysis of transitional countries experience indicate the 
importance of a carefully thought out decision making process. However important 
the development of stock market is, in some small countries it could be very costly, 
and thus unjustifiable money and time spent. These countries should concentrate on 
the development of banking industry to start with financing the basic industry in the 
country. Once the economic development choice has been made, political will is 
necessary to continue the chosen way to reform the system. The literature on 
transition studies the role of the initial condition and the economic policies the 
country chooses to implement the reforms (de Melo, Denizer, Gelb, Tenev, 1997). 
Studies support the fact that initial conditions transition countries had at the starting 
point are not that significant as the devotion to the political reforms. Researchers 
argue that political reform emerges as "the most important single determinant of the 
speed and comprehensiveness of economic liberalisation" (Ibid.,p.4l). Further in the 
study we will be examining the experience of Ukraine in creating the environment for 
the reforms. 
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Chapter 4. White-collar crime phenomenon and financial market 
development in Ukraine 
4.1 Ukraine: initial level of development, resources and growth 
Studies show that the experience of countries during transition from a planned 
economy to a market economy has been different (Claessens, 1996;Claessens, Oks, 
Polastri, 1998; Grigorian, Manole, 2002). While some countries experience deep 
depression and significant decrease of their GDP, the performance of the others are 
growing. What are the major factors which determine the outcome of the transition? 
The answers are different. Some researchers concentrate their analysis on the 
inherited economic conditions, and natural resources (Fisher and Gelb, 1991; 
Foglesong and Solomon, 2001). The other stress the importance of the economic 
policies the country chooses to implement. Political transition was named as a key 
factor in shaping the reform process and economic outcome. The World Bank studies 
suggest that the link between political reforms and economic reforms is very close 
(World Bank, 2000). It is known that economic reforms are easier in countries where 
political changes are fundamental and rapid. 
Table 8 presents the data on the initial level of development, resources and growth in 
Ukraine. 
Table 8. Initial level of development, resources and growth in Ukraine. 
Country Per cap Urbanizatio Industry Distrib of GOP 1990 Rcdictcd Average Natural Location 
GNP at n(%of cur prices share of % resources 
PPPUSS population) Agriculture Services industry growth 
1989 1990 1985·89 
Ukraine 680 67 44 21 3S 40 4 moderate 0 
Source: De Melo, Denizer, Gelb and Tenev, 1997. 
Table 8 presents a number of important indicators. Income levels, measured in 1989 
was US$ $5680 in Ukraine, that is about the same level as Poland US$ 5150, and 
Croatia $US 6171. As on 1989 among the Soviet Union Republics the lowest income 
was in Uzbekistan US$ 2740, and the highest income was in Estonia US$ 8900. 
Industrial shares were high in Ukraine, as it was typical for almost all socialist 
countries. The richness of natural resources differs from country to country. Ukraine, 
Poland, Georgia are among those countries named as moderate in resources; Hungary, 
Czech Republic are among the poor once; and Russia, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan 
named as rich in natural resources. Location means geographical situation and the 
proximity to the developed market economies. Such countries as Hungary, Czech 
Republic, Baltic countries have benefited from better access to developed markets. 
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The geographical location of Ukraine has not been considered as beneficial by the 
above authors. 
De Melo, Denizer, Gelb and Tenev analyse the role of initial conditions and their 
interaction with policy choice and economic performance during the transition in 28 
countries (De Melo, Denizer, Gelb and Tenev, 1997). Researchers suggest that initial 
conditions for transition countries can be summed up in two principal components 
such as "market distortion" and "overindustrialization" (Ibid., p. 38). Results suggest 
that the effectiveness of the reform does not depend on the initial conditions, 
"unfavourable initial conditions discourage reforms but effectiveness of reforms is 
not reduced once they are implemented" (Ibid., p.40). Political reforms are named as 
the most important determinant of the speed and the character of economic reforms 
(Ibid., p.4I). 
Following is the discussion consisted of a few parts, which was designed to 
specifically examine transition period in Ukraine, the role of the initial conditions and 
the chosen policies. It will lead us to the consideration of the impact of some specific 
factors, such as economic crime and corruption on the development of the financial 
market in the country. 
4.2 Macroeconomic situation 
In the beginning of the 90-s Deutsche Bank named Ukraine as the most advanced and 
promising post - Soviet economy. However, since 1991 a great majority of the 
researchers identified Ukraine as a financial disaster (Foglesong and Solomon, 2001, 
p.7). 
"In 1996, the World Bank categorised Ukraine as among the group 4, or slow reform, 
countries. In 1997, the World Economic Forum ranked Ukraine as the 52d of 53 
countries in overall competitiveness in its Global Competitiveness Report. And in 
1998, the Heritage Foundation - Wall Street Journal Index of Economic Freedom 
ranked Ukraine as the 125 of 156 countries, labelling Ukraine as the "mostly unfree" 
economies of the world. Industrial investment (both domestically and abroad) remains 
low, despite lower inflation and a more stable currency. Since 1995, Ukraine has 
become dependent on massive infusions of capital from multilateral lending 
institutions, partiCUlarly the International Monetary Fund (IMP), to prop up its 
economy" (Foglesong and Solomon, 2001, p. 8). 
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Ukraine was considered as the most developed Soviet Republic. The country had 
advanced military and industrial complex, metallurgy, and chemical industry. 
Thousands of people were employed at large enterprises. However, what appeared as 
an advantage proved to be a 'disadvantage' during the first years of independence, 
when an attempt had been made to restructure these enterprises. The Ukrainian 
government directly subsidised non-profitable enterprises, and introduced tax 
concessions. These decisions were often political rather than economic. So that many 
managers of the enterprises made large illegal profit during the so-called restructuring 
(see below for the details of the crimes committed). 
From 1991-1994 Ukrainian economy had experienced hyperinflation with the annual 
rate about 2.000 % in 1992 and 10.000% at its peak in 1993. The sharp expansion in 
the money supply in the first half of the 90-s was named as the main cause of 
hyperinflation. 
During 7 years since 1991-1998 the Gross Domestic Product declined dramatically. 
Different sources name different figures, usually with variation from 48 % to 100%. 
Almost all sectors of economy had deep depression. A new currency (the Hryvnia) 
was introduced in 1996 as one of the aspect of macroeconomic stabilisation. 
There are a lot of arguments about the causes of economic collapse. Foglesong and 
Solomon named three areas of economic decay in Ukraine (Foglesong and Solomon, 
2001, p. 9). Firstly, the natural resources in Ukraine. Though Ukraine is rich in 
natural recourses, most of these were depleted during the Soviet period. Extraction 
cost in many cases exceeds the prospective sales prices. Secondly, the economic base 
of Ukraine is not marketable. This is mainly due to the industry in eastern part of 
Ukraine, in particular, unprofitable mining and metallurgy concerns. Thirdly, Ukraine 
is highly dependent on Russia for its energy. "Ukrainians with connections to Russian 
exporters have taken advantage of the price differentials and their administrative 
authority to reap huge illegal profits from import business" (Foglesong and Solomon, 
2001, p. 9). Robinson named such causes of economic collapse as the breakdown in 
intra-CIS trade after independence, enterprise's slow progress in finding the new 
markets, the effects of paying for energy at market prices, the very slow emergence of 
market structure, hyperinflation (Robinson, 1998, p. 38). 
Unstable legislation in economic sphere has complicated the economic reforms in the 
country. Research suggests that this situation has been very well explored by 
criminals (Kamlukand Nevmerzhickiy, 1998). Slow reforms and the role of 
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government in it have been one of the main reason for the current economic 
problems. It tends to be very difficult to break through the old bureaucratic habits of 
doing business, and the transition towards the responsible decision making is still in 
process. 
4.3 Legal framework to tackle economic crime and corruption 
4.3.1 General Provisions 
Ukraine has signed and ratified the Vienna Convention and the Council of Europe 
Convention. Ukraine has joined the CIS Council of Ministers, the particular goal of 
which is to combat crime in the former Soviet Union countries. Ukraine has also 
signed the counter-narcotics agreements with the United Nations Drug Control 
Program. In 1995 with the assistance of this program, Ukrainian Parliament passed 
drug-control laws. In 1994 a draft of the Anti-Money laundering law was introduced 
to the Ukrainian Parliament. In December 1997 Ukraine has signed and ratified 
Strasbourg Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure, and Confiscation of the 
proceeds from crime. A new Criminal Code was adopted in Autumn 2001, 
introducing new articles punishing financial fraud and money laundering. 
Specific offences (New Criminal Code of Ukraine, adopted in Autumn 2001) 
• Crimes committed in relation to property and connected to fraud (Criminal 
Code, Part VI, art. 185-198). For example, Article 191 punishes the abuse of the 
office power followed by embezzlement of state or collective property, its 
appropriation, and waste; 
• Crimes committed in the sphere of the state budget fulfilment ( Criminal 
Code, Part VII, article 210-211): Ukrainian budget legislation violation (Article 210); 
The adoption of the decrees potentially confusing the legal income-expenditure 
structure of the state budget (Article 211); 
• Crimes committed in the financial sectors (Criminal Code, Part VII, Art. 
199-235). For example, Manufacture, sale and circulation of the forged non-state 
securities (Article 224); Foreign currency earning concealment (Article 207); Tax 
evasion, failure to fulfil the obligatory payments (Article 212); Securities issue and 
circulation rules violation (Article 223); Forged mail or travel documents (Article 
215); Legalization (laundering) of money or other property illegally acquired (Article 
209). 
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• Crime committed in the entrepreneurial sphere (Criminal Code Part VII): 
Involvement into the legally forbidden entrepreneurial activity (Article 203); The 
entrepreneurs activity rules violation (Article 202); Fictions enterprises (Article 205); 
Financial Fraud (Article 222); Bankruptcy concealment (Article 220); Fictive 
bankruptcy (Article 218); 
• Crimes related to the anti-monopoly rules violation and dishonest 
competition: Illegal obtaining of commercial secrets (Article 231); Commercial 
secrets disclosure (Article 232); Agreement to fix the price (Article 228); 
• Crimes committed in the sphere of public service: Production and sale of 
poor quality goods (Article 227); Deceive of customers (Article 225); Breach of trade 
regulations (art. 155, p.3); 
• Crimes committed in the sphere of the custom regulation: Contraband 
(Article 201); 
• Crimes committed with the aim to destroy or to use illegally the work of 
the automatic system (art. Criminal code Part XVI, Articles 361-363). For example, 
computer crimes, such as illegal obtaining of some information by misuse of official 
posts (Article 362); 
• Crimes related to business practices and misuse of official position 
(Criminal Code, Part XVII, Articles 364-370), for example, Article 364 punishes the 
abuse of authority or business duties, Articles 366 and 367 deal with counterfeiting of 
official documents and unscrupulous or careless official activity, Articles 368, 369 
and 370 punish bribery of public officials as well as officials in corporation 
disregarding the forms of ownership. 
• Crimes related to the privatisation process (Articles 233-235), for 
example, illegal privatisation of the state property (Article 233). 
• Ukraine has adopted a series of presidential decrees, including Decree No 
1199/2001 (10 December 2001) "On the measures Aimed at Elimination of 
Legalisation of the Profits Obtained by Illegal Ways", Resolution No.35 (10 January 
2002) "On Establishment of the State Department of Financial Monitoring", and 
Resolution No.1 94 (18 February 2002). Regulation No.700 29 May 2002 provides 
guidance to what kinds of transactions financial institutions should consider as 
'doubtful and uncommon'. 
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4.4 The political elite in Ukraine 
To understand the problems Ukraine has experienced since the declaration of 
independence, there is a need to address the issue of the political elite formation in the 
country. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukraine had being left with almost no 
central authority. None of the following institutions was present in Ukraine: central 
government, political elite, effective democratic institutions, including parties, civic 
movements and non-governmental organisations. The presence of the above 
mentioned institutions generates political process and can guarantee the foundation of 
the democratic political regime. The paradox of the Ukrainian situation was the 
coexistence of two phenomenon: the so-called vacuum of the political centre from 
one side and the presence of an old administrative mechanisms of the Soviet type of 
politics. 
During the first years of independence and democratisation, the state apparatus was 
formed and reinforced due to the migration of many political leaders from different 
regions of Ukraine, but mainly from Western part of the country. Karasev describes at 
least three waves of such migration (2002). The first wave of the migration is the so-
called 'familiarization' of those who came to the capital with the characteristics of the 
central authority in the country. The majority of those who came during the first 
years were representatives from the Western part of Ukraine. These politicians 
formed a first coalition of national democrats and post-communist political elite. The 
second wave occurred as a result of dissatisfaction expressed by the 
political/business elite from the Eastern Ukraine. The elite in Eastern Ukraine did not 
support the national oriented presidency of Leonid Kravchuk (1991- 1993). Under the 
influence of East Ukrainian lobby, Ukrainian political elite was reinforced with a 
number of new political figures from the Eastern part of the country. Leonid Kuchma 
from Dnepropetrovsk became a Prime Minister in 1992. The third wave in the year 
1993 saw a rise of Doneck region and their mining lobby. Zvyagilky was then chosen 
as a prime-Minister. In 1994, Dnepropetrovsk elite had recovered its 'lost' influence, 
then Leonid Kuchma became a President, Lazarenko became a Prime-Minister, and a 
number of new people from the Dnepropetrovsk region were included in a new 
presidents command (including Julia Timoshenko, Tigipko, etc.). 
The so-called vacuum of political elite allowed the formation of a new type of elite-
people, those who made an unbelievably fast careers in politics in a short period of 
time. The central political arena of the country has now comprised a number of 
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political and business leaders representing different regions in the country. By the end 
of 90-s the centre of the political power in Ukraine was fonned. This centre has an 
interesting feature. Despite a big number of political parties and the presence of a 
number of groups in the Parliament, the centre of Ukrainian political elite is fonned 
on the basis of an alliance between the representatives of the resourceful regions and 
representatives of central power. All the 'pure' party activists were pushed to the 
periphery of the political life. The result is an absence of a united administrative 
management of the country and the fight between these 'resourceful regions' groups. 
The basis of the state is fonned not on the united cultural and political platfonn, but 
rather on the administrative pressure, regional sabotage and those who have enough 
resources to influence most. 
Karasev (2002) discusses two pillars of post-soviet political regime in Ukraine. The 
first one is the presidency, the administrative pillar, with the president at the top and 
'his people' all the way down to the bottom (regional authority, administrative and 
military structures). These people ensure the control of different regions and local 
self-governance. They also made an alliance with the regional authority and business 
elite to control recourses in the regions. In a number of regions such allies created a 
cultures of 'fathers' Cfathers'- regional leaders). Regional elite can be very powerful 
if it consolidates administrative and financial resources, and a number of powerful 
people. Such consolidation is very important during the electoral campaign. The 
second pillar of the post-soviet Ukrainian economy units is the three systems, namely: 
financial, budget and tax regulation. The post-soviet economy still depends on a 
number of different privileges, such as privilege to reallocate the budget money. In 
this system the loyalty towards the central authority would mean more privileges 
while planning the regional budget, more business privileges, including tax reduction. 
To summarise what has been said, the Ukrainian politics these days is the politics of 
the fight between the resourceful regions, and fight for more privileges. 
4.5 Case study 1: Economic crime and financial market: the results of the 
expert study in Ukraine 
The purpose of this study is twofold. First, we need to know the opinion of 
knowledgeable experts regarding the state of economic crime in different sectors of 
financial market in the country. Second, we need to identify the most affected by the 
economic crime sector of financial market in the country to conduct further analysis. 
60 
We will examine the existing regulatory norms and enforcement to understand 
whether the existing regulatory framework is adequate for the development of 
emerging market. 
The total number of the respondents questioned is twenty four. Among the experts 
interviewed were eight representatives from official government agencies (e.g., 
Verhovna Rada and the Ministry of Economics), and sixteen experts from the private 
sector. Experts from the private sector included those working in insurance 
companies, banking, money markets and the foreign currency exchange market, the 
stock exchange, trust companies, and investment funds. 
The introductory part of the questionnaire includes the political platform question. 
We want to know whether our respondents consider themselves as being politically 
active or not. Only 20% of the "business" respondents identified themselves as a 
party member or a party supporter. The majority is out of politics or pretend have 
neutral political views. Generally, ordinarily Ukrainian citizens tend to stay out of 
politics, blaming the corrupt activity of some ex-politicians and absence of 
constructive thoughts from the side of the new political elite. What is interesting, is 
that although economics and politics are tied together in Ukraine, only a small 
proportion of respondents representing financial market players has expressed strong 
support for certain political party. 
Three types of financial crime were identified in the questionnaire: money laundering, 
tax evasion and corruption. The respondents were to select the most popular. We did 
not limit the choice of options in the answer. 30% of respondents named all three 
types of economic crime as being widely practised in Ukraine. Sometimes it is 
impossible to distinguish which type of economic crime is primary and which is 
secondary. For example, tax evasion and corruption are at least two 'necessary' types 
of crime to gain the resources to launder money. Experts who singled out some of the 
types of crime as the most popular chose tax evasion (30%) and corruption (5%). Our 
results support the belief that a great proportion of economic crime has been provoked 
by unstable and repressive tax system in the country. According to the State Tax 
Administration, in the middle 90-s there had been a tendency to register fictitious 
companies to cover illegal activity, in particular tax evasion. According to some 
sources, in 1996, 33,4% of all registered private companies did not pay taxes (Kamluk 
and Nevmerzhickuy, 1998). 
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One of the intriguing topics in the study is experts involvement in the illegal 
economic activity in the course of their ordinary business. The question about 
personal involvement in economic crime is a very sensitive issue. However, in the 
case of Ukrainian reality the neutralisation techniques proved to overcome the so-
called 'sensitivity barrier'. The most widely used statement was 'everyone does the 
same'. Only 20% of the respondents answered that they have never encountered 
criminal activity in their business career. The majority (80%) answered that in one 
way or another they have been subjected to economic crime. Some respondents told 
that the involvement in the criminal activity in economic area occurs on a regular 
basis and does not constitute exceptional cases. By providing the alternatives to 
answer this question, we actually directed our respondents to think about corruption 
in the country. The answers proved th,e fact that corruption is widespread in Ukraine, 
especially among the high level state officials, involved in regulatory and economic 
activities. The limitation of government involvement in the nation's economic activity 
is one of the main issues. A number of international organisations have warned the 
Ukrainian Government about the danger of the state being so closely related to the 
economic activity (Transparency International, 2001; International ,Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development and World Bank, 2001). 
We asked our respondents to identify the most affected by economic crime financial 
sectors. The answers may be summarised in the following table. The level of 
criminalization is very high at number 1 and is low in number 7. 
Table 9. The impact of economic crime on financial market in Ukraine. 
1. Money market/foreign exchange market; 
2. Commercial banks/savings banks; 
3. Trust companies and investment funds; 
4. Insurance companies; 
5. Stock Exchange; 
6. Central bank. 
Insurance companies and stock exchange shared the fourth place in the table. Let us 
now consider each sector separately: 
1. Commerci~l and savings bank sector. According to the responses given, 
money laundering and corruption are the most popular crimes in this sector. 50% of 
the respondents identified the necessity to pay bribes in order to obtain the loan. The 
soundness of the projects would not be questioned then. Siegelbaum (1997) discusses 
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a form of "relationship" banking in the transition economies and suggests that 
borrowers face little risk given the creditors lack of effective remedies or bankruptcy 
procedures. This is why bribing bank officials or lobbying politicians to influence 
bank officials will help even unsound projects obtain loans. This situation prevents 
banks from having the most creditworthy customers. This highly politicised process 
of issuing loans has also been described in a report by the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development & World Bank (2001). Further, and OECD report 
stated that the system of government guarantees for credits obtained in hard currency 
from foreign lenders by Ukrainian companies needs to be eliminated as soon as 
possible. According to the OECD experts, this system encourages large-scale 
corruption and has resulted in enormous losses to the state treasury (OECD, 2001, 
p.25). 
2. Insurance companies. Money laundering through insurance companies 
received the biggest score. 40% of those who answered the question named insurance 
companies as the helpful tool to escape taxes and legalize money. 30% of respondents 
named the breach of the insurance obligations and insurance payment evasion as the 
typical crime in this sphere. 15% of respondent named corruption and bribery needed 
to insure the state companies and 15% named insurance of the high risk activities as 
the popular offence. 
3. Trust companies and investment funds. Involvement into the high risk 
activities named by 50% of the respondents. Bribing to escape penalties for the failure 
to return credit received 25% of responses. Financial fraud was named by 25 % of 
the respondents. 
4. Money market and foreign exchange market. 'Black exchange' was named 
by 50% of the respondents. Meaning tax evasion then exchanging currencies. 
Financial fraud named by 35% of the experts and money laundering received 15% of 
the answers. 
5. Stock and bond market. This sector is equally affected by tax evasion, 
breach of the securities issue regulations and insider trading. Although, only 30 % of 
the respondents identified this sector being exposed to economic crime. 
6. Central bank. One respondents told, this is "a sort of forbidden area for the 
discussion". None of the respondents named illegal activities connected to this sector. 
Let us now have a look at what our respondents think about the impact each specific 
crime has on the identified financial sector. 60% of "business" respondents 
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(representing the financial market players) think that illegal acts committed in the 
banking area have a positive impact and promote the development of the sector, and 
only 40% think that it prevents further development. However, considering the 
responses on the question about the general impact economic crime has, it tends to be 
that corruption in the banking sector goes to the first place and considered to be one 
of the factors which prevent the development of the whole financial market. Such a 
controversial data may be explained by a fact that in reality in Ukraine, bribing bank 
officials would give you the chance to receive a short term credit, but as one 
respondent answered 'it is almost impossible to get a long -term credit'. Almost the 
same tendency is observed when analysing the responses in regard to insurance 
companies. 55% of "business" respondents consider the activity of this sector as 
positive, 20% believe that it prevents the development and 25% answered that it does 
not have an essential impact. Those who believe in a positive impact have very good 
grounds to think so. They actually named money laundering as the most popular 
crime committed in this sector. Some businesses in Ukraine use the services provided 
by insurance companies to avoid high taxes and to legitimise money, which otherwise 
would be 'burdened by taxes'. Those who identified the negative impact economic 
crime has on the sector have previously noted the high rate of crime in regard to 
breaching the insurance obligations. Trust companies and investment funds activities 
prevent the development of the sector according to 40% of respondents and 60% of 
experts think that illegal activities do not have any impact at all. Money market and 
foreign exchange market as well as stock exchange suffered the 'normal' 
development according to 50% of all the experts questioned. 
A regulatory base for the existing financial market is also a very serious issue. Eighty 
percent of respondents involved in business activity think that the regulatory 
framework needs major restructuring and that it does not correspond with the needs of 
the emerging market. However, the majority of those representing official 
governmental bodies believe that the legislative framework has been properly 
developed or is currently in the process of development and revision. They believe 
the reasons why the existing legislation has not resulted in a positive outcome are 
seen in such issues as political pressure and corruption in the enforcement and control 
agencies. Seventy percent of the respondents believe that there is a lack of political 
will to enforce the regulations because of corruption inside the regulatory bodies. In 
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the meantime, the growth and development of financial markets in the country is 
stunted. 
These findings are in line with recent reports by such international organisations as 
Transparency International (2001) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development and World Bank (2001). The development of financial institutions and 
improvement of the financial market services in a country can be described as 
indicators of the effectiveness of the economic, political, and legal reforms and the 
dedication of the government to these reforms (Claessens, Djankov and Klingebiel, 
2000). Weak financial institutions, then, are vulnerable agents in a corrupt system 
(International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and World Bank, 2001). 
The results of the study suggest that the financial sectors under consideration have not 
been acting as agents to promote the development of the financial system as a whole, 
but rather serving as mediators to provide cover for political mistakes and/or those 
earning "easy money," as well as being a tool to avoid regulatory obligations. A few 
respondents in the pilot study, for example, argued that the insurance companies in 
the country exist for one main purpose, laundering money in order to avoid paying 
high taxes. Stock exchange suffered the lack of regulations and slow privatisation 
process, as well as mismanagement inside the privati sed companies. 
The respondents were asked to summarise the impact of economic crime on the 
development of the financial sector in general, and 85% agreed that the impact is 
negative, is preventing development, and is spreading corruption even deeper into 
society. 
The majority of experts agreed that the regulatory system is over-constrained and 
needs to be liberalised. The following are the proposed steps toward the liberalisation 
of the system: 
• The majority believes in changing tax legislation, as well as in 
stabilisation of legislation. 
• The development of the normative bases for the trust companies to work 
efficiently and the fulfilment of the existing rules as in case of the stock exchange 
formation. 
• 70% of respondents believe that introducing criminal responsibilities for 
breaching the credit obligations also followed by a few successful cases and 
conviction would only improve the investment environment in the country. 
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• Improving the joint-stock companies regulations was named by 40% of the 
respondents. 
• Simplifying the system of accountability of financial sector to the state 
establishments was named as one of the possible ways how to tackle corruption and to 
bring transparency in the sector. 
The emerging markets tend to experience a lot of difficulties on the way. In case of 
Ukraine, it has been burdened with complex and not stable regulatory bases, 
incredibly high tax rates and wide-spread of corruption. Unfortunately, the reality is 
that we can not speak about the development of the financial sectors to serve the 
economy as it is known in the West. At the moment, financial sectors, willingly or 
sometimes, because of the high political influence just serve immediate needs of the 
customers, which is either to avoid taxes or to invest in non-sound project. 
4.6 Shadow economy in Ukraine 
Shadow economy is not a new or recent phenomenon in Ukraine l • Some researchers 
believe that the actual "commencement" of the shadow economy occurred in the 
mid-80s, with the beginning of "perestroyka" (Popovich, 1997) the other suggest, that 
shadow economy had been a feature of the Soviet economic system for a long time 
(Simis, 1982). The World Bank named three types of activities which together create 
the shadow economic activity: 
"Illegal activities such as drug dealing, prostitution, protection rackets, and 
theft from state enterprises; marginal subsistence activities of micro 
enterprises that employ individuals and their family members; legal activities 
that are hidden from taxation, regulation, or other public scrutiny and official 
records" (World Bank, 1999, p. 25) 
The third type of activity is the largest and most developed in the country. It is 
explained by the existence of economic restrictions adopted by the central 
government during the Soviet time. "Few efforts were made to minimise production 
costs, including transportation .... draconian restrictions on trade, currency 
transactions, and private property and business made people reluctant to obey 
legislation and trust the government to protect their savings, investment and property" 
(World Bank, 1999, p. 25). The formal sector which was created during the Soviet 
I See the discussion of red-collar crime in Chapter 2, part 2.9. 
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time, and later inherited by the Independent Ukraine, is not efficient and does not 
promote the idea of being a good citizen. "In Ukraine the costs of being formal are 
excessively high, and the benefits doubtful" (World Bank, 1999, p.25). 
"Low benefits and high costs induce businesses to operate informally, 
reducing revenues to the state and undermining its ability to provide services 
that might attract businesses into the formal economy. The key cost 
encouraging shadow activity is the burden of regulations and taxes as they are 
implemented. If rules look fine on paper but officials have considerable 
discretion in implementing them - as in Ukraine - the result is a higher 
effective burden on business, more corruption, and a stronger incentive to 
move to the unofficial economy"(World Bank, 1999, p. 25). 
Excessive state intervention and tax system are named among the factors that have 
stimulated the growth of the shadow economy in Ukraine. Enterprises are heavily 
taxed in Ukraine. Appendix 1 shows the example of the ordinary taxation requirement 
for an enterprise in Ukraine. 
In 1997 Global Competitiveness Report rated the tax burden from the firm's 
standpoint, using scale of 1 to 7, the high score indicates that the tax system enhance 
competitiveness. Ukraine was one of the worst countries evaluated, with the score at 
l.58. According to the researchers, a one point increase in this index reduces the share 
of unofficial economy by 6.5 % (World Bank, 1999, p.26). 
"The high cost and small benefits of participating in the formal economy create an 
enormous informal sector. The World Bank estimates that half of Ukraine's economy 
is in the shadow. Much ofthis shadow activity is happening in mainstream 
enterprises. For example, a 1997 survey by the IFC found that 69% of Ukrainian 
small businesses fail to report at least 30% of their profits. Thus Ukraine's 
malfunctioning tax, regulatory, legal, and service delivery systems have driven 
mainstream businessmen to commit illegal acts in order to survive"(World Bank 
1999, p. 27). 
Studies suggest three methods of estimating the real size of shadow economy in 
Ukraine (Borodiuk and Turchinov, 1997). These methods are electricity consumption 
method, monetary method, and cash in circulation and taxation. The first method 
calculates a real GDP based on GDP of a known date in the past and changes in 
electricity-consumption since that date. It is assumed that electricity consumption will 
reflect changes in real GDP. The result is then compared with official data on GDP 
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and with estimated share ofGDP in the shadow economy. On this basis Borodiuk and 
Turchinov estimated the shadow economy at 38.1%,50.5% and 56.4 of the official 
GDP in 1993, 1994, 1995, respectively (World Bank, 1999, p.1l8). 
Monetary method suggests that the size of shadow economy depends on the amount 
of cash in circulation outside the banks. So that by examining changes in the key 
monetary aggregates, such as cash in circulation, and cash in hands, the size of 
shadow economy is estimated (World Bank, 1999, p. 118). Using this method 
Borodiuk and Turchinov estimated that the size of the shadow economy was 101 %, 
32%, and 158% of the official Ukrainian GDP in 1993, 1994, 1995 respectively. 
Cash in circulation method focuses on measuring influence of cash in hands and size 
of taxation on the size of shadow economy. The formula puts the size of shadow 
economy in direct proportion to the amount of cash in hands and inverse proportion to 
the size of taxation (World Bank, 1999, p.l19). The size of shadow economy was 
estimated at 30%,55% and 77.3% of the official GDP in 1993, 1994 and 1995. 
4.7 Financial market development in Ukraine 
As it has been discussed in previous chapters almost all transition economies have 
underdeveloped financial market mechanisms and institutions. Ukraine is not an 
exception. The typical financial development in most countries can be observed as a 
number of different indicators such as market capitalisation, market turnover, foreign 
financing and the existence of a strong group of institutional investors. 
4.7.1 Market capitalisation 
Market capitalisation is very low in Ukraine. As Table 4 shows the figure was 2 % in 
1998,3% in 1999 and 4% as on March 2000. This is significantly lower than the 
average 11 % of market capitalisation figure in transition economy. 
Table 10. The development of stock market in Ukraine (Bhattacharya & Daouk, 
2000). 
Country Establishm Company Market Dollar volume in Tumoverin Insider Trading 
entofMain listing in Main capitalisation of Main Exchange Main Laws 
Exchange Exchange Main Exchange (USD billion in Exchange Enforcement 
(end. 1997) (USD billion in 1997) 
end-1997) 
Ukraine 1992 6 0.212 nla nla No 
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It is believed that such good fundamentals as strong macroeconomic policy, advanced 
law system and disclosure requirements (Claessens, Djankov, Klingebiel, 2000, p. 3) 
are the preconditions to the large stock market in the country. 
Stock exchange had been open for more then 50 years before the Soviet power closed 
Kyiv exchange in 1930. Nowadays, there are three stock exchanges in Ukraine: The 
Ukrainian Stock Exchange (USE), the Kyiv International Stock Exchange (KISE) and 
the Donetsk Stock Exchange (DSE). Shares are also traded on the Ukrainian 
Interbank Currency Exchange (UICE) and, over the counter, on the PFTS (Ukrainian 
OTC Stock Trading System Association) electronic trading system. The stock 
exchange account for only 5% of equity turnover in Ukraine (Robinson, 1998, 
p.130). 
The stock exchange regulations are based on the following statutes: The Law of 
Ukraine "On securities and stock exchange", adopted in 18 June 1991, The Law of 
Ukraine "On the state regulation of the securities market", adopted in 30 September 
1996. In September 1995 Ukrainian Parliament adopted the Concept of the 
development and functioning of the stock exchange in Ukraine. In 1997 the President 
of Ukraine issued a decree "On the state commission on the securities and stock 
exchange". According to this decree it is the responsibilities of the state commission 
to control securities issue and circulation (except the privatisation voucher). The Law 
"On the state regulation of the securities market" identifies the fines and legal 
responsibilities of those who breach the regulations (including high level state 
officials). 
According to Article 3 of the Law of Ukraine "On securities and stock exchange", the 
following types of securities may be issued and traded: 
• shares, defined as securities that do not have defined flotation period and 
serve to prove the ownership of the statutory fund of a joint stock company and give 
the right to receive the part of the company's profit, as well as the portion of assets 
should the company cease to exist; 
• bonds issued by central and local authorities, defined as securities that 
serve as proof of payments made by their owner and assurance to repay the owner the 
nominal value of a bond as well as accrued interest at a specified date; 
• shares of companies; 
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• savings certificates, defined as the written bank's statement to prove the 
right of the account owner to withdraw the deposited funds as well as accrued 
interest; 
• promissory notes, defined as obligation to pay a specified amount of money 
at a specified date to the issuer of a promissory note; 
• privatisation certificates; 
• investment certificates issued by the investment funds and investment 
companies. 
Pursuant to the law described above, the following operations may be carried 
out on the securities market: 
• securities trade, defined as operations that involve buying the security 
either as authorised by a client (broker activity), for own benefit, or for the purpose of 
reselling the security to third parties (dealer activity); 
• depository activity, defined as providing services of securities safekeeping, 
keeping track of securities ownership and servicing the operations with securities; 
• clearing activity, defined as establishing mutual obligations under 
operations with securities; 
• managing securities, defined as authorisation to manage securities during 
specified period of time; 
• keeping track of owners of personal securities; 
• organisation of trade on the securities market, defined as provision of 
services to assist entering the contracts related to securities trade. 
The illegal activities on stock market are specified in article 223 of the Criminal 
Code of Ukraine. These articles, respectively are 'On false money and securities issue 
and trade', and 'On the breach of procedures of securities issue and circulation' . 
According to these provisions there are two types of offences. The first one relates to 
false securities issue and trade and the second type considers the breach of established 
procedures of securities issue, including the breach of registration procedures. There 
is no law on insider trading, however articles 231 and 232 of the Criminal Code 
proscribe the criminal liabilities in case of intentional disclosure of false information 
which may lead to the damage of someone's reputation and the commercial secrets 
disclosure with the aim to damage someone's reputation. According to article 51 of 
the Law 'On Prevention of Corruption', civil servants should not be a member ofa 
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directorate or management team of the financial establishments. Civil servants must 
not use their official business to assist in economic, credit and business activities. 
This can be applied to the stock market as well. 
4.7.2 Market turnover 
Most transition markets are illiquid (Claessens, Djankov, Klingebiel, 2000, p. 3), the 
exceptions are Hungary, Czech Republic and Poland. The average market turnover in 
transition economies is 30 %. Market turnover in Ukraine in 1999 was 12%, and as of 
March 1999, 19%. Ukraine is also among the list of countries with the high turnover 
concentration, which is above 80%. A few companies in Ukraine account for more 
than 95 % of the market turnover (Claessens, Djankov, Klingebiel, 2000, p. 3). 
4.7.3 Institutional investors 
This is the least developed part of the financial market in Ukraine. The three groups 
of the institutional investors: investment and mutual funds, pension funds and 
insurance present the least developed part of the Ukrainian financial market. Only 
pension funds amounted to 1% ofGDP. As Table 6 shows most of the transition 
countries have the pension funds assets underdeveloped and amounted at 1% ofGDP. 
The insurance funds and investment funds are in an embryonic state in Ukraine and 
the legal provisions needed to develop these sectors. 
There are a number of reasons why the financial market development is in such a 
infant state in Ukraine. Among these reasons are such as macroeconomic and political 
instability in the country, inefficient law enforcement, cultural issues, such as low 
level of law obedient behaviour and political ethics. 
4.7.4 Foreign exchange market 
Foreign exchange market is one of the important components of money market in the 
Ukrainian financial system. The National Bank of Ukraine established the foreign 
exchange market in 1992, then the Cabinet of Ministers adopted the decree 'On the 
system of foreign currency exchange regulation and control'. According to this 
decree the National Bank of Ukraine is the only structure in the country which is 
responsible for the development and control of the foreign currency regulation. In 
July 1993 the Decree adopted by the National Bank of Ukraine directorate 
transformed the Ukrainian Foreign Exchange Market into the Ukrainian Inter-
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Banking Foreign Exchange Market. The new decree stated the aim of the foreign 
exchange market as to regulate the trade and to determine the actual exchange rate 
policy in the country. At the beginning the foreign exchange market operated as a 
structure within the National Bank of Ukraine, and later it was registered as a joint-
stock company with 40 commercial banks being among the founders (each bank has 
2.5% of shares). 31 banks have been involved as the working operators and 106 banks 
registered as a member of foreign exchange market. The foreign exchange market has 
three sectors: foreign currency, stock and temporary contracts (Ushenko, etc., 1999). 
Only two currencies, USA dollars and Belorusia rubles, had operated in the 
beginning. In 1993 Russian rubles and deutschemarks were introduced, and in 1995 
French francs, sterling and Italian lira started to operate in the market. 
The Ukrainian Inter-Banking Foreign Exchange Market has four branches (in 
Dnepropetrovsk, Kharkiv, L'viv and Donezk).The Crimean Foreign Exchange Market 
was opened in 1994. 
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Table 11. The Ukrainian Inter-Banking Foreign Exchange Market. 
Branch 1994 (%) 1995(%) 1996(%) 1997(%) 1998(3 
months)(%) 
Kyiv (centr) 997 89.2 87.1 91.8 89.7 
L'viv 0.0 1.5 1.1 0.8 0.3 
Kharkiv 0.0 1.1 0.9 1.4 3.0 
Dneprop 0.3 8.2 11.0 6.1 7.0 
Donezk 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Source: Ushenko & Mishenko, 1999. 
To become a member of the Ukrainian Inter-Banking Foreign Exchange Market the 
following conditions of entry should be satisfied. The bank should have no less than 
50 clients and the total of the balance in foreign accounts should be more than 
500,000 USA dollars. There are also some conditions as to the correspondent banks 
accounts. 
Article 6 of the Cabinet of Ministers Decree 'On the system of foreign exchange 
regulation and control' (19.02.l993, No.l5-93) proscribes the responsibilities for 
breaching the regulations of foreign exchange. Articles 207 and 208 of the New 
Criminal Code of Ukraine punish illegal activity with foreign currencies, such as the 
abuse of regulation in regard to income obtained in foreign currency and illegal 
opening and using the bank accounts outside of Ukraine. 
4.8 Case study 2: Banking in Ukraine 
4.8.1 The starting points 
During the Soviet times savings were allocated through a government's budget and 
largely passive banking system. Financial decisions and assessments were made by 
the special planning department in accordance to an agreed budget. Banking system 
served as so-called "supplementary system" to maintain the industry. Krotuk defined 
the banking system in the USSR as a primitive structure (Krotuk, 2000). There was no 
such function as management of banking activity. Ukraine, as all of the Soviet Union 
Republics inherited the mono-bank system of the USSR. Almost all financial and 
credit operations were conducted in one bank, the Derzhbank and its two branches 
servicing specific areas of economy, Budbank and Zovnishstorg Bank. Derzhbank 
worked with short-term crediting, Budbank had a set of functions dealing with the 
long-term customers, and Zovnishtorg Bank operated with foreign clients (Krotuk, 
2000, pp. 12). As Robinson stated "by the time Ukraine achieved independence, the 
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country had no real banking system, just buildings. The capital was in Moscow" 
(Robinson, 1998, p. 142). 
Three stages of the development of Ukrainian banking system can be identified: from 
1991 to the 1994, from 1994 to 2000, and the third stage from the year 2000 to 
present. The first stage began in 1991, when Ukraine had to decide what to do with its 
remnant of the Soviet Union banking. In 1991 the Law of Ukraine On Banks and 
Banking (20.03.1991) was adopted. This law proclaimed the Ukrainian Republic 
branch of the Derzhbank as a property of Ukraine, and provided a legal background to 
establish the Central Bank- the National Bank of Ukraine (NBU). 
In the previous chapter we discussed different approaches towards banking reforms. 
We identified the new entry and rehabilitation approaches as the possible choice to 
transform old banking system. Ukraine adopted the new entry approach and in 1992, 
130 banks were organized. This number had almost doubled in 1993, about 207 banks 
were registered in the country. By the end of 1997,224 banks were registered in 
Ukraine. However, far less were actually functioning as banks. Chart 1 presents the 
data on the number of banks in Ukraine. For less than a year since Ukraine obtained 
independence in 1991, the number of banks had increased from less then ten to more 
than hundred. 
Chart 1. The number of banks in Ukraine, 1989-2001 
In summer 1991 NBU introduced a first set of instructions, addressing such issues as 
the interrelationship between NBU as a central bank and commercial banks. In 
summer 1992 NBU started introducing the system of licensing for those banks 
operating with foreign currency. In January 1994 the electronic payment system was 
introduced in all Ukrainian banks. In autumn 1991 NBU made first attempt to 
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introduce compulsory requirements to the minimum capital required to establish 
bank. However, minimum capital was set at a very low level. 
Table 12. Statutory capital paid by banks, 1992-2001 in mIn. Hrv. 
Year 1989 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Number of 
bankslYear 30 II 28 30 29 27 14 03 95 92 
Statutory 
capital paid, mIn. fa .5 5 7 41 098 560 107 914 666 028 
Hrv 
Mean 
statutory capital fa .004 .07 .4 .4 .8 .9 .8 4.4 8.8 1.0 
paid by one bank, 
mIn. Hrv 
As Table 12 shows mean statutory capital paid by one bank is very low in the early 
90-s. It was increased in 1996 and 1997 due to the changes in the banking regulation 
and rising level of the minimum statutory capital to be paid. According to the data of 
the National Bank of Ukraine, in the year 2000 the total capital of all Ukrainian banks 
was about 1.1 billion SUS. 
The first stage is characterised by the extremely liberal policy adopted by NBU 
toward the licensing of new commercial banks. Many new private banks were 
established by enterprises and functioned as pocket banks. Ukraine was not an 
exceptional case, and the majority of newly independent countries had experienced 
the same problem (see Fleming, Chu, Bakker, 1996 for the examples of Baltic 
countries experience). The majority of commercial banks established between 1993-
94 could not function properly. Economic crises and high level of inflation were the 
obvious reasons which caused troubles for a lot of banks. However, this was not the 
only reason. Lack of educated staff and a very close connections a lot of banks had 
with the Ukrainian industry were named as negative causes. Four out of five banks 
had their statutory capital formed with the state enterprises finances. This lead to the 
high dependency on clients, representing state enterprises and almost lost interest in 
the independent clients. The Degree of the Cabinet of Minister of Ukraine from 31 
December 1992 prohibited involvement of state enterprises in any type of business 
activity, to avoid further disruption of the banking sector. 
The second stage began at the end of 1994, characterised by the introduction of a 
number of regulations related to the supervision of the commercial banks activity. 
Although, new regulations were introduced, this period was characterised by 
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deepening economic crises, poor bank management and poor risk assessment in 
lending. During the year 1995-96, 65 banks went bankrupt (Krotuk, 2000, p. 17). 
Table 13. Number of banks breaching the banking regulations, 1992-2000. 
Year 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
N of banks 3 6 11 1 11 10 16 11 9 liquidated due to 
the breach of 
banking 
relUllations 
N of banks with 3 1 0 7 26 5 9 0 9 
recalled licenses 
due to the breach 
of the foreign 
currency 
operations 
According to the data presented in Table 13 in 1996, 26 banks lost their license to 
operate with the foreign currency because of the breach of the banking regulation (the 
total number of banks holding the licenses was 146 as of 1996). With the adoption of 
the Constitution of Ukraine, the National Bank of Ukraine had received the legal 
foundation to operate. Article 99 of the Constitution of Ukraine states that the 
National Bank of Ukraine (NBU) is a state central bank, whose main function is to 
provide currency stability (see Eremenko for the critic of this choice)2. By the end of 
the 90s, with more than 200 banks registered in the country, the National Bank had 
finally realised the importance of a managerial function, and such issue as 
commercial banks' supervision became of particular importance. Since 1999 the 
National Bank has prioritised such functions as regulatory and supervisory functions. 
NBU stresses the importance of reforms in the state credit policy, introduction of the 
world best experience in inter-banks payments 
The third stage began in 2000. As we mentioned already, financial sector reforms 
involved transformation of a virtually passive banking structure of a centrally planned 
economy into an active financial sector supporting the development of the real sector. 
Introduction of the market reforms changed the monopolistic system. Two banking 
systems were created with central and commercial banks functioning separately. One 
2To be in line with the IMF policies, Ukraine, as many eEE countries, had followed the IMF 
recommendations to single out monetary stabilisation as a top priority for the central bank. Many 
experts argue that such a narrow policy does not create the right environment for the development of 
the financial institutions in transitional countries (Eremenko, 2000). For example, Eremenko (2000) 
writes, "Setting money stability as the only main target of the central bank is certainly the right thing to 
do in the case of hyperinflation. There is no evidence, however, that this stability should be the main or 
only target in an environment of moderate inflation. Moreover, such a narrow targeting enables the 
authorities to intervene more easily in the financial sector in order to finance budget deficit or to 
siphon off funds to selected enterprises or individuals" (Eremenko, 2000, p.5S.). 
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of the reasons for such separation was the autonomy the newly created banks would 
obtain in the area of credit allocation. 
During the years 2000-2001 the State policy was centred on banking sector 
improvements, and, also on stressing the importance of the role of banks in economic 
transition. The main priority for the year 2001 was an increase of the investments into 
the real economy. Changes to two major legal acts related to banking were adopted 
during that two years: The Law of Ukraine "On Banks and Banking", from 7 of 
December 2000, and The Degree of the President of Ukraine "On measures to 
improve banking system in Ukraine and on improvement of the role of banks in the 
processes of economic transformation" N 891, from 14 July 2000. These normative 
acts set up the main directions to develop the systemic program on the development 
of banking in Ukraine in 2001-2003. 
Table 14. Banks in Ukraine, as on April 2001. 
Total number of registered banks 194 
Total number of banks with foreign capital 31 
Total number of banks holding licenses to 150 
operate with foreign currency 
Total number of banks liquidated during 1991- 76 
1999 
Total number of banks which are currently in 37 
the process of liquidation 
Total number of banks with the assets more 47 
than 100 million hryvnia (less than SUS 18mln) 
Number of banks with 100% of foreign capital 7 
3.86 
Total statutory capital of registered banks billion Hrv 
(approximately 
SUS 700mln) 
Source: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development! The World Bank 
Report, 2001, p. 32. 
Simple calculation of the data presented in this table shows that excluding banks with 
the assets more than Hrv.lOO million, the mean average assets for the rest, 147 banks, 
would be about Hrv. 5.7 million (about $US I million). In general, the main 
indicators of bank performances improved. The banking system had about 30 million 
Hrv lost in the year 2000, and it started to make a recovery in the first part of2001, 
making 187 million Hrv in profit. Balance capital grew by 8.3 %. There was a 
positive sign in recovery of the general population interest to long-term bank deposits. 
The banks credit portfolio increased 
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on 14.4 %. However the problems remained to be the same: low level of bank 
capitalisation, low quality of assets, substantial number of unrecoverable loans, not 
sufficient interest to reorganise and restructure banks, weak development of the 
property market, which unable banks to develop a system of risk covering, like 
mortgages. 
4.8.2 The crises 
During the mid-90-s a lot of Former Soviet Union republics experienced crises in 
banking. For example, banking crises in Estonia in 1992, in Latvia in early 1995, and 
in Lithuania in late 19953• 
While the Ukrainian banking sector had escaped serious crises, at least two events had 
shaken the stability of emerging banking: crises in Russia in 1998, and bankruptcy of 
two big banks, "Ukraine" Bank and Slovyanskiy Bank. Three factors mitigated the 
danger of systemic crises in Ukraine: (i) slow progress on privatisation and other 
structural reforms, (ii) high inflation 'minimised' the effect of bad loans, and (iii) 
ongoing distortion in the economy, and ongoing volatility of many key prices, 
including that of foreign exchange (Roe, Siegelbaum, King, 1998, p.,14). 
In Ukraine some deeply insolvent banks were still considered to be 'safe', due to the 
state subsidies allowing to cover losses. While these banks could be safe for some 
time, they were very unsafe from the perspective of taxpayers, who somewhere in the 
future would be liable to cover bank's losses. 
Ukrainian banking system had substantial losses after two big banks collapsed. Here, 
we present a brief history of the "Ukraine" Bank. 
The "Ukraine" Bank was established in September 1990. This period would later be 
characterised by the absence of adequate bank supervision and control, aggravated by 
macro-economic instability (like hyperinflation). All these irregularities created a safe 
environment for suspicious practices in banking (the interest rate reached 700% a 
year at some stage). Experts argue that during these years a lot of banks had created a 
portfolio of 'hopeless' credits. However, a lot of big banks, such as OshadBank and 
UkrsocBank, had managed to recover. These banks had better management and 
strong control from the side of the management. The "Ukraine" Bank had the 
3 For the detailed study of banking crises in the Baltic countries see Fleming, Chu, and Bakker (1996) 
The Baltics- banking crises observed, The World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 1647. 
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disadvantage of a constantly changing management, which would often abuse bank 
information and act against the bank's interest. 
As in April 2001, the balance was about 4.5 billion Hrv, the credit portfolio was 1.37 
billion Hrv, of which more than 70 % were credits allocated to enterprises working in 
agriculture. The structure of the "Ukraine" Bank consisted of the main office, 26 
regional directorates and more than 1100 branches. More than 1.7 million people, and 
around 200,000 legal entities were bank depositors. The Bank had around 337,000 
shareholders. 
As a result of activity in the year 2000, the Bank had losses of91,152 million Hrv. 
About forty foreign banks and companies extended credit to the bank, and the total 
credit allocated to the bank was $70 million Hrv. As on July 2001 deposits of physical 
entities accounted for 271 million Hrv ($50.4million), and the bank's liquid assets 
were estimated to be around 290 million Hrv ($53.9 million). 
The Parliament supported the idea of creating a special commission to investigate the 
financial activity of the "Ukraine" Bank. According to some sources, as of 1 May 
2001, the credit portfolio of the Bank had 800 million Hrv in delayed credit payments. 
The court received the cases on the Bank's failure to pay $30 million and 150 million 
Hrv credit payments. Its losses accounted for about 353.6 million Hrv, and during 
January - April 2001 this amount increased by 37.2 million Hrv. The Bank owed 0.5 
billion Hrv to other banks. It received 320 million Hrv as credit from the National 
Bank of Ukraine. In total, the bank spent 137.2 million Hrv to buy credit from other 
banks. One of the conditions upon which the International Monetary Fund would re-
open the credit line in Ukraine was the end to the long saga of the financial problems 
of the "Ukraine" Bank. 
On 16 August 2001, the Attorney General's Department requested 160 credit files 
from the Bank. One of its former managers was accused of illegal activity which led 
to losses of more than 1 million Hrv. During 1997- 2000, bank officials authorised 
almost irrevocable loans to some commercial structures. The total sum of the loans 
issued was 330 million Hrv. The Attorney General's Department accused these bank 
officials of simply stealing 3.5 million Hrv from the Bank. 
Results of the year 2000 showed that the majority of Ukrainian banks came to the end 
of the financial year with good results. Losses were reported only in 12 banks. 
However, the amount of losses in these banks was sufficient to make total banks 
profit negative. In total banks lost 30 million Hrv. One of the reason for this is 
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financial trouble in three banks: Oshadbank and "Ukraine" Bank losses accounted for 
nearly 124 million Hrv, and Slovyanskiy Bank losses accounted for 325 million Hrv. 
Criminal investigation followed the official announcement of financial troubles in 
Slovyanskiy Bank and "Ukraine" Bank. 
Five years, from 1996 to 2000, showed a sharp increase in the number of crime 
committed in banking sector. In 1995,362 offences were registered. Among them 92 
were committed by organised groups. In 1996 the number of crimes registered in 
banking sphere had risen to 3721, and 244 were committed by organised groups. The 
number is almost doubled in 1997, 6227 crimes were registered, and among them 361 
crimes were committed by organised groups (Kamluk and Nevmerzhickiy, 1998, p. 
99). 
4.8.3 The underlying causes 
It is difficult to uncover the complex web of causes which led to the criminalization 
of the banking industry in Ukraine. However, we can discuss a number of systemic 
factors involved in the criminalization process. These factors pressured the solvency 
of banks and created incentives for unsound banking practices. 
Transitional literature categorises these systemic factors under the following broad 
headings: 'poor regulation and supervision, poor accounting and excessive taxation, 
an inadequate legal infrastructure for bank lending, and pervasive corrupt practices 
coupled with weak banking skills and mismanagement on a significant scale' 
(Fleming, Chu, Bakker, 1996, p.26). The above-mentioned factors are interrelated. 
For example, poor regulation and supervision could be considered a result of 
negligence and corruption of government officials. At the same time, the lack of 
adequate bank supervision created a safe environment for corrupt practices. 
4.8.3a Banking regulation and supervision 
Banking supervision is a difficult subject in developed and financially advanced 
countries, and it presents a lot of problems for transitional countries. However, 
whereas Western banking considers supervision a necessary mechanism to reduce 
individual and systemic risks, transitional countries consider supervision to be 
another form of political pressure. Transitional countries should start with 
establishing independent regulatory mechanisms, free from political pressure. 
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As discussed earlier, during the first years of independence, in the early 90s, the 
National Bank of Ukraine had a very liberal policy towards the entry of new banks. 
Even in the mid 90s, when the problems were identified, the implementation of 
regulations remained a serious issue. A good example of the supervisors inability to 
impose new regulations is the issue of a minimum authorised capital requirement for 
new and existing banks. A few years after this requirement was introduced, some 
Ukrainian banks still struggle to meet minimum capital requirements (Caprio, Hunter, 
Kaufman, and Leipziger, 1998). 
It is important to understand the problem of banking regulation in the context of the 
economic and financial development of the country. The old Soviet system of 
regulation was very repressive, the emphasis was on almost literal obedience. The 
new market-oriented system brought a different concept of relationship between the 
state and financial institutions. The main idea of this concept is co-operation. The 
problem is how to adopt this new system to the reality faced by transitional countries. 
To some extent, we may argue that, in general, transitional countries experience wide 
spread ignorance of existing rules. This may negatively influence the financial 
institution's environment. It may be argued that strong and transparent supervision of 
the banking sector could positively influence the development of a safe economic 
environment in general, and a safe environment for financial institutions in particular. 
In Ukraine, as in many other transitional countries, currency stability was chosen as a 
prime objective of central bank policy. IMF considered monetary stabilisation as a top 
priority for the newly developed countries. 
As Eremenko (2000, p. 60) writes, "In politically unstable countries with a high level 
of corruption, and particularly in ex-USSR countries, price stability as the sole target 
On monetary policy provides the authorities with greater freedom to achieve short-
term objectives and pursue personal interests. It also enables a government to justify 
financial repression and to subsidise enterprises favoured by particular officials. 
Moreover, there is no evidence of gains from very low inflation, especially in 
transition economies. In fact the opposite seems to be the case. A policy enforcing 
"artificial" stability, not supported by economic and institutional fundamentals, could 
result in missed opportunities to pursue other goals, while gaining little from stable 
prices. After all, in transition economies, price stability is not the main factor in 
investment decision-making: there are other, much more serious problems related to 
the tax system, contract enforcement, corruption, etc.". 
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The following regulatory inefficiencies complicate banking in Ukraine: the absence 
of an independent body to supervise banks and other financial institutions; indecisive 
action from the NBU towards bad banks, fast privatisation of state banks, problems 
with implementation of adequate regulations to control bank secrecy and disclosure of 
information; inadequate regulation, which allows excessive use of barter operations 
and delayed credit payments; involvement of commercial banks in the NBU's 
monetary problems; and transfer of state regulatory functions, such as foreign 
currency control, to the commercial banks. The last, but definitely not the least, is the 
lack of transparency in the regulatory practice of the NBU and the absence of clear 
rules applicable to all banks. This has resulted in the different treatment which the 
NBU provides to different banks (the NBU may choose a bank to help cover debts, to 
provide some financial assistance, or contrary to the financial help, the NBU can fine 
the bank and refuse to provide financial assistance). The other loophole in supervision 
is the absence of a 'bad' enterprises official register (those with the 'bad' borrowers' 
records). Such enterprises should not be eligible to borrow unless the previous debt 
payment is made. 
4.S.3b Accounting and taxation 
As in many countries of the former Soviet Union, banks in Ukraine continued to use 
the old Soviet chart account. The introduction of accounting and reporting 
requirements began in 1994-1995. In Ukraine, as in other former Soviet Union 
countries, the distinction between supervisory and tax accounting was initially an 
unknown concept. Almost common practice for the FSU countries was explained in 
those days as better banks using profit and loss data after hypothetical provisioning to 
determine dividends payouts, while corrupt banks were using this loophole to drain 
funds out of their banks through large dividends payouts out of non-existent profits 
(Fleming, Chu, Bakker, 1996, p.27). As a result of such regime many 'good' and 
'bad' banks were taxed on the basis of fictitious profits. In Ukraine, this problem has 
been addressed only recently. The level of the taxes imposed on banks is very high in 
Ukraine, and in total is about 70%. It has been argued that in a system where the 
taxation of bank profits is punitive, substantial negative consequences may flow from 
introducing transparency through Western accounting and loan loss provisioning 
techniques (Roe, Siegelbaum, King, 1998). The authors write that "complex 
prudential regulations and discretionary principles of bank supervision can present 
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new and lucrative opportunities for rent-seeking on the part of politicians and 
bureaucrats, especially where social and legal controls on corrupt behaviour have 
been weakened in the transition" (Ibid. p.7). 
4.S.3c Legal infrastructure for bank lending 
Financial system development in transitional countries is difficult without advances in 
the legal system. In many FSU countries, a legal framework supporting bank lending 
was missing at an early stage. For example, the development of the banking industry 
strongly depends on such procedures as bankruptcy and collateral recovery. Both 
procedures had been underdeveloped in Ukraine4• 
As we write, the following areas of banking in Ukraine are underdeveloped: the 
circulation of securities bills, the management of state budget allocations, liquidity 
provisions, insurance of deposits and bankruptcy legislation. From the early years of 
independence, appropriate corporate governance and accountability provisions for 
banks were missing. This led to a lack of information and regulation on such issues as 
the duties and responsibilities of bank shareholders and the supervision of board 
members and managers. Lack of knowledge or negligence from the side of the NBU, 
led to the fact that a number of bad banks were given subsidies, which never helped 
the recovery process, and on the contrary, only worsened the financial situation of 
that bank. The bankruptcy of the "Ukraine" Bank, one of the eight biggest banks in 
the country, has been named as a supervisory fault. The problems with the "Ukraine" 
Bank began in 1998. Since then, through the intercession of the National Bank of 
Ukraine, the "Ukraine" Bank has received substantial help from state budget money. 
By summer 2001, it became obvious that it was no longer possible to cover the 
activity of the bankrupted bank. In total, the "Ukraine" Banks's debt to depositors 
was around Hrv 270m (arOlmd US$ 50m). In July 2001, authorities opened the 
investigation into the reasons of the bankruptcy of the "Ukraine" Bank. The 
Ukrainian Prime Minister, Mr Kinah, said that it is necessary to find those responsible 
for the bankruptcy of one of the biggest banks in the country (Ukrainian News, 200 I). 
4.S.3d Corrupt practices 
.. However, many bankers realised that in a weak and corrupt judicial system the collateral recovery is 
not an effective risk control device. 
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There are a number of factors which determine the scale of corrupt practices inside 
the banking industry. First of all, in a society where corruption is systemic, corrupt 
practices inside financial institutions constitute alternative forms of management. For 
example, bad supervision can be a product of corrupt exchange or corrupt agreement. 
Second, corruption or the threat of politically-influenced supervision leads to 
inequality in the treatment of banks. Third, a weak judiciary system leaves almost no 
chance for successful prosecution of corrupt practices. 
Corrupt practices in banking include the following examples: allocation of 'cheap' 
state-budget money into banks with 'special' connections; inequality of banks; 
different activities of 'pocket' banks (banks created as funding mechanisms by groups 
of entrepreneurs). 
4.S.3e The policy response 
The fact that the majority of banks had positive results at the end of financial year 
2000 should be considered as the positive outcome of the state policy aiming on 
strengthening banking sector in the country. 
The Law of Ukraine "On the banks and banking activity" is the basis for the 
regulation of the credit and banking practices. In 1998 NBU adopted a number of 
instructions with the aim to supervise and strengthen the banking system. These 
instructions increase the minimum authorized capital requirement for new and 
existing banks (to one million ECU), the solvency ratio limited the ratio of a bank's 
total capital to total risk-weighted assets to 8%; set up standards to single borrower 
exposure (maximum is 25%); identifies maximum amount oflarge credits (limited by 
the ratio of total loans exceeding 10 % to 8 times the bank's capital) and maximum 
investment in shares, as well as maximum insider lending (to be reduced from 100% 
of capital to 25%) and maximum borrowing from the interbank market and the NBU 
(should not exceed 300 % of a bank's capital). In 1998, after the registered banks 
submitted the information to NBU, it became clear that among 189 banks submitted 
information, 127 violated some of these norms (Robinson, 1998, p. 146). 
Unfortunately, these regulations are not always satisfied. There have been a lot of 
Cases reported involving banks failing to fulfil the minimum capital requirements. 
The Old Criminal Code prohibited such activities as tax evasion, fictitious 
entrepreneurial activity, financial fraud, concealment of bankruptcy and fictitious 
bankruptcy. Matysovskiy (1999) considers the importance of the financial fraud 
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article in the Old Criminal Code. It prescribed criminal responsibility for the 
provision of false documentation and information to the state organisations, banks or 
credit institutions with the aim to obtain tax relief, credit or subsidies. 
To avoid further criminalization of financial establishments the New Criminal Code 
introduced article 209 that punishes laundering of the illegally acquired gains, article 
200 punishes illegal activity in banking sphere, such as illegal electronic money 
transfer. 
The Criminal Code of Ukraine specified the responsibility for opening up and use of 
the accounts in foreign currency out of the Ukraine without the prior consent of the 
with National Bank of Ukraine. The object of this type of crime is the profit in foreign 
currency, enterprise accounts opened without the agreement with the National Bank 
of Ukraine. However, the problem is to define 'the profit'. For example, the illegal 
foreign currency flow is possible in the form of fictitious enterprises or agreement 
between the company in Ukraine and abroad. These fraudulent companies are called 
'one day' companies, because they are established with the only aim which is "to 
transfer bearer bonds into local cash and then to transfer this into foreign currency 
with the aim to bring it abroad and use it in some overseas shadow economy" (Osyka, 
2001, p. 122). According to some sources, the Nauru island has about 35 branches of 
Ukrainian banks and more than 200 trade accounts. This bring us to the problem of 
money laundering control in the country. 
The introduction of the system to control, prevent and counteract the legalisation of 
proceeds of crime has only started in the year 2000. It has been a very difficult 
political issue to discuss at a high level. The draft of the Law of Ukraine, 'On 
prevention and Counteraction of Legalisation of the Proceeds of Crime' was prepared 
in the year 2000. The draft law includes five section: general provisions (articles 1 
and 2), the state control of financial transaction to prevent legalisation of the proceeds 
of crime (articles 3-12), counteraction to legalisation of the proceeds of crime (articles 
13-18), international co-operation for the prevention and counteraction of legalisation 
of the proceeds of crime (articles 19-21), and section five on final provisions. The 
draft law regulates relations in the area of prevention and counteraction of the 
proceeds of crime being put into legal turnover, as well as their seizure and liability 
for legalisation of such proceeds (article 1). The Law may apply to actions committed 
outside Ukraine by Ukrainian citizens and aimed at legalisation of the proceeds of 
crime (article 1). Proceeds of crime is identified as any criminally acquired money or 
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securities, movable and immovable property, property rights, items of intellectual 
property, or any other items covered by property rights (article 2). Financial 
transactions include the following: bank account transactions, cash transaction, 
international money transfer, crediting transactions, movable and immovable property 
transaction (article 2). Legalisation of the proceeds of crime means any action taken 
to make legal the proceeds of crime by means of: concealment or wilful distortion of 
information on their origin, source or location, or making modifications in the rights 
to them; as well as use of such proceeds as legal in any financial transaction or other 
agreement or in business or any other economic activities (article 2). A financial 
transaction is subject to control if its amount exceeds 5,000 Euro (article 4). Tree 
major controlling agencies discussed in the draft: financial operators, i.e. commercial 
banks, finance and credit institutions; special governmental agencies authorised to 
monitor financial operations; and special units set up in the state tax services (article 
5). To control financial transaction the following measures are considered: 
identification of the initiator of a financial transaction, detection and registration of 
any doubtful transaction, reporting the doubtful transaction to a special unit of state 
tax service, and record making and verification of the reported doubtful transaction by 
the special unit of state tax service (article 6). Criminal Code punishes the legalisation 
of money or property illegally acquired (article 209). 
The draft program of preliminary measures on introduction of the system to control, 
prevent and counteract the legalisation of proceeds of crime includes the following 
spheres: legislative regulation; organisation, management, information, scientific-
methodological, staff, and material support; international co-operation. In the sphere 
of legislative regulation the following topics are considered: elimination of 
contradictions in regulating the grounds and procedures of restricting the scopes of 
commercial and banking secrets, giving the information on movement of money by 
the organisations, conducting financial operations; enlarging the sphere of grounds 
and mechanism of civil liability for actions, connected with obtaining and using the 
money and other assets, gained in an illegal way; improvement of the normative 
regulation of operations, conducted by residents or non-residents through the 
correspondent accounts type LORO and NOSTRO, as well as the control over the 
movement of money being on correspondent accounts with the aim to eliminate the 
possibility of their use for laundering of proceeds of crime, or tax evasion. In the 
sphere of organisation, management, information, scientific-methodological, staff, 
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and material support the following issued considered: introduction of a system to 
communicate information on financial transactions (for example, establishing a 
department as a part of the state taxation service, to combat non-paying taxes and 
laundering the proceeds of crime); and creation of an integrated bank of data on 
unfair subjects of financial-crediting and banking activity. In the sphere of 
international co-operation the aims include bringing the current national legislation in 
line with international regulations preventing and counteracting the legalisation of 
proceeds of crime, establishing co-operation with information-analytical centres 
(groups) of other countries to monitor and prevent financial crimes as well as to 
obtain relevant information (see Appendix 1). 
4.8.4 Efficiency analysis in banking: methodological problems 
The intensity of the European financial integration, and the increasing number of 
emerging transition banking system, have brought the topic of efficiency analysis of 
the banking systems in different countries. While there are certain rules regarding 
how to measure the efficiency of banking system in Western economies, the analyses 
of the banking industry in transition economies has to employ some specific 
characteristics that are likely to influence bank behaviour and safety. 
To begin the evaluation of financial institutions performance researchers need to 
identify those production unites that by some standard perform well from those that 
perform poorly. This can be done with the help of non-parametric or parametric 
frontier analysis. Berger and Humphrey identify three ways how the obtained 
information can be used: "( 1) to inform government policy by assessing the effects 
of deregulation, mergers, or market structure on efficiency; (2) to address research 
issues by describing the efficiency of an industry, ranking its firms, or checking how 
measured efficiency may be related to the different efficiency techniques employed; 
or (3) to improve managerial performance by identifying 'best practices' and 'worst 
practices' associated with high and low measured efficiency, respectively, and 
encouraging the former practices while discouraging the latter" (Berger, Humphrey, 
1997, p.l75). 
Frontier analysis had been described as 'a sophisticated way to 'benchmark' the 
relative performance of production units' (Ibid., p.l75). Berger and Humphrey argue 
that frontier analysis "permits individuals with very little institutional knowledge or 
experience to select 'best practices' firms within the industry, assign numerical 
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efficiency values, broadly identify areas of input overuse and/or output 
underproduction, and relate these results to questions of government policy or 
academic research interest" (Ibid., p.175). Frontier analysis provides "an overall, 
objectively determined, numerical efficiency value and ranking of firms (also called 
X-efficiency in the economic literature) that is not otherwise available" (Ibid., p.176). 
Researchers indicate the need to analyse productivity, efficiency and differences in 
technology in one given country and to be able to compare the obtained results with 
the similar findings from different country (Pastor, Perez, Quesada, 1997). Computed 
efficiency indicators are usually based on the use of production, cost or profit 
frontiers. Experts describe the production frontier as the maximum attainable level of 
output, given a level of inputs, or the minimum level of inputs required to produce a 
given output. The profit frontier studies maximum level of profits that can be 
obtained given a set of output and input prices (Ibid., p. 396). Optimality was named 
as the common characteristic of these three frontiers (Ibid., p.396). The above 
mentioned frontiers derived from a maximum or minimum condition under given 
conditions on technology and prices describing a frontier or a boundary (Ibid., p.396). 
The estimation of the distance from each observation to such frontier would provide 
efficiency level data. 
The study of the Spanish banking system Pastor et al (1997) employed a production 
frontier analysis. The productive change was estimated through the use of Malmquist 
indexes. "These indexes use the notion of distance function, so that a previous 
estimation of the corresponding frontier is required. Such estimation is carried out by 
using data envelopment analysis (DEA), a non-parametric deterministic frontier 
method based on mathematical linear programming" (Pastor, et aI, p.396). 
Roe, Siegelbaum, and King (1998) employed the risk frontier technique to analyse 
banking problems in transitional countries. The framework based on the analytical 
approach of asymmetric information, which discusses adverse risk selection when 
riskier borrowers could pay more for credit, and moral hazard, with riskier borrowers 
involving in greater risk in the deployment of funds to generate better returns. 
Information Processing Capability is "a function of the individual's bank's ability to 
collect and process information about the economy in general and specific enterprises 
in a way that generates valid conclusions of relevance to the banks profitability and 
risk profile" (Roe, Siegelbaum, King, 1998, p.,9). 
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Graph 2. Banking sector risk frontier (Roe, Siegelbaum, King, 1998, p. 9). 
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Sophistication of Bank Products represents "a continuum of commercial 
banking activities and products with the operational complexity increasing 
cumulatively with moves to the right along the axis" (Ibid., p., 9). So that, for 
example, direct credits to state enterprises would appear at the far left of the axis, and 
sophisticated activities such as project finance and derivatives fall to the far right of 
the axis. The horizontal axis, representing the sophistication of commercial banks 
activities may be presented as following: 
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Figure 1. The sophistication of bank products. 
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Banking sector risk frontier identifies that "level of information processing capability 
required to engage in an activity having a given level of sophistication without 
incurring an unreasonable level of risk" (Ibid., p.l 0). The authors agree that the 
precise shape of the Risk Frontier may be a subject for discussion, and to justify the 
proposed frontier the assumption is made, that in order to progress the development 
of financial institutions in the country which used to be deeply involved into the 
government directions into lending the significant increase in banking skills and 
information processing infrastructure is necessary. Also, the operating environment, 
such as legal infrastructure, macro-economic conditions, structural reforms, and 
reform in banking regulation would contribute to the quality, and risk taking in 
particular in banking. One additional factor should be considered, which is very 
important to the country experiencing changes in social values and norms. This 
factor is trust. Trust is important when we consider the attitudes of general public to 
the financial institution, or the relationship between commercial counterparts. 
Social trust is closely related to the issue of asymmetric information (Greenwald and 
Stiglitz, 1987), a situation where one side of market has better information than the 
other on options and incentives, an the less informed side is aware of its informational 
disadvantage (Bossone, 2002). Incomplete trust, or awareness that others may seek to 
pursue inappropriate gains either through deliberately reneging on obligations due to 
earlier commitments, or by hiding information relevant to transactions, has been 
considered as the core of the asymmetric information (Bossone, 2002). 
The analysis of individual bank in transitional country according to the above 
presented theory would lead to the following picture. The majority of banks in 
transition countries provide very simple services, such as directed credits, short and 
long- term credits. So, that the axis presenting the sophistication of bank procedures is 
very simple. 
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Graph 3. Risk profile of a specific bank (Ibid., p., 12). 
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According to the theory, the point there a bank's level ofinfonnation processing 
capability (A) intersects with the Risk Frontier is the actual limit of the bank activity, 
"the maximum product sophistication a Bank can deliver at that stage without 
incurring undue risk" (Roe, Siegelbaum, King, 1998, p.ll). The relationship of the 
high risk area to the corresponding low risk area would give sQme indication of the 
overall risk profile of a given bank in a given environment (Ibid., p.ll). Roe, 
Siegelbaum, King apply this approach to the entire banking sector and receive the 
following picture (Ibid., p.,12). Each "X" represents one bank. 
Graph 4. Banking sector risk profile (Ibid., p.,13). 
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According to the theory presented, "the overall riskiness of the sector depicted is a 
function of: (i) the number of banks in the "High Risk" zone, (ii) how far below the 
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Risk Frontier each of those banks is, and (iii) the relative share of banking activity 
represented by those banks" (Ibid., p.12). In the next part we are going to undertake 
the analysis of the banking system in Ukraine. We will make an attempt to understand 
how safe is the banking system in the country and what roles do banks play to 
improve the economic performance of the country. 
4.8.5 Analysing banking sector in Ukraine 
What is the application of the risk frontier theory to the analysis of banking sector in 
Ukraine? There are at least three factors which can influence banking in transition: (i) 
the information processing capabilities of one bank; (ii) the sophistication of banking 
products; (iii) the external operating environment (Roe, Siegelbaum, King, 1998). In 
one way or another each of these factors were considered in this study. 
How innovative and how risky is (was) the banking sector in Ukraine? 
At least three innovations are considered in the literature: mobilising deposits in a 
foreign currency, inter-bank borrowing, and introduction of promissory notes 
(Claessens, 1998; Roe, Siegelbaum, King, 1998). These innovative products added 
the extra risk to the banking system in Ukraine. 
The axis representing the sophistication of banking products in Ukraine can be 
presented as following: 
Figure 2. The sophistication of banking products in Ukraine. 
~ 
Direct Short- Foreign Mid-tenn Inter Promissory Long-tenn 
credits tenn currency lending bank notes! lending 
lending deposits and lending veksel 
credits 
In the mid-90s foreign currency activity was the source of a substantial profit 
in Ukrainian banks. Because of the large excess demand, the margins on these 
resources were very high. Introduction of the veksel (promissory notes) system 
supported a non-cash payments, because once in circulation veksel' can be used as 'a 
substitute for cash payment by any enterprise or organisation which happens to 
become the temporary owner' (Roe, Siegelbaum, King, 1998, p.19). Inter bank 
lending was reported as a cause for mini-crises in a couple of banks in Ukraine (Ibid., 
p.19). The major borrowers in the inter bank lending market were the newly emerging 
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private banks, unable to get a sufficient number of household deposits, or subsidies 
from the state budget funds. 
It is rather difficult to estimate the risk of such services, because many banks were 
integrated with the state system. So, that cheap state subsidies would not lead the 
bank to be bankrupted. The majority of Ukrainian banks would be in a far left corner 
of a figure presented above. The next question we address is how would this position 
of Ukrainian banks affect the development of the economy? 
4.8.6 Banking system and resource allocation in Ukraine: 
achievements and obstacles 
Findings suggest that the richest countries allocate about 113 of their loans to the 
private borrowers, while the poorest countries have less than half of such loans (King 
and Levine, 1996). According to the data published by the National Bank of Ukraine, 
only a small proportion of loans is allocated to the private sector, and the most 
substantial number of loans are made to finance the former state or types of 
collective enterprises. Graph 1 presents the loan allocation data (per million Hrv). 
Private means private ownership, collective ownership is when the group of 
employees is the owner (in Ukraine, a number of former state owned enterprises have 
become collective property during the privatisation process), state enterprises are 
owned by the state, and international enterprises are those with foreign capital and 
owned by non-residents. 
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Chart 2. The loan allocation, 1995-2000. 
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As Chart 2 shows a substantial number of loans have been allocated to support 
collective ownership. With privatisation under way from the mid 90s, a lot of state 
enterprises became collectively-owned enterprises. However, as we noticed earlier in 
this paper, there have only been some nominal changes (see p. for the discussion of 
privatisation in Ukraine) . This means that the management has remained the same at 
these enterprises. In some ways, this is a new name given to the old structure. The 
following graphs present the short and long term credit allocation data. 
Chart 3. Short term credit allocation, 1995-2000 (per million Hrv). 
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As Charts 2 and 3 show collective form of ownership attracts the major part of both, 
short and long term loan allocation. 
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Chart 4. Long term credit allocation, 1995-2000 (per million Hrv). 
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The amount banks lend to private companies could be substantially reduced if the 
choice of activity to invest were considered. The majority of loans have been allocated 
to finance current activity and not to invest in long-term projects. About 75% of the 
credit portfolio of Ukrainian banks comprised of3-6 month loans. Chart 5 presents the 
choice of activities in which to invest (per million Hrv). 
Chart 5. Investment preferences, 1991-2000. 
Short and long-tenn credit allocation 
16000 
14000 
12000 
c: 10000 :z:: 
c: 8000 ~ 
~ 6000 
4000 
2000 
0 
m N M "¢ l() co I'- IX) m 0 m m m m m m m m 0 
m m m m m m m m m 0 
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ N 
Year 
As Chart 5 showed the substantial number of credits were issued as short-term credits. 
As of May 2001 , 82 % of credits issued, were short-term credits. The unpaid debts on 
these credits accounted for 19 billion Hrv, and increased on 21 % during the first six 
months of the year 2001 . In the first part of the year 2001 there was a positive 
tendency towards increase of the level oflong-term credits, from 17.9% in the 
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beginning of the year 2001 to 18.2% in May 2001 . However, as Chart 6 shows the 
domination the collective type of ownership credit allocation is still substantial. 
Chart 6. The loan allocation. 
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A study conducted by a German agency and reported by The International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development analysed the activity of about 1000 Ukrainian 
enterprises (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 2001). The 
results show that credit allocation is high even among the enterprises experiencing 
considerable losses. Moreover, the level of creditors' debt has a statistically positive 
impact on the usage of all forms of bank finances. It tends to be that, in order to 
understand the process of loans allocation in Ukraine, one has to employ not only the 
banking risk assessment techniques, but some techniques which allow measurement of 
political influence and the level of ' effective connections' Ukrainian entrepreneurs have 
managed to establish. Such patterns contradict the key aspects of sustainable 
development theory by King and Levine (1996) where the main role of financial 
institutions is to identify the creditworthiness of entrepreneurs in society by means of 
transparent methods. 
To summarise what has been said, unfortunately the Ukrainian banking system has 
been unable to allocate sufficient resources to the economy. During the decade of the 
90-s the percentage of the bank credits to the GDP has varied from 10 to 20 %. This 
situation leads to the creation of the alternative forms of loans allocation and debt re-
payment system, which increased the risks of financial services in the country. 
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Now that we have identified the difficulties a company may experience when searching 
for the necessary resources, we can consider the disadvantages of the loans issued by 
commercial banks in Ukraine. The major one is the high operational cost and high 
credit rates. Ukrainian banks are known for their high operational cost and high 
interest rates. One part of explanation lies in unstable economic environment in the 
country, including high level of inflation in the mid-90s. As of May 2000, the official 
interest rate of the National Bank of Ukraine was 21%. Chart 7 presents data on the 
credit issued in national and foreign currency. 
Chart 7. Interest rate on credits in national currency. 
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The inflation reached its peak during 1993-94, but then fell gradually, and since 1997 
the interest rate varied ITom 30 to 45 %. In 1993 Ukrainian banks started mobilising 
the deposits in foreign currency. By 1994 the deposits in foreign currency were 
equivalent of8.5% ofGDP. Involvement in foreign currency deposit mobilisation, as 
well as foreign currency credit issue were considered as extra risk activity. 
There has been reported a tendency towards the lowering interest rate on credits 
issued in national currency. For example, in May 200lthe medium weighted interest 
rate on credits in national currency was 31 .7%, which is 5.7% less then in the 
beginning of the year. 
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Chart 8. Interest rates on credits and deposits issued in national currency as on April 
2001. 
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About 80% of credits issued to physical persons were credits in the national currency, 
issued under the 24.1 % interest rate. 
In the year 2001 the interest rate on credits issued in foreign currency was 15.5%. 
Credits issued in foreign currency for the period from 3-12 month, were the most 
expensive, with the interest rate reaching 15 .7% a year. 
Chart 9 presents data on credits issued in foreign currency, as of April 2001 . 
Chart 9. Credits issued in foreign currency. 
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From the beginning of the year 2000, there has been a tendency towards increasing the 
total amount ofloans issued in national currency (see Chart 10 below). In May 2001 
the total amount ofloans issued in national currency increased on 4.5% , and on 3 % in 
loans issued in foreign currency foreign currency. As of May 2001 , credits issued in 
national currency accounted for the 55 .7% of the total credit issued. This can be 
considered as the first sign of internal market stabilisation. 
Chart 10. The loan allocation in national and foreign currencies, 1991-2000. 
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The analyses of credit allocation can not be complete without knowing the structure of 
credit allocation and the rate of credit repayment. The last one is a special concern for 
us, because the indicator of credit repayment is an indirect indicators of how to 
measure the abuse of banking system. Chart 11 presents data on loan allocation as of 
May 2000. 
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Chart 11 . The loan allocation, 2001 . 
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As of the end of the year 2000 the biggest Ukrainian banks had around 24% of their 
credits as suspicious with the possible losses accounted for 2.5 billion Hrv. 
Understandably, the banking service wanted to insure the possible losses and 
increasing the cost of bank products. Banks expenses in Ukraine differs dramatically 
from those expenses in Western and Central European countries. In 1998-99 the 
operational expenses of seven biggest Ukrainian banks were in between 8% as the 
lowest and 37% at the highest. Western experts suggest that 2-3% is a 
recommendable figure. The report conducted by the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development blames political influence as the major distracting 
element: direct credits due to the political decisions, political interference with such 
issues as bank profit and liquidity management after the crises in 1998, banks expenses 
when performing role of tax inspectors, which is the result of political decision. Apart 
from political influence such issues as expenses on premises and branches, as well as 
unjustified high number of bank staff 
How efficient is bank management in the country? Is it possible to obtain a realistic 
picture by simply studying the statistics presented by the National Bank of Ukraine? To 
understand that we need to employ a variety of indicators, we present the calculation 
of two main indicators, which would be helpful in understanding the problem. On the 
bases of the statistics submitted by the majority of Ukrainian banks 
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to the Central Bank it is possible to calculate proportion of credit portfolio to the total 
assets, and proportion of other assets to the total assets (see Appendix 4). 
Proportion of credit portfolio in the total assets tends to be the main evidence of the 
preferences of bank activity, which is to provide loans to the banks' customers or 
invest in securities, inter-banking credits. If the proportion of the credits in the total 
assets is substantial it is not necessarily that a bank prefers investment activities. It 
may also be a result of financial trouble. For example, if the number of suspicious/or 
bad loans is big, then all liquid assets may be spend on the fulfilment of the client 
requirements. Chart 12 presents data on the selected banks as of 01.01.2001. 
Chart 12. Credit portfolio in selected banks. 
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Selected Banks 
As the above Figure shows, the majority of Ukrainian banks has a substantial 
proportion of credit portfolio in the total assets. Knowing that the problem of bad 
loans is a very serious issue in Ukraine, our suggestion is that a great number of banks 
with the proportion of credits to the total assets more than 30% has experienced 
financial troubles. 
Proportion of 'other assets' in the 'total assets' can be a helpful tool in understanding 
the level of management effectiveness. The term' other assets' referred to the assets 
which are not profitable to bank, and can not be added to any other categories. For 
example, delayed debtors payments, not fiscal assets, and premises and equipment. 
When conducting the analysis of the bank assets, it is believed that the proportion of 
credit portfolio in the total assets should be the biggest one. While the proportion of 
other assets should be the smallest one. Why? There are several explanations to this 
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fact. First of all 'other assets' are not profitable. Second, is that for some time some 
Ukrainian banks tended to 'hide' low quality assets, which in fact were the bank's 
losses, under the 'other assets' category. Chart 13 below presents data on the selected 
banks as of 0 1.0 1.200 1. 
Chart 13. Bank management indicator in selected banks. 
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As Chart 13 shows, for the majority of banks the proportion is low, but there are still 
some banks where the 'other assets' accounted for the more than 20% of the total 
assets. The interpretation of this data is very difficult (it is important to remember that 
the majority of banks window-dress their statistics to show better results). However, 
this analysis can give a hope that the implemented in the year 2000 regulations have 
started to work and the bank management system has being improved. It is too early 
to judge the success or failure of the current reforms in banking. 
At the beginning of the study, we discussed the key aspects of sustainable 
development. Now we would like to critically analyse the presence of such aspects in 
Ukraine and discuss the impact of corruption. The first point is the existence of an 
entrepreneur who wants to invest in a business. The results of our expert study 
suggest that in Ukraine there are at least two groups of entrepreneurs, with useful 
connections and without. The representatives of the first group would have better 
access to the resources than those from the second group. The majority of Ukrainian 
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enterprises finance themselves not with the help of short or long term investments but 
by employing their own funds, e.g. delaying or not paying wages to employees 
(International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 2001). A study conducted 
by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development suggests that only 5% 
of the active (not fictitious) enterprises succeeds in obtaining loans from the financial 
sector (Ibid.). When we discussed the result of our experts study we cited Siegelbaum 
(1997) definition of the banking in transitional economies- "relationship" banking, 
which prevents banks from having the most creditworthy customers. 
What seems to be happening in Ukraine, is that due to the 'bad' environment to 
develop banking sector, including corruption of the high level state officials, absence 
of clear and transparent rules of banks' supervision from the side of the Central bank, 
the Ukrainian banks information processing capability became extremely low. In fact, 
already mentioned specific feature of the banking system as being 'relationship' 
banking, when decisions are made on the basis of who have the most powerful friend, 
led to the minimisation of the bank's ability to assess, and what is more importantly 
to implement decision on the basis of their risk assessment measurements. Although, 
knowing that a lot of banks were created as 'pocket' banks, one may argue, if the risk 
assessment could really change the situation in such banks. 
Not only the customers of banks need to have a sort of special protection, but banks 
themselves need to be protected. In case of pocket banks it is easy-the customers and 
'guards' come in one 'package', but in case of banks operating as 'normal' that would 
be a question. Those banks without protection (ifthere are any), would be the ones to 
establish their own risk assessment techniques, and increase the information 
processing capabilities. 
4.8.7 Social trust 
In a system where corruption is endemic, to conduct a serious business, such as 
banking, one has to be connected to the high-level officials. It may be some kinship 
ties, friendship, or an exchange of favours among the colleagues. It reminds the major 
characteristics of traditional system, where the business relations are based on 
informal contacts and trust in 'spoken' agreements. Western countries experienced 
this type of relationship long time ago, and contract form of socio-economic relations 
has been in place for many decades now. One of the main tasks for transitional 
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countries is to establish the contract system of relationship based on a rule of law. 
Trust is an important concept in these changes. Economists consider trust as carefully 
calculated long-term interest, which brings different groups of people together and 
results in the voluntary contracts. It has been argued that the level of development of 
the economy reflects the level of trust in the society. Fukuyama finds a possible 
explanation of corruption in a system with narrow radius of trust, where different 
standards of behaviour would apply to different groups of people (Fukuama,2001a). 
In such system, the "transaction cost" the cost of legal agreement, can be substantial. 
Transition societies such as Russia and Ukraine have 'weak voluntary associations' 
because people do not trust one another. The primary forms of kinship have 
substituted the voluntary associations of people (Markovskaya et al 2002). 
Modem societies consist of many different groups interacting with each other to 
provide the wide radius of social trust and, therefore substantial economic and 
political benefits. The economic function of social capital has been seen as the 
reduction of the transaction costs associated with formal co-ordination mechanisms 
such as contracts and bureaucratic rules (Fukuyama, 2001).The political benefits stem 
from the ability of people to organise themselves, to form associations in order to 
Participate in political life and to form the foundation of civil society. If the level of 
social trust is low, the ability of people to co-operate is reduced, and the danger of 
state interference in all sector of public life, and in economic in particular, is high. 
Social trust is closely related to the issue of asymmetric information (Greenwald and 
Stiglitz, 1987), a situation where one side of market has better information that the 
other on options and incentives, and less informed side is aware of its informational 
disadvantage (Bossone, 2002). Incomplete trust, or awareness that other may seek to 
pursue inappropriate gains either through deliberately reneging on obligations due to 
earlier commitments, or by hiding information relevant to transactions, has been 
considered as the core of asymmetric information (Bossone, 2002). 
Trust in traditional societies is based on trust in relationships, connections. While 
trust in a contract society is based on trust in law and legal system. It tends to be that 
in transitional countries trust has a very low credibility. For example, general 
population tend not to trust banks and keep their savings literally under their own 
pillows. One of the way to restore the trust is seen in coming from the top of the 
society. So, that for example, imposing strict laws and regulations on banking, as well 
as transparent mechanism of controls would insure the general public that their 
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deposits safety comes first. Globalisation is widely perceived as creating external 
impulses for the advancement of social capital in transition countries. Globalisation 
is capable of breaking apart dysfunctional traditional and social groups and bringing 
the horizons of modernity closer ( Fukuyama, 2001). 
Here is the place where the problems had started. The restoration of trust, as we 
suggested, need to come from the high level officials, those, who in Ukraine, were 
named as the most distrustful category. In the beginning of the study we discussed the 
red-collar crime phenomenon, as crimes committed by officials during the time of the 
USSR. At that time, the belief in government and official policy, as well as the 
concept of social trust were a part of the ideological propaganda. In transitional 
Ukraine the official propaganda is far away to be publicly recognised as the icon to 
believe in, moreover, there has not been a ground on which to build this belief. 
To understand the Ukrainian government's devotion to reform we must also 
understand the human factor at the individual level. We must consider changing 
attitudes and perceptions of what is good and what is bad and what are inappropriate 
acts for a state official. One of the respondents suggested that the inappropriate 
behaviour goes to the very top of the government, arguing that the new ruling elite 
Who recently came to power are unable to think globally, but are instead concerned 
with enriching themselves in the immediate situation. During the Soviet era, those 
Who ruled the country had at least some basic understanding of the political process 
and management of the country. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the 
Communist Party, Ukraine lost its system of educating future public leaders in the 
prerequisites for their difficult positions. 
Today, those who five years ago were members of criminal groups or who were low-
level directors in collective farms, and who gained enough money during the 
transition to run for office or to gain the ear of politicians, are able to actively 
Participate in high level political and official life. As one of our respondents 
suggested, "the racket came to the power." The majority of these people appear to be 
more concerned with their immediate personal and monetary interests. There appears 
to be a great danger of losing the educated official and political elite. Of course, there 
is little desire to return to Soviet ways, but there is a need to establish a sort of 'filter' 
for those who come to rule the country. 
BUilding trust and confidence in government institutions is essential for the transition 
Countries, and Ukraine in particular (Popovich, 1998). The President of the Ukrainian 
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Legal Foundation, Sergey Holovaty, addresses the problem of weak governance that 
enables corruption to grow. It has resulted, he says, in "the emergence of the present 
machinery of government, where responsibilities overlap and accountabilities are 
diffuse, as well as in ministerial ownership of commercial activities and associated 
conflict of interest, in low pay and poor supervision of civil servants and in the lack of 
a public service ethos in the civil service" (Holovaty, 2000, p.271) A number of 
reports (for example, see Foglesong and Solomon, 2001) suggest that there is a need 
to increase the responsibilities of high-level state officials. But this can only be 
achieved if there is a strong political will present in the country, and unfortunately it 
appears as if Ukraine is a country where political will has been replaced by the will 
and financial resources of the oligarchs. Power in Ukraine is divided among different 
clans or groups of oligarchs (Panchenko, 2000), and the major groups of political and 
economic interest have been reported recently in the Ukrainian magazines 
(International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and World Bank, 2001; 
Panchenko, 2000). These groups have divided the country according to their spheres 
of interest, such as the electric and energy sector (which is recognised as the most 
lucrative, and thus most corrupt, sector of the Ukrainian economy), metallurgy, the oil 
and gas sector, and export-import operations. The existence of such groups, at least at 
such a high level and with such control, is only possible with the support of ranking 
state officials. Each group has representatives in the Parliament and in the political 
parties to support its interests, and often also control mass media sources (Panchenko, 
2000). 
According to the information gathered during the experts study and the literature 
study it is possible to discuss the hypothesis suggested in Chapter I. It tends to be that 
the majority of cases of grand scale economic crime in Ukraine is associated with 
corrupt involvement of high level state officials or politicians. On a bigger scale it 
proved to be the obstacle to the successful reforms in transforming the financial 
system of the country, adopting the internationally recognised standards of 
transparency and corporate governance. It is reasonable to suggest that the 
development of the financial institutions in transitional economies can be considered 
as one of the indicators of the successful democratic reforms. Going back to the micro 
level, and considering the quality of law with regard to the financial institutions, 
transitional countries, and Ukraine is a good example, proved the fact that 
establishing the legal framework for the financial institutions to operate is an essential 
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starting position. Absence of legal provisions to cover bankruptcy enabled some 
interested parties to be involved in illegal conduct. Banking is a good example of the 
area where regulations do matters. Total neglect of the banking supervision in the first 
years of the independence lead to the establishment of a great number of banks unable 
or unwilling to operate legally, working essentially to cover financial manipulations 
of a small group of business or political elite. Introduction of the simple requirements 
proved to be a very helpful tool in regulating the number of new banks, and the 
quality of work of those banks established during the first years of the independence. 
For example, the National Bank of Ukraine recommendations on the consolidation of 
banks can potentially improve the banking performance, and reduce the number of 
'problematic' banks. 
4.8.8 European banking Iiberalisation and integration: lessons Ukraine 
can learn 
The problems the Ukrainian banking system has been experiencing for over a decade 
now is not new or unique to the financial world. In the previous chapter the examples 
of financial crime conducted in different economically advanced jurisdiction 
developed, such as the USA, prove the fact that Ukraine is not alone in experiencing 
the spread of illegal conduct in the financial service. However, after 1985, only four 
major banking failures can be identified: BCCI in 1991, Banesto in 1994, Baring in 
1995 and problems with Credit Lyonnais (Vives, 2000). Among the factors stimulated 
banking crises in Spain in the first part of the 1980s were inadequate enforcement of 
the capital requirements, poor supervision, close links between banks and the 
industry, and bad management (Ibid.). These factors are no different from what we 
have just discussed in regard to the Ukrainian experience. How Spain had managed to 
Overcome its banking crises? Vives (2000) suggests that Spain is an example of the 
sUccessful transformation of the deeply disturbed banking system through the 
improved mechanisms of institutional settings, strengthened supervision by the Bank 
of Spain, establishment of a rule of law framework, although far from perfect, as 
Vives noted. 
Vives (2000) considers two cases of bank failures, Credit Lyonnais and Banesto and 
stresses the importance of a timely response to the bank problems. However simple it 
may seem the timely response is a very complex issue, involving financial and 
political issues. As, for example, in case of the Credit Lyonnais, "political 
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interference and lack of transparency characterised successive attempts to rescue the 
bank" (Ibid., p.188). This is exactly the problem Ukraine is experiencing, the close 
links of supervisors and managers of the banks, as in case of Ukraine Bank. To 
resolve the problem of the Credit Lyonnais the European Commission had to be 
involved to limit the public aid to the bank. 
There is a need to identify the level of problems: is it individual banking problem or a 
systemic problem? It tends to be that the individual banking crises is a consequence 
of ineffective corporate governance system, not able to control managers and, as 
Vives (2000) suggests, facilitate the exit of badly managed institutions. The biggest 
obstacle to the creation of the system of corporate governance is seen in political 
interference. The systemic crisis is more difficult to overcome as it not only involves 
the creation of a safe environment inside the financial institutions, but also 
strengthening the system of national regulation, establishment of the rule of law. 
There are at least two lessons that can be learned from the experience of the European 
countries. First, is that banking supervision is a very important issue, and second is 
that political interference with banking regulation should be eliminated, and to 
achieve this the external regulatory structure can be established. In case of the 
European Union countries the importance of the role of external supranational 
regulatory institutions have to be stated (Vives, 2000). 
What is the prospect of these lessons being learned in Ukraine? Next part will 
examine the rule of law and the enforcement problems in Ukraine. 
4.9 Ukraine: Present economic crime situation and the rule of law 
The researchers argue that criminals in Ukraine can be divided into two groups: the 
one which is actually a syndicate of businessmen and corrupt officials, and the other 
is criminal groups, involved in petty crimes (Transcrime, 2000). In the year 2000, in 
the annual report to the Ukrainian Parliament the President identified the major ways 
to prevent corruption in society. It has been stated that the most profitable sectors of 
the Ukrainian economy have been divided between criminal groups. The report 
conducted by Transcrime cited one of the state officials in Ukraine who pointed out 
that "criminal groups are dividing spheres of influence in Ukraine among themselves" 
(Transcrime, 2000, p. 57). According to some Ukrainian state officials the main areas 
affected by economic crime (as of 1997) were "the transfer of hard currency funds to 
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foreign bank accounts, money laundering through investments in real estate, 
securities, hard currency and legal commercial activities (Transcrime, 2000, p. 57). 
Organised criminality can be explained with the help of a "pyramid" structure 
(Kamluk and Nevmerzhickiy, 1998). Where the corrupt state officials are at the peak 
of the pyramid, businessmen working in shadow are in the middle, and criminals are 
at the bottom of the pyramid. These three groups have developed very close 
relationships. A number of mutual tasks, such as issuing of licenses, credits and loan 
obtaining, lobbying certain types of legislative acts, have improved this 'alliance'. 
Studies suggest that businessmen who work in shadow economy present the biggest 
group in this structure (Koshuy, 1996; Kamluk and Nevmerzhickiy, 1998). 
Studies suggest that there are at least two groups of financial crimes in Ukraine, 
which generate illegal profits (Transcrime, 2000, p. 58) . The first is mainly 
represented by fraud, drug trafficking, embezzlement of state property, theft, forgery 
of documents, corruption, unfaithful management, extortion and racket. The second 
includes the smuggling of consumer goods, alcohol and cigarettes, tax evasion and tax 
fraud, arms trafficking and small-scale trafficking of nuclear materials (Ibid., p. 58). 
Studies suggest that corrupt state officials have negatively affected at least three 
spheres of economic activity in Ukraine (Kamluk and Nevmerzhickiy, 1998). These 
spheres are entrepreneurial activity, banking, and privatisation. 
4.9.1 Entrepreneurial activity 
Due to the very close state supervision of business and entrepreneurial activities, a 
number of 'bad' practices have almost been institutionalised in the country. Among 
them are such issues as state control over issuing licenses to different types of 
services, high taxes and almost inevitable will to 'neutralise' state agencies who 
Collect taxes, and bad management. 
The previous part discussed the general macroeconomic situation in the country and 
mentioned the difficulties the large state enterprises have experienced during the 
transition. Many state enterprises received large state credits and tax concessions to 
improve the business. However, due to the management fraud and in some cases 
Political influence, these measures rarely improved the situation at the enterprises. 
Many managers at these enterprises made huge illegal profits by establishing private 
companies to buy and sell goods to state enterprises at artificially high prices 
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(Kamluk and Nevmerzhickiy, 1998, pp. 91-118). Such operations allowed the 
relocation of profit from state-enterprises to private ones. Moreover, later, state 
enterprises could apply to the government credits or subsidies to cover the losses. 
The involvement of high level state officials was necessary to allow such transfer at 
the first place and to prevent the competitive market solutions to the problems. The 
box below presents some well known examples of the corrupt practices of the high 
level officials. 
Box 1.1. 
Example 1. 
A former Prime Minister Lazarenko allowed privatization of a number of 
large enterprises who where 'customers' and 'buyers' of each other. The owners were 
'people' of Lazarenko. Being owned by the same groups, these enterprises were forced 
to buy supplies, including energy (gas) by artificially high prices and sell their 
products for artificially low prices. This scheme resulted in a very rapid money 
earned on the one hand and in almost bankruptcy if enterprises. After the money were 
safely transferred to the off-shore and foreign accounts, the 'financially sucked' 
enterprises were transferred back to the state. The owners argued about 'unsuccessful' 
privatization and reform attempts. 
Example 2. 
Indirect bad influence of Lazarenko manipulation with energy sector. 
Lazarenko bought gas from Russia and sold it through the number of 'his' companies. 
His famous 'say' was 'you either do business with me, or you do no business at all'. 
Apart from huge kickbacks, there was another negative effect: the selling price of gas 
was about three times larger than that bought from Russia. Say a gas provider sells 
gas to lamp- producing company ('Iskra' in Lviv, the largest producer in Ukraine). He 
knows that 'Iskra' will not be able to pay gas bill and takes lamps as in -kind payment 
(barter). The lamps are sold in large quantities by very low prices, the gas -provider 
makes lots of money quickly, but 'Iskra' suffers since it can not sell lamps on its 
normal price. A lot of companies use energy and gas, which represent vast proportion 
of their production costs. Thus, they suffer the same problem as Iskra with marketing 
and selling their products. 
The role of the enterprises in transition to market economy are paradoxical in Ukraine 
(Kamluk and Nevmerzhickiy, 1998, pp. 94-95). Instead of becoming the main tool to 
advance economy, the Ukrainian enterprises have become unproductive force which 
only worsen the economic crisis in the country. One of the reason for deterioration of 
the enterprise's strengths is seen in the corrupt activity of some high level state 
officials. These people made it possible to transfer the economic system of the 
country into the "arena to trade privileges and redistribute property between the most 
influential groups" (Ibid., p. 94). 
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According to some sources (Osyka, 2001) 9 out of 10 Ukrainian companies use illegal 
transfer of money mainly to avoid taxes. 
4.9.2 Banking 
The use of 'loro', or overseas accounts have been employed by criminals to transfer 
huge funds. According to the National Bank of Ukraine data, in 1996 only 25 % of 
the transactions used to transfer money abroad were results of the export-import 
operations. The rest is the result of the financial transactions of non-resident banks 
with Ukrainian currency (Kamluk and Nevmerzhickiy, 1998, p. 100). 
In 1996, $81 millions was discovered as been illegally transferred by using this type 
of personal accounts. 
"One of the main methods used for laundering illicit proceeds is the 
commingling of licit with illicit money. Among the most frequently employed 
instruments for laundering are electronic payments, traveler's cheques, credit 
cards, wire transfers and cheques" (Transcrime, 2000, p. 58). 
Criminal practices in banking in regard to creditlloan can be classified on the 
following ground: different illegal methods the loan applicant uses to obtain financial 
sources; the credit institution officials methods to defraud their clients; the illegal 
agreement between the client and the bank officials. The mechanism of obtaining 
illegal credit seemed to be very simple. The 'ingredients' are false enterprise, false 
project and a bank willing to credit such project. Kamluk and Nevmerzhickiy (1998) 
give an example of one bank in the city Odessa which credited such false enterprises 
with $500 thousands. $10 thousands for the enterprise, $240 thousands to the 
'authors' of the project, and $250 thousands was left in the bank (Ibid., p.102). 
Kamluk and Nevmerzhickiy (1998) argue that organised groups of corrupt state 
officials have developed a.system to illegally transfer state foreign currency to the 
foreign bank accounts (Kamluk and Nevmerzhickiy, 1998, p.100). Transcrime found 
out that "because of loopholes and lack of legislation, considerable amounts of non-
cash money are systematically transferred into cash and used in the criminal turnover 
(Transcrime, 2000, p. 58). Special companies are established with the only aim to 
transfer non-cash money into cash and vice-versa. In 1996, 210 such companies were 
identified by the authorities (Kamluk and Nevmerzhickiy, 1998). The 'life-
expectancy' of such companies is very low, usually from 3 to 6 months. 
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The new Criminal Code adopted in autumn 2001 has addressed the issue of money 
laundering. The problem now is to find the experienced agents to prosecute financial 
crimes. As Transcrime report suggests, "Ukrainian law enforcement agencies have 
little experience in prosecuting offences relating to money laundering and other 
financial crimes, especially in cases that involve more technical aspects of financial 
investigation such as tracing of funds transferred abroad" (Transcrime, 2000, p.61). 
As for providing information or assistance to another country, for freezing bank-
accounts, seizing and forfeiting assets, the authorities may only act on the basis of 
bilateral agreements existing between countries" (Transcrime, 2000, p. 61). 
4.9.3 Privatisation 
In the mid-90s about 120 billion Hrv earned due to the sale of state property, but only 
1 billion ended up in the state budget. Privatisation process had witnessed such crimes 
as late or unqualified consideration of the buyers applications, breach of the rights of 
people who work at the enterprise to be involved in the decision making as to the 
choice of ownership and type of privatisation, intentional decrease of the actual cost 
of the enterprise. During 9 months of the 1997, there were about 1 SOO enterprises 
privati sed. The estimated cost of these enterprises were 4.2 billion ofHrv, but the 
state budget received only 48 million Hrv. It is certain that illegal acts with such huge 
profit were supervised at the very high level. 
The causes of such widespread criminalization of the privatisation process are seen in 
firstly, the absence of the actual supervision from different state agency, and State 
Property Department in particular; secondly, corruption among state officials, who 
were authorised to control privatisation, and thirdly, the low level of management. 
To summarise what has been said, there are at least three areas in which the impact of 
corrupt state officials can be seen. These areas are entrepreneurial activity, banking, 
and privatisation. 
One of the preconditions for economic crime to rise is the ineffectiveness of legal 
institutions in the state and the poor quality of the law on the books. 
4.9.4 Legal institutions in Ukraine 
Pistor, Raiser and Gelfer use three variables to measure the effectiveness of legal 
institutions in transition economies: rule oflaw, an index of the effectiveness of 
corporate and bankruptcy law, and the enforcement index (Pistor, Raiser, Gelfer, 
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2000, p. 13). The rule oflaw (for which the researchers use the Central European 
Economic Review Index), an index representing the effectiveness of corporate and 
bankruptcy law in transition economies (which was previously constructed by the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development in Transition Report)~ and an 
enforcement index (which was constructed on the basis of the Business Environment 
and Enterprise Performance Survey and which reports the percentage of firms studied 
in the survey that agree that the legal system will protect their property rights and 
enforce their contracts). Table 15 below shows the data from three countries. 
Table 15. Rule oflaw, legal effectiveness and law enforcement in Ukraine, Russia 
and Poland. 
Country Rule of law Legal Enforcement 
effectiveness now 3 years ago 
Ukraine 3.4 2 0.26 0.30 
Russia 3.7 2 0.27 0.25 
Poland 8.7 4 0.75 0.70 
Studies conducted in this area suggest the difference between transition countries, and 
existence of at least two groups. The one with the high scores of legal effectiveness, 
represented by Central European countries (Poland, Czech Republic), and the other 
group, with the lower scores unites almost all the countries of the former Soviet 
Union, except the Baltic countries (Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia). The problem which 
has been studied for a few years now, is if there are any correlation between the 
quality of law on books and the improvements in the development of the financial 
market. The results tend to be twofold. Ukraine, for example, received legal technical 
assistance from the West, and today some of the areas of the legislation are very well 
developed. However, the development of the law has not yet matched the 
development of the financial sector. 
The following section is addressing the issue of the rule of law and law enforcement 
in Ukraine and presents the results of the case study conducted in Ukraine. 
4.10 Case study 3. Corruption and law enforcement in Ukraine 
The following case study examines the existing legislation on corruption in Ukraine 
and attempts to identify the impact of corruption on different sectors of financial 
market. 
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According to a Transparency International Survey, the Corruption Perception Index2 
in Ukraine is 2.2, and the World Bank estimates that the annual sum of bribes in 
Ukraine is equal to the country's trade turnover for a two-month period (Haran, 2000). 
The high level of official illegality portrayed by the Corruption Perception Index help 
to reveal the high levels of corruption in Ukraine makes it easy to assume that there is 
an absence of legislative measures designed to combat corruption in the country. This 
is not the case, however. Beginning in the mid-1990s, the Ukrainian President, 
parliament, and law enforcement agencies began introducing a number of decrees and 
laws that constitute the Ukrainian anti-corruption framework. 
4.10.1 Corrupt exchange in Ukraine 
The Ukrainian-Polish cross-border trade is a good business. Due to price differentials 
between Ukraine and Poland, entrepreneurs from Ukraine go to Poland to buy goods, 
which they later sell for a profit in Ukraine. Thousand of people use this opportunity 
to make money. Bribes are not uncommon along the way, and to ensure quick and 
safe procedures at customs, the entrepreneurs often offer bribes to border guards. The 
price is well known, as are the people to bribe. 
During an expert study of corruption in Ukraine, one respondent described the 
following process, which helped expedite a particular border crossing. At Christmas 
time many people bring holiday items from Poland to sell in Ukraine. Due to the 
necessity of selling these goods before Christmas, sellers need to cross the border 
quickly. While approaching the customs checkpoint to enter Ukraine, someone who 
was heavily loaded with Christmas items to sell in Ukraine realised that the queue 
was extraordinarily long. In fact, there were hundreds of cars waiting in line. The 
reason for this situation was that an inspector from Kiev had come to "check the work 
of the crew" at this border. crossing. The majority of those in the queue possessed 
Christmas items to sell in Ukraine and knew that they did not have the time to wait at 
customs. After discussing their options, the sellers decided to collect money and 
bribe the high-level inspector from the capital. About US $60,000 was collected and 
the sellers' representatives went to see the inspector to discuss the chances of quick 
entry. The inspector laughed at their offer. He informed them that this amount did 
not offset the bribe he had given to officials in Kiev in the first place in order to come 
to this particular checkpoint (ostensibly to check on the work of those at the border, 
but in truth to collect bribes from these entrepreneurs). 
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The final decision might be considered extraordinary in other places, but not 
uncommon in this setting. Since the inspector had paid more in cash to Kiev officials 
than the bribe offered to him by the sellers, the local customs officials decided to raise 
the additional funds among themselves that was necessary to make up the deficit. 
The result was that everyone was happy: The inspector went back to capital with a 
'good' report about the work of the crew at the customs point, the local customs 
officials kept their jobs, and these entrepreneurs were allowed to rush back and sell 
their Christmas presents. 
4.10.2 General provisions 
There are more than 52 legal provisions relating to the fight against corruption in 
Ukraine. The three main pillars are (1) "The Law of Ukraine Against Corruption," 
adopted on 5 October 1995, N 356/ 95-BP, (2) "The Decree of the President of 
Ukraine 'Concerning the Concept to Fight Corruption,'" Strategic Plan for 1998-
2005, adopted on 24 April 1998, N 367/98, and (3) "The Decision of the Plenary 
Meeting of the Supreme Court of Ukraine' About the Court Procedures Related to 
Corrupt Practices,'" introduced on 25 May 1998, N 13, and amended on 3 March 
2000, N 5. These were very recently supplemented by the new Ukrainian Criminal 
Code, which was adopted in 2001. 
The fight against corruption officially began in 1995, with the introduction of the Law 
of Ukraine Against Corruption. According to this law, corruption is any activity by 
those authorised to fulfil state functions that is designed to misuse authority in order 
to obtain financial resources, services, privileges, or other advantages. The law 
divides corrupt activities into subgroups. The first is the quid pro quo of illegally 
obtaining financial resources, services, or privileges in return for services provided. 
The second subgroup consists of receiving credits securities or property by using the 
advantages and privileges provided to them as part of their position. Civil servants, 
People's Deputies of Ukraine and the Republic of Crimea, governors, and deputies of 
the regional Union of People's Deputies are subject to this law. Both administrative 
and criminal punishments may be imposed on those guilty of violating these laws, 
and the criminal punishments shall meet the requirements of the corresponding 
statutes in the Criminal Code of Ukraine. 
The Law of Ukraine Against Corruption is rather general and covers mainly 
administrative norms. The old Criminal Code of Ukraine (see discussion of new 
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Criminal Code below) did not have a legal definition of corruption. Some legal 
scholars (see Gultay, 2000) believe there is no need to introduce a definition, since 
corrupt practices will usually fall under the illegal activities already outlined in the 
Criminal Code (e.g., Article 84 on embezzlement of state property or Article 165 on 
abuse of power). The Criminal Code applies to the criminal activities of the entire 
population and is not limited in its power to civil servants or public officials, and 
Gultay argues that such an approach is sufficient to ensure an effective response to 
corruption. 
On the other hand, the lack of clarity in the law was viewed by many as a problem. 
For example, since there is no clear boundary between criminal and administrative 
responsibilities for corrupt practices, it is up to the courts to make final decisions on 
charges. The generality of the former Criminal Code of Ukraine was believed by 
some to be obsolete in its treatment of corruption. These issues are dealt with 
explicitly in the new Criminal Code adopted in 2001, however, and this is outlined 
below. 
The Law of Ukraine Against Corruption has been the target of criticism from a 
number of other legal researchers and practitioners. This criticism consists generally 
of two main groups of problems. The first is the lack of clarity in the written statutes 
in terms of what constitutes an infraction of the law, and the second is the unrealistic 
time-frame for bringing legal proceedings. Critics propose (1) to prolong the time 
given to prosecute corrupt practices to at least a year (only two months are currently 
allowed for prosecutors to bring corruption cases to court), (2) outlining regulations 
for the mechanisms and procedures of evidence collection in order to reduce 
bureaucracy, (3) to introduce procedures of preliminary investigation and a system of 
appeal, and (4) to introduce specialised courts to handle these cases. These measures 
would substantially ease the work of the enforcement agencies and may be regarded 
as a step toward strengthening responsibilities of high level state officials (Gultay, 
2000). 
The need to increase the responsibility of high-level state officials is a pressing issue 
in the country. The Constitution of Ukraine has granted immunity to People's 
Deputies who may be subjected to the Law Against Corruption. In order to deprive a 
member of immunity, Parliament must organise a special meeting and vote. The 
complicated system of immunity deprivation makes it nearly impossible to prosecute 
People's Deputies for corruption. According to the Ministry of Internal Affairs 
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statistics, in 1997, in Ukraine 947 applications were made by attorneys to receive the 
permission to administratively prosecute people's deputies. However, only 183 
permissions were given. 374 applications were rejected and 417 applications were left 
without any response. 
Finally, most of these problems pale in comparison to the most important one: the 
absence of an independent judiciary system. "[I]n practice, the judiciary is subject to 
considerable political interference from the executive branch and also suffers from 
corruption and inefficiency. The courts are funded through the Ministry of Justice, 
which allows the Government to influence judicial proceedings" (Holovaty, 2000, p. 
271 )3. 
A study conducted by the Supreme Court of Ukraine and cited by Foglesong and 
Solomon (2001, pp.78-79) reported that many corruption related cases are poorly 
prepared. In 1998, total number of cases sent to trial was 6,656 (civil servants and 
deputies). However, in only 246 cases were the permissions to proceed with charges 
requested, and only in 48 cases was such permission granted. Foglesong and Solomon 
suggest that in some cases corruption may be the answer to the fact that "many 
charges fail to stand up to evidentiary scrutiny at trial," or the fact that some judges 
assign penalties lower than the statutory minimum suggest. The Decree of the 
President of Ukraine 'Concerning the Concept to Fight Corruption,' Strategic Plan for 
1998-2005, was adopted on 24 April 1998. The general statement of the concept 
includes a list of the negative effects of corruption on society, including the 
promotion of organised criminal activity in the economic sphere and the provision of 
illegal privileges to the corrupt groups and clans, which undermines the integrity of 
the state (Kushnarev, 2000). The Decree discusses the social causes of corruption in 
Ukraine and suggests political, economic, legal, managerial, and social-psychological 
ways to prevent the further spread of corruption in Ukrainian society. Many of the 
respondents in the pilot study outlined in the next section view this Decree as an 
important achievement, since it was one of the first official documents that publicly 
recognised the problems of corruption and suggested ways to fight it. 
The Decision of the Plenary Meeting of the Supreme Court of Ukraine 'Concerning 
the Court Procedures Related to Corrupt Practices' was originally introduced on May 
25tb, 1998, and was later amended in March 2000. It considers courts' responses in 
regard to battling corruption and suggests ways to interpret the law and to improve 
practices. For example, one of the possible loopholes of the law is that the 
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responsibilities of those subjected to it could only be imposed in case of direct 
financial advantages and privileges. The law does not clarify so-called third party 
involvement. On 3 March 2000, the Supreme Court of Ukraine recommended that 
the courts should implement the law in a way that would not allow avoidance of 
responsibilities in cases where family members or other relatives are involved in 
obtaining corrupt proceeds. 
Several scholars have argued that since there was no new criminal code in place, it 
was difficult to combat corrupt behaviour with these decrees, since with the Ukrainian 
legal system decrees carry considerably less weight than law. Further, there was 
deliberate stonewalling of the necessary legislation by corrupt officials and those 
otherwise connected with the government. 
Finally, the new Criminal Code adopted in 2001 also introduces provisions designed 
to control corrupt practices. Part XVII considers crimes related to business practices 
and activities and consists of seven articles. Abuse of authority or business duties is 
punishable under Article 364. This article relates not only to government officials or 
civil servants, but to private employees as well. To be precise it does not differentiate 
the forms of ownership. Abuse of power is defined as the use of official post against 
the official interest, causing substantial injury to the rights, freedom and interests of 
certain citizens or state or citizens interest, or interest of the legal entity. Types of 
sanctions vary depending on the severity of offences or 'seriousness' of 
consequences. In the case of considerable consequences, the punishment may be 
corrective labour up to five years, imprisonment up to six months, or sentencing up to 
three years and a court-imposed ban on the defendant occupying a particular post or 
working in a given field for up to three years. 
Article 365 provides punishment for exceeding authority or official duties. 
Punishment depends on the severity of consequences and the use of offensive 
weapons or physical threat. The maximum punishment is ten years imprisonment and 
a court-imposed ban on the defendant occupying a particular post or working in a 
given field for up to three years. Articles 366 and 367 deal with counterfeiting of 
official documents and unscrupulous or careless official activity. Articles 368, 369 
and 370 punish bribery of public officials as well as officials in corporation 
disregarding the forms of ownership. 
An official who takes a bribe can be punished by up to five years of imprisonment or 
be fined 750 or more times the pre-taxed minimum salary and face a court-imposed 
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ban to occupy certain posts. The punishment is also dependent on the size of the 
bribe. Article 368, parts 2 and 3, distinguish the sizes of bribes as "large" and "very 
large." Large is an amount 200-499 times larger than the monthly minimum wage, 
and very large is 500 or more times larger than monthly minimum wages. In both 
cases, the confiscation of property is provided as a penalty. Part 2 of Article 368 also 
considers repeated offenders. Those who bribe can get up to five years imprisonment 
or be subjected to a fine of between 200 and 500 times the monthly minimum wages. 
Repeated bribing can be punished by up to eight years of imprisonment, sometimes 
with property confiscation. Article 370 punishes those who provoke the bribe giving 
behaviour. 
The new Code has also introduced an article that prohibits laundering of money or 
other property illegally acquired. Article 209 makes it a crime to conduct financial 
transactions with money or other property illegally acquired, as well as to use 
illegally acquired money or other property in business or other activity, or to establish 
organised groups in Ukraine or abroad with the purpose of legalising money or 
property that was unlawfully acquired. Article 209 imposes penalties such as fines 
from 500 to 3,000 times the pre-taxed minimum salary, or up to five years of 
imprisonment with confiscation of the property and money illegally acquired. 
The old Code was believed to be obsolete in its treatment of corruption and did not 
differentiate offences depending on the size of bribe, duration and severity of criminal 
practices. The new Criminal Code provides an attempt to measure the illegal conduct. 
In the new Code, an attempt has been made to increase the financial penalties. The 
old code was criticised due to the very mild financial penalties, which were between 
25 and 50 times the minimum monthly wages, or approximately $250 to $500 
(Foglesong and Solomon, 2001). 
Discussions among experts concerning the weak points of the legislation regarding 
corruption in Ukraine continue. One point that must be addressed is if those cases 
where the substance of the corruption laws may interfere with the primary legislation. 
Another fact that must be considered is that now that Ukraine has constructed a 
framework for anti-corruption legislation, the true question that must be addressed is 
how well these legal acts are implemented and enforced and if cases can successfully 
prosecuted. Recent studies assessing the legal environment in transition tend to 
conclude that the quality of law enforcement is at least as important as the presence 
and coverage of the law (Pistor, Raiser, Gelfer, 2000). 
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Pistor, Raiser, and Gelfer argue that legality would have been higher in transition 
countries if the legal transfer were "smoothed by cultural proximity, legal adaptation 
and ability of lawyers trained in application of the new laws" (Pistor, Raiser, Gelfer, 
2000, p.IS). 
Thus, lack of enforcement appears to present one of the major problem for the 
Ukrainian system. This weakness creates a lack of confidence in the rule of law and 
leads to resistance on the part of the government to give up or transform its role as a 
major co-ordinator of economic activity. 
Earlier in the chapter the hypothesis was proved that the high quality law on books 
brings the quality financial services, and guarantees the development of the financial 
services even in transitional countries. The quality laws on corruption tends to have 
bigger problems with regard to the enforcement issues. Generally, the equation better 
law better policies does not work if applied to corruption. There can be certain hidden 
elements to explain the situation. For example, the irregularities in financial 
institutions, such as banks can be solved by employing corruptive means, so while it 
does not affect researchers' attitude to how law affects financial sphere, it brings 
more light on the effectiveness of the law on corruption. The most obvious 
explanation, however is the complexity of corruption as a social phenomenon, so that 
fighting it by only legal means is not enough. 
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Chapter 5: Developed economies in fighting white-collar crime: the 
lessons Ukraine can learn. 
The evolution of the international responses to the white-collar crime problems in 
emerging countries can be explained through the evolution of international financial 
regulations in developed countries. Chapter 3 considered some specific examples of 
white-collar crime in financial market, and mentioned the fact that the major financial 
regulation initiatives came after big financial or political scandals. For example, 
Bhala (1994) discusses the US government response to the BCCI scandal, and 
critically considers the Foreign Bank Supervision Enhancement Act of 1991. 
According to Bhala, the Act did not address the issues raised by the scandal, but 
makes the international banking system very complicated. 
Following recent events in the US and continuing threat of international terrorism, the 
global financial community has become increasingly worried about the effectiveness 
of financial supervision and financial policing. 
This chapter briefly discusses the evolution of the financial regulation with the 
specific attention paid to the financial crime problems. It addresses the problems of 
financial regulation in transition countries and discusses possible ways to improve 
financial environment in transition Ukraine. The main argument of this chapter is that 
the international community represented by a number of international organisations 
can and should address the issue of financial crime problems in transitional society. 
However, the help and assistance provided should be relevant to the country's social, 
cultural and legal traditions, and should not be centred on punitive sanctions only. 
5.1 Multilateral initiatives 
Over the last two decades a substantial number of international organisations have 
been established to address the issues of financial regulation. Generally, these 
organisations can be divided into two groups. The first group is presented by the 
organisations designed with the specific task, such as the Basle Committee on 
Banking Supervision, the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC), and 
many others concerned with the hannonisation of certain standards of financial 
services. The second group represented by the established international organisations 
such as European Union, and Council of Europe, dealing with the issues of 
international political co-operation in different areas, including the one of financial 
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services. Empel and Morner (2000) discuss the General Agreement on Trade and 
Services (GATS) as an example of an international agreement focused primarily on 
'the political commitment to liberalisation' (Empel and Morner, 2000, p.39). 
However, it is understandable, that to make a strict dividing line in a complex web of 
the organisations dealing with the issues of financial regulations and supervision is 
almost impossible. Following is the discussion of the initiatives undertaken by 
different organisations and states (the examples of USA and UK initiatives) to 
harmonise technical rules in the financial market area, and to stress the importance of 
the financial crime phenomenon. 
In the early 80-s then the Council of Europe Committee on Crime Problems 
considered the growth of criminal offences in the economic area as the consequences 
of the growth of economic activity in Europe and the development of international 
economic activity. The list of economic crime consisted of 16 offences. Among such 
offences were fraudulent practices and abuse of economic situation by multinational 
companies, computer crime, faking of company balance sheets and book-keeping 
offences, offences concerning money and currency regulations, stock exchange and 
bank offences (Council of Europe, 1981, p., 1-12 p.). It was stated that economic 
crime "causes loss to a large number of people (partners, employees, creditors), to the 
community as a whole and even to the state, which has to bear a heavy financial 
burden or suffer a considerable loss of revenue; it also causes a certain loss of 
confidence in the economic system itself' (Ibid., p.l 0). It was recommended for 
"governments of members states to take steps to facilitate the detection of economic 
offences, ensure swift and efficient criminal justice in the field of economic crime, 
review the legislation on criminal penalties for economic offences" (Ibid., p.9-1 0). 
By the end of the 1980-s the international community had recognised the danger of 
economic crime and large illegal financial profit derived not only from drug 
trafficking but also from other criminal activities such as tax evasion, financial fraud 
and corruption. 
Since the mid- 80-s economic crime problems have become a focus of attention for a 
number of international organisations, such as the Council of Europe, the Committee 
on Crime problems (European Ministries of Justice), the United Nations, the Basle 
Committee on Banking Regulation and Supervisory Practices, the Financial Action 
Task Force (FATF), the Interpol. 
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The study of international response to economic crime problems would necessarily 
bring us to the study of international measures to combat the laundering of illicit 
proceeds. Savona (1999) writes: 
"The initial impetus for co-ordinated international action against money 
laundering arose in the 1980s within the context of efforts to combat the 
problem of drug trafficking, when a high priority was afforded to law 
enforcement strategies designed to disrupt the organisation and management 
and break the economic power of major trafficking organisations" (Savona, 
1999, p.,19). 
The main international initiatives to prevent the laundering of illicit proceeds are: the 
United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances, adopted in Vienna in December 1988 (UN Convention, 1988); the 
Statement of Principles concerning money laundering, issued in December 1988 by 
the Committee on Banking Regulation and Supervisory Practices (Basle Committee); 
the Forty Recommendations issued by the Financial Action Task Force in April 1990; 
and the Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of Proceeds of 
Crime, adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on 
September 8, 1990 (Strasbourg Convention, 1990). The international anti-money -
laundering regime is an example of non-binding principles and recommendations. 
Alexander (2000) explains: "The international anti-money laundering regime includes 
a variety of soft law (non-binding) principles and rules that involve voluntary co-
operative arrangements amongst states that have hardened to a certain degree into a 
specific legal framework that binds the major states of the international system" (p., 
9). Alexander also suggests that "the international anti- money laundering regime may 
serve as a model of how a high degree of international co-operation and co-ordination 
amongst national and regional regulators may result in an effective legal framework 
to combat transnational crime" (Ibid., p.,21). 
Following is a list of well-known multinational initiatives to combat corruption and 
money laundering: 
Council of Europe I : 
I Council of Europe web-site: http://www.coe.intlportalt.asp 
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Council of Europe instruments on combating terrorism and money laundering include 
the following conventions: European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, 
ETS No.090 (1978); European Convention on Mutual assistance in Criminal Matters, 
ETS. No.030 (1959); Convention of Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of 
the Proceeds from Crime ETS No. 141 (1990); European Convention on the Transfer 
of Proceeds from Crime, ETS No,141 (1990). 
Council of Europe adopted several anti-corruption conventions, including Criminal 
and Civil Law Conventions on Corruption, opened for signature in 1999. The 
Criminal Law Convention on Corruption demands parties to criminalise bribery of 
public officials and private persons, domestic and foreign. The implementation of the 
Criminal Law Convention on Corruption is monitored by the group of states against 
corruption. 
United Nations2: 
One of the United Nations recent initiatives is the UN Convention against 
Transnational Organized Crime has been considered as a result of the 25 years efforts 
of the United Nations to strengthen international co-operation to combat organized 
crime. The Convention extends beyond the sphere of co-operation on drug trafficking. 
It strengthens the power of governments in combating serious crimes. The new 
convention provides the basis for stronger common action against money-laundering, 
greater ease of extradition, and measures on the protection of witnesses and enhanced 
judicial co-operation. Article 5 of the convention deals with the criminalisation of 
participation in an organised criminal group, Articles 6 and 7 consider criminalisation 
of money laundering and measures states parties shall consider to effectively 
implement anti-money laundering regimes. Articles 8 and 9 deal with the corruption 
and measures against corruption. Articles 12 to 31 consider the issues of conficscature 
and seizure, extradition and international co-operation, mutual legal assistance and 
investigative techniques. The Convention seeks to establish a funding mechanism as 
well as technical assistance to help countries implement the Convention. An 
important issue which the convention raised is the synchronisation of the national 
laws, to avoid uncertainty as to whether a crime in one country is also a crime in 
another. As on 15 December 2000 124 states signed the Treaty. 
2 United Nations web-site: http://www.un.orgllaw/ 
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World Trade Organisation (WTO)3: 
In 1996 the WTO Ministerial Conference established a working group on 
transparency in government procurement. All 140 members of the WTO agreed to 
make binding international conventions to guarantee transparency and predictability 
in their government procurement procedures. 
The Basle Committee4: 
Established in 1975, the Basle Committee comprised of the governors of the central 
banks from the G-l 0 countries and Switzerland. Its purpose is to co-ordinate 
international bank regulatory activities, specifically to develop standards of good 
practice in international bank regulation. The work of the Basle Committee has been 
especially influential in the area of capital adequacy standards. The recommendations 
on the minimum capital adequacy standards do not have legal force but have been 
successfully adopted by many countries. 
In 1983 The Basle Committee agreed to four principles: first is that bank regulators 
cannot be satisfied with the soundness of individual banks unless they are able to 
examine all aspects of a bank's world-wide business on a consolidated basis; second, 
no foreign bank establishment of an international bank should escape supervision; 
third, supervision should be adequate; fourth bank regulators in different countries 
should co-operate with each other. Revised Basle principles includes the issues of 
mutual critical assessments, comprehensive, extraterritorial supervision, and co-
operation. In 1988, the Basle Committee published a set of minimal capital 
requirements for banks. These requirements became law in G-l 0 countries in 1992. 
The requirements have come to be known as the 1988 Basle Accord. In 1992 the 
Basle Committee published a paper entitled "Minimum Standards for the Supervision 
of International Banking Groups and their Cross-border Establishments". 
In 1997, The Basle Committee prepared a list of 25 basic principles, which should 
constitute the framework for the banking supervisory policies and structures. The 25 
Core Principles structured in seven sections: preconditions for effective banking 
supervisions, licensing and structure, prudential regulations and requirements, 
3 WTO web-site: http://www.wto.org 
4 The information on the Basle Committee can be downloaded from: 
126 
methods of ongoing banking supervisions, information requirements, formal powers 
of supervisors, and cross-border banking (Bas Ie Core Principles, 1997). 
This list of basic principles known as the 1998 Basel Accord, formed a single 
international model for prudential regulation. More than 100 countries have 
implemented the Basel Accord in some form. Today, the Basle Committee is working 
on a replacement for the 1988 Accord. The three pillars of the New Accord are: 
minimum capital requirements, supervisory review and disclosure. As on January 
2003, the 1998 Basel Accord is being wholly rewritten. The Basel Committee hopes 
to finalise the New Accord by the end of the year 2003. 
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's (OECD) 
Convention5: 
According to the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in 
International Business Transaction (adopted by the Negotiating Conference on 21 
November 1997), it is a crime to offer, promise or give a bribe to foreign public 
official in order to obtain or retain international business deal. 34 countries have 
signed convention and more than half has changed their domestic laws in accordance 
with the Convention. 
In 1999 OECD launched the Global Corporate Governance Forum. The Forum 
provides a framework for international co-operation, aims to improve corporate 
governance world-wide. 
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC): 
The International Chamber of Commerce is a business organisation that supports and 
promotes high level standards in such areas as international trade and investments. In 
1977, the ICC published "Rules of Conduct to Combat Extortion and Bribery", which 
were revised in 1996.To provide a guidance to comply with the OECD Bribery 
Convention the ICC issued a manual of best corporate practices. 
The World Bank and The International Monetary Fund (IMF)6: 
http://www.bis.orglindex.htm 
5 OECD web-site: http://www.oecd.org 
6 The World Bank web-site is: http://www.worldbank.orgl 
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The World Bank and IMF consider economic cost of corruption and adopt measures 
to prevent corruption and fraud in bank-financed projects. These international 
financial institutions have agreed that corruption is a serious obstacle to economic 
growth. The World Bank advises countries on economic policy reforms, stresses the 
importance of the institutional reforms. The IMF policy restricts financial assistance 
in cases where corruption and fraud reached the level threaten to undermine the 
economic recovery programs. In some cases both institutions denied or suspended 
assistance to countries where corruption affected the way the recovery policy goes 
and governments are not ready to tackle the problem of corruption and fraud. 
Transparency International (TIY: 
TI is a non-profit organisation working to prevent corruption in international business 
transactions, encourages national and local governments to implement effective anti-
corruption laws, policies and programs. TI publishes annual Corruption Perception 
Index, which reflects perceived levels of corruption in 90 countries. 
Financial Action Task Force (FATF): 
FATF was established by the G7 Heads of State in 1989 at the G7 Summit. It is the 
international organisation established to fight financial crime, and in particular, 
money laundering. In 1990, FATF issued a list of Forty Recommendations on money 
laundering counter-measures. These recommendations are not legally binding under 
public international law. However, FATF may impose sanctions against non co-
operative jurisdictions. In 2002 F ATF group on Money Laundering produced a report 
on Money Laundering Typologies, which is a helpful tool in combating money 
laundering. Since June 2000 the F ATF has started to conduct an annual review of the 
non-cooperative countries and territories by identifying the major deficiencies in the 
legislative systems and any developments. 
Although the majority of the above mentioned initiatives represent the example of the 
'soft laws' - which do not have a legally binding force, a great number of countries 
follow its rules. For example, more than 100 countries followed the Basel Accord and 
implemented it in some form. Ward (2002) identifies several possible explanations: to 
7 Transparency International web-site is: http://www.transparency.org! 
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cut the cost of legal drafting it is cheaper to borrow the rules; financial markets 
reward developing markets in case if, for example, a Basel regime is implemented; 
financial institutions from countries which do not complying with certain 
international standards, such as Basel standards, tend to find it difficult to enter 
financial centres in New York and London. 
There are other organisations which work on more specific areas, such as accounting 
standards. A growing number of international organisations dealing with economic 
crime problems can be explained through a growing concern expressed by 
governments in some financially advanced countries over the financial security in 
emerging markets. An international agreement has been reached in regard to the 
policies a country needs to adopt to provide laws for the confiscature of the proceeds 
of serious crime (the major development was made in the area of confiscation of the 
proceeds of illicit drug trade). The investigation and interdiction of the proceeds of 
serious offences are of great importance to the international community. The 
criminalisation of money laundering, the reporting of suspicious transactions, the 
imposition of reporting and due diligence requirements on tho$e most likely to 
confront money laundering and facilitation of international mutual assistance- all 
these problems are on today's international agenda. 
Rose-Ackerman (1999) lists five broad arenas for international involvement in 
combating corruption. One of these is particularly important for transition countries 
such as Ukraine, the idea that international programs should control the flow of illicit 
funds in order to check corruption "by impeding the transfer of secret funds abroad 
where they cannot be traced" (p. 178). Further, the United States Department of State, 
for example, has listed several practices that have been developed and introduced by a 
number of international organisations in combating the problem. These include (US 
Department of State, 2001, pp. 36-42): 
1. Adaptation of systems to promote transparency, such as through disclosing 
the financial circumstances of senior officials (promoted by Inter-American 
Convention Against Corruption; Council of Europe Committee of Ministers 20 
Recommendations against Corruption, November 1997; United Nations Commission 
on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice: Report of Expert Group on Action Against 
Corruption and Bribery, March 1997, others). 
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2. Development of the systems for swift and effective extradition so that 
corrupt public officials can face judicial process (OECD Convention on Combating 
Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions; Council of 
Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption; United Nations Convention Against 
Transnational Organised Crime, others). 
3. Development of the systems to enhance international legal assistance to 
governments seeking to investigate and prosecute corruption violations (OECD 
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International 
Business Transactions; United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organised 
Crime, others). 
4. Promoting efforts to educate the public about the dangers of corruption and 
the importance of general public involvement in government efforts to control corrupt 
activity (United Nations Secretariat Manual: practical Measures Against Corruption, 
July 1990; United Nations Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice: 
Report of Expert Group on Action Against Corruption and Bribery, March 1997). 
Some of the most effective measures against corruption the international community 
can provide are those that come from outside a particular nation. This includes 
closing down the channels for international capital flight (as well as for the proceeds 
from corruption and money laundering) and tightening the international laws and 
financial market regulation. For example, the Transparency International "Global 
Report on Corruption" (2001, p. 122) stated that "the role the West can play in 
helping post-Soviet countries in their efforts to curb corruption must not be 
underestimated. One of the most important challenges facing the international 
community is to monitor more closely offshore banking activities and, in particular, 
to ensure that banks strictly follow 'know your customer' rules when dealing with 
money transfers from the region." 
Next section explores certain recent initiatives undertaken by the US and the UK. 
5.2 Individual country's initiatives: anti-corruption and money 
laundering control initiatives in the USA and the UK 
5.2.1 The USA on corruption 
The United States of America has to be named as the country which started the fight 
against money laundering and corruption at the international level. In 1977, the 
United States enacted the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), criminalising offer, 
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promise and payments by US firms to foreign officials, political parties, party 
officials and candidates made to secure business advantage. The United States played 
significant role in encouraging other countries to take similar steps. The real progress 
came in the late 90-s with the establishment of the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development's (OECD) Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign 
Public Officials in International Business Transactions. The OECD Bribery 
Convention entered into force in February 1999. Signed by 34 countries, the OECD 
Bribery Convention required parties to: "apply effective, proportionate and dissuasive 
criminal penalties" to those who bribe; establish liability of legal persons or impose 
comparable civil sanctions or fines; make bribery a predicate offence for money-
laundering legislation; improve accounting procedures; prohibit off-the-books 
accounts; and provide mutual legal assistance and extradition in cases falling under 
the Convention" (United States Department of States, 2001, p.II-12). 
The US recently amended the FCP A 1977 to provide for jurisdiction to prosecute US 
persons. "The US can prosecute for the payment of a bribe to a foreign government 
official or private party, even where that activity takes place solely outside the US, if 
the payment is made by a US person. Consequently, US companies must now assume 
greater responsibilities to ensure that their employees overseas do not attempt to 
secure a contract or close a business deal through the payment of improper 
commissions or bribes" (The Society for Advanced Legal Studies, 2000, p.201). 
The United States Anti-Money Laundering Laws provide extra-territorial reach to 
prosecute illegal money transfer. "18 USC section 1956 (f) provides for extra-
territorial jurisdiction over the substantive money laundering offences where the 
impugned conduct is by a US citizen, or otherwise if the conduct occurs in part in the 
US, and in either situation the transaction involved over US$ 10,000" (Ibid., p.202). 
Almost for a decade the US had been ahead of all the industrialised counties in its 
legislative initiative to combat foreign bribery (Ibid., p.202). The report conducted by 
the Society for Advanced Legal Studies (2000) states that even among the 
democratically governed countries the issue of foreign bribery has being overlooked. 
For example, "the official UK position is that existing legislation criminalises 
transnational bribery, but legal opinions differ and there have been no prosecution to 
date (Ibid., p.203). 
5.2.2 The USA on banking regulation 
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In the USA the Federal Reserve, the FDIC, the Comptroller of the Currency and the 
state banking regulators work closely together to establish the framework for banking 
supervision. 
International Banking Act 1978 was the major piece of federal legislation regulating 
foreign banks until the BCCI scandal and the following changes in legislation such as 
the introduction of the Foreign Bank Supervision Enhancement Act (FBSEA). 
FBSEA has five major topics. First is the entry requirements, the standards that a 
foreign bank must meet in order to enter and engage in banking in the USA; second is 
deposit insurance, mainly the circumstances under which foreign banks may receive 
deposit insurance; third topic is the issue of termination and enforcement; fourth is the 
examination of foreign banks operations in the USA; and fifth is the disclosure 
requirements (Bhala, 1994). Some authors suggested that the FBSEA did not address 
the core issue of the BCCI case, that is about lying to the government, but made it 
extremely difficult for foreign banks to gain entry into the US banking market (for the 
critique of the FBSEA see Bhala, 1994). 
5.3 Financial market regulation in the UK: a brief overview 
Historically, financial services in the UK have been regulated by different agencies, 
government bodies, laws, private association and self-regulatory organisations. For 
decades the English banking system was managed "as a small gentlemen's club of 
bankers through the practice of 'moral suasion'" (Norton, 2000, p.l06). Regulatory 
consolidation was announced in 1997, and with the approval of the Financial Services 
and Markets Act 2000, the super regulator was established. The new UK system of 
financial regulation separates the job of prudential control - Financial Service 
Authority from the responsibility for financial stability and lender of last resort 
facility - Bank of England, The Financial Service Authority (FSA) has significant 
power. FSA has four regulatory objectives. The first is to maintain confidence in the 
financial system; the second is to promote public understanding of the financial 
system, including awareness of the benefits and risks associated with different kinds 
of investment and other financial dealings and the provision of appropriate 
information and advice; the third objective is to secure the appropriate degree of 
protection for consumers; and objective number four is to reduce the extent to which 
it is possible for financial services businesses to be used for financial crime. 
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FSA is accountable to the Treasury. FSA is given the power and responsibility to 
require the provision of infonnation and to conduct investigation in various cases 
(FSMA 2000, sI65). 
The Financial Services and Market Acts (2000) (FSMA 2000), creates a new civil 
offence of behaviour that may not have fallen into the criminal concept of 'insider 
dealing'. The new prohibition widen the group of individuals to whom this rule can 
be applied: "commodities finns who conspire with futures traders to distort prices in a 
market, associates or family members of market participants who might not 
previously have been caught by the insider dealing rules; and members of public, such 
as participants in a web chartroom who 'pump and dump' a stock for profit" (Blyth, 
2001, p.414). 
In the UK, HM Treasury works together with FSA and those responsible for the 
financial stability from the Bank of England. 
In summer 2001 the FSA published "The Money Laundering Theme: Tackling our 
New Responsibilities", a document which specifies the issues of money laundering in 
the UK, and clarifies the methodological approach the FSA applies in dealing with 
money laundering. The FSA study suggests that compliance failures are common as 
regards to the major requirements of the Regulations and the FSA rules. Morris 
(2001) singles out the following failings: problems in the identification of customers 
who are based overseas or introduced by others and the beneficial owners of 
corporate customers; problems arising when there is a need to acquire source of 
wealth infonnation from customers. Morris (2001) writes "knowing yom customer 
means precisely that and should not be considered to be a matter of fonn filling, 
especially where large sums are at stake or unusual transactions are to be carried out" 
(Morris, 2001, p.399); insufficient attention is given to the geographical location of 
customers and the need to conduct additional due diligence for customers from 
jurisdictions designated as uncooperative by the Financial Action Task Force. The 
FSA identified six risk areas most vulnerable to money laundering: international 
banking involving high risk jurisdiction, independent financial advisers dealing with 
offshore funds, domestic banking involving large volumes of small scale deposits, 
online broking, credit unions, and spread betting. 
5.3.1 The UK on corruption 
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The report conducted by the Society for Advanced Legal Studies which has already 
been mention here, focused its attention around the legal issues of corruption in the 
UK. The report concluded that "it is unclear whether bribery of foreign officials is an 
offence under UK's existing prevention of corruption legislation ... No offence under 
the existing prevention of corruption legislation is committed if the offer and payment 
of the bribe takes place abroad .. .If the bribe is offered and paid abroad, it is tax 
deductible" (The Society for Advanced Legal Studies, 2000, p., 11). As of the year 
2000, no -one has been convicted for bribing foreign officials under the present 
legislation in the UK (Ibid., p.19). Anti-corruption legislation in the UK based on the 
following three acts: Public Bodies Corrupt Practices Act 1889, Prevention of 
Corruption act 1906, and prevention of Corruption Act 1916. 
5.3.2 The UK on money laundering 
The UK's money laundering regime has three main directions: the UK has 
criminalised money laundering with penalties for offenders, obliged financial 
institutions to put system in place to detect and prevent money laundering, and 
encourage reporting of known or suspected money laundering to the authorities 
(Cabinet Office, 2000). 
The Money Laundering Regulations 1993 oblige financial institutions to provide an 
adequate system of control to identify suspicious transactions. There are still some 
obstacles in the defendant's favour in case of money laundering offence. It is believed 
that the test for money laundering should be simplified (Cabinet Office, 2000). 
The Financial Service and Market Act adopted in the United Kingdom in 2000 
reflects the changes introduced by the globalization of financial markets. Financial 
Service and Market Act has significantly extended the responsibilities of the Financial 
Service Authority in the markets area. Among the four objectives stated in the act, 
one addresses the reduction of financial crime: 
"This involves reducing the extent to which it is possible for a business carried 
out by a regulated person or in contravention of the general prohibition to be 
used for a purpose connected with financial crime. The FSA must have regard 
to the desirability of regulated persons being aware of the risk of their 
business being used in connection with the commission of financial crime, and 
regulated persons taking appropriate measures to prevent financial crime, 
facilitate its detection and monitor its incidence, and regulated persons 
devoting adequate resources to these matters" (Financial Service and Market 
Act, Section 6). 
134 
According to the Act 'offence' includes an act or omission, which would be an 
offence if it had taken place in the UK. It means that the bankers can no longer turn a 
blind eye and say that it is not their major concern what happens in, for example 
Russia and Ukraine. Rather, the bankers must treat events in Russia and Ukraine as if 
they happened in the UK. 
5.4 The Patriot Act: international response to terrorism and its 
implication to the financial service regulation. 
The attack on the USA of 11 th September had dramatically changed the international 
approach in dealing with terrorism and its financial aspects. The US Government has 
adopted extraterritorial financial controls on foreign banking and financial institutions 
that facilitate transactions with, or assist designated terrorist groups. In October 2001 
the US Congress enacted legislation entitled 'the Uniting and Strengthening America 
by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism' (the 
Patriot Act 2001). Title III of the Patriot Act deals with the International Money 
Laundering Abatement and Anti-Terrorist Financing Act of 200 1. It considers US and 
foreign banks and financial institutions. Among the other provisions, Title III 
provides authority to take targeted action against countries, institutions, transactions, 
or types of accounts that the Secretary of the Treasury finds to be of prime money-
laundering concern. It contains high standards of due diligence for inter-bank 
correspondent accounts and payable-through accounts opened at US financial 
institutions by foreign offshore banks and banks in jurisdictions that have failed to 
comply with international anti-money-Iaundering standards. 
Provisions of US Executive Order 13224 on 24th September 2001, and the Uniting and 
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and 
Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 200 1 impose extra-territorial 
jurisdiction on foreign banks, companies and individual who conduct, facilitate or 
assist transactions involving US-designated terrorist organisations and provides a 
framework to establish a set of new reporting requirements and due diligence 
standards for US and foreign financial institutions designed to combat international 
money laundering and to stop terrorist financing (Alexander, 2002). 
Title III of the Patriot Act is entitled the International Money Laundering Abatement 
and Anti-Terrorist Financing Act of 200 1. It contains the major provisions addressing 
not only US banks and financial institutions, but foreign financial institutions as well. 
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Section 312 of the Patriot Act requires financial institutions to establish due diligence 
programs for correspondent accounts of foreign financial institutions and private 
banking accounts of "non-US persons". 
With regard to correspondent accounts for foreign banks, the proposed regulation 
requires that a due diligence program must first, assess whether the foreign institution 
presents a significant risk of money laundering; second, consider information from 
US government agencies and multinational organisations with respect to supervision 
and regulation of the foreign institution; third, review guidance from the Treasury and 
federal regulators regarding risk associated with particular foreign institutions; and 
fourth review public information to decide whether the foreign institution has been 
the subject of any criminal or regulatory action relating to money laundering 
(Alexander, 2002). Special attention is given to certain foreign institutions that 
operate under licenses issued by countries regarded as non co-operative with 
international anti-money laundering principles (ie F ATF). 
With regard to due diligence programs for private accounts of non-US persons, the 
proposed regulation requires that such programs must: establish the identity of all 
nominal holders and beneficial holders of the accounts, including information on their 
lines of business or source of wealth; identify the source of funds deposited into the 
account, identify whether any holder may be a 'senior political figure' (if it is 
established that an account holder is a senior political official further due diligence is 
required), and report any known or suspected violation of law conducted through or 
involving the account (Alexander, 2002). 
The due diligence regulation is believed to be the 'further-reaching' regulation issued 
under the Title III (Gimbert, 2002). In case if suspicious financial transaction have 
been discovered the institutions must report to federal law enforcement agencies and 
the Treasury. The reports then entered into a confidential database. The FBI uses this 
database to create the list of suspicious persons and entities, which is available to all 
financial institutions. 
Section 313 (a) prohibits some fmancial institutions from establishing, maintaining, 
administering or managing correspondent accounts with foreign banks that have no 
physical presence in any jurisdiction (known as 'shell banks'). 
Section 315 entitled 'Inclusion of foreign corruption offences as money laundering 
crimes' recognises bribery and other foreign corruption offences as unlawful for 
purposes of the crime of money laundering. 
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The definition of financial institutions became wider and from now includes foreign 
banks or other financial institutions operating outside the USA (Alexander, 2002). 
The regulations issued by the Department of Treasury will determine financial 
institutions subject to anti-money-Iaundering laws. New regulations will apply to the 
concentration accounts to prevent the financial institution's customers from 
anonymously directing funds into or through these accounts. 
Section 326, considers the issue f identity verification and sets up the following rules: 
"all financial institutions must have a Customer Identification Program detailing its 
Identity Verification Program; all new accounts need to be screened against the 
OF AC and other published lists of suspected terrorists and terrorist organisation; any 
documents used to identify the new account holder, such as, driver license, passport, 
social security card, etc, need to be verified against a third party database to 
determine that the identity is valid to extent reasonable and practicable; a database of 
all accounts needs to be maintained that includes the account name, date of account 
opening, identifying information presented, and the items used to verify the identity. 
This information needs to be time and date stamped and maintained for 5 years 
following the closure of the accounts" (Penley, 2002). 
Section 311 entitled Special measures for jurisdictions, financial institutions, or 
international transactions of primary money laundering concern, considers a payable -
through accounts as 'an account, including a transaction account, ... opened at a 
depository institution by a foreign financial institution by means of which the foreign 
financial institution permits its customers to engage, either directly or through a sub-
account, in banking activities usual in connection with the business of banking in the 
United States'. 
"Payable -through accounts are offered by US banking entities to foreign 
banks. It involves the US banking entity opening a checking account for the 
foreign bank. The foreign bank then solicits customers that reside outside the 
USA who, for a fee, are provided with the means to conduct banking 
transactions in the US payment system through the foreign bank's account at 
the US banking entity. Ordinarily, the foreign bank will provide its customers, 
commonly referred to as sub-account holders, with checks that enable the sub-
account holder to draw on the foreign bank's account at the US banking entity. 
The group of sub-account holders may become signatories on the foreign 
bank's account at the US banking entity" (Alexander, 2002, p.316). 
A new obligation to identify the 'foreign beneficial owners' of accounts with US 
financial institutions may lead to conflicts between the secrecy law provision in some 
jurisdictions and these new US requirements. 
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5.5 International response to the USA initiative to strengthened anti-
money laundering regime 
The USA initiatives to strengthened anti-money laundering control has been regarded 
as highly controversial, but long awaited in terms of establishing world-wide 
understanding of the danger of the abuse of financial institutions. The Patriot Act 
2000 received a wide international response. Following are just a few examples of the 
initiatives undertaken by two international organisations, such as United Nations and 
the F ATF, and one country, the UK. 
United Nations: 
The UN adopted resolution 1373 requires some extra measures to be taken into 
account by countries to prevent future terrorist acts. Under the article 2 (c) states are 
required to prevent and suppress the financing of terrorist acts and to refrain from 
providing any type of support, active or passive, for terrorists and to deny safe haven 
to those who finance, plan or participate in terrorist acts. 
FATF: 
F ATF issued "Special Recommendations" on terrorist financing to establish the basic 
framework for detecting, preventing and suppressing the financing of terrorism and 
terrorist acts. Special recommendation II asks each country to criminalise the 
financing of terrorism and associated money laundering. 
Alexander writes that "The 'Special Recommendations' supplement and reinforce the 
measures already adopted by the UN and create a more comprehensive international 
regime for interdicting the financing and commercial support of terrorists and terrorist 
activities (Alexander, 2002, p.320). 
Great Britain: 
The UK Government adopted a number of measures to combat the financing of 
terrorism. Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Amendments to the Terrorism Act 
2000 adopted in November 2001 creates new offences, including offences of 
international terrorism, offence for a person to solicit, or to receive, money or 
property on behalf of terrorists if the person knows or has reasonable cause to suspect 
that such money may be used for the purpose of terrorism. 
It is difficult to discuss now the implication of this act to the developing nations. 
What is clear is that financially advanced countries such as USA and UK take the 
issue of the abuse of financial system very seriously and they are willing to impose a 
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set of strict regulations allowing the financial system to identify the terrorist finances 
at a very early stage. It is also important to remember that corruption of the foreign 
state officials is now considered as an offence by US legislators. For countries there 
corruption is endemic these changes can bring a lot difficulties. 
Next section considers the issue of financial regulation in transition countries. 
5.6 Financial stability in emerging financial markets: Ukraine at the 
international agenda 
5.6.1 FATF black list: the image of Ukraine 
On 7th of September 2001 F ATF added Ukraine to the list of non-co-operative 
jurisdictions. Non-cooperative jurisdictions are those, which have not made adequate 
progress in addressing the serious deficiencies in anti-money laundering legislation 
identified by the FA TF. As on September 200 I Ukraine met the following FATF 
criteria 4,8, 10, 11, 14, 15, 16,23,24, and 25. These criteria described are: (4) 
existence of anonymous accounts or accounts in obviously fictitious names; (8) 
secrecy provisions which can be invoked against, but not lifted by competent 
administrative authorities in the context of enquires concerning money-laundering; 
(10) absence of an efficient mandatory system for reporting suspicious transactions to 
a competent authority, provided that such a system aims to detect and prosecute 
money laundering; (11) lack of monitoring and criminal or administrative sanctions in 
respect to the obligation to report suspicious or unusual transactions; (14) regulatory 
or other systems which allow financial institutions to carry out financial business 
where the beneficial owner(s) of transaction is unknown, or is represented by an 
intermediary who refuses to divulge that information, without informing the 
competent authorities; (15) laws or regulations prohibiting international exchange of 
information between administrative anti-money laundering authorities or not granting 
clear gateways or subjecting exchange of information to unduly restrictive conditions; 
(16) prohibiting relevant administrative authorities to conduct investigations or 
enquiries on behalf of, or for account of their foreign counterparts; (23) failure to 
provide the administrative and judicial authorities with the necessary financial, human 
or technical resources to exercise their functions or to conduct their investigations; 
(24) inadequate or corrupt professional staff in either governmental, judicial or 
supervisory authorities or among those responsible for anti-money laundering 
compliance in the financial services industry; (25) lack of centralised unit (Le., a 
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financial intelligence unit) or of an equivalent mechanism for the collection, analysis 
and dissemination of suspicious transactions information to competent authorities 
(FATF,2000). 
Ukraine met F ATF criteria 11, lack of monitoring and criminal or administrative 
s~ctions in respect to the obligation to report suspicious or unusual transactions. 
Criteria 11 needs to be explained in more details. According to Article 64 of the Law 
on Banks and Banking Activities, banks are required to identify persons involved in 
substantial or suspicious transactions. Pursuant to the law the threshold for substantial 
transactions are transactions amounted more than Euro 50.000, and cash transactions 
Euro 10.000. As defined by the Law suspicious transactions have following 
characteristics: (1) transactions, which are carried out in an unusual or unjustifiably 
complicated conditions; (2) transactions are not economically justified or are against 
the legislation of Ukraine. According to some Ukrainian researchers (Neelov, 2001), 
to observe the law and other requirement, one has to report the major part of the 
transactions of legal and physical entities undertaking in Ukraine. 
However, for F ATF meeting these criteria were not enough not to list Ukraine as non-
co-operative jurisdiction. Ukraine was given time until completion of the third round 
of the FATF's evaluation to work on serious deficiencies identified to be able to 
escape the FATF's counter measures. 
The remaining deficiencies originate from different problematic areas: financial 
regulations, international co-operation, and recourses available to finance public and 
private sector. While the poor state of the economy, and state budget deficit can 
explain the last problem, which is the general lack of resources, the rest of the 
problems tend to be united by the lack of political will in the country. For example, 
the draft Anti-Money Laundering legislation has been at the discussion in the 
Parliament for almost a year since FATF identified the problem and warned Ukraine 
about possible sanctions. 
5.6.2 Law of Ukraine on Prevention and Counteraction of LegaUsation 
("Laundering") of the Proceeds from Crime. 
On December 7th 2002 Ukraine enacted the "Law of Ukraine on Prevention and 
Counteraction of Legalisation of the Proceeds from Crime". However, according to 
the FA TF this legislation does not address the main deficiency identified by the FA TF 
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earlier in the year 2001, during the anti-money laundering regime review in Ukraine. 
In the mid-December 2002 Members of the FATF decided to apply the counter 
measures to Ukraine. Although, as of the 14 of February 2003, the FATF informed: 
"F ATF members have decided to withdraw the application of additional counter-
measures with respect to Ukraine as the result of a recent enactment by Ukraine of 
comprehensive anti-money laundering legislation that addresses the main deficiencies 
identified by FATF in 2001 and reaffirmed in December 2002. Ukraine will remain 
on the list on NCCTS until it has implemented effectively its new anti-money 
laundering legislation" (F ATF, 2003 downloaded from http://www 1.oecd.orglfatfl 
FATF withdraws counter measures with respect to Ukraine, 14 February, 2003). 
As it has already been mentioned the draft law had been under consideration in 
Ukrainian Parliament for more than a year and it had been approved by the Parliament 
and signed by the President just a couple of weeks before the FATF's deadline in 
December 2002. This law consists of 16 articles, described under 6 sections. Section 
I: The General Provisions consists of three articles: Article 1 provides definitions, 
Article 2 gives an account of activities related to money laundering, and Article 3 
describes the scope of the law. According to Article 1 the main definitions are: profit, 
illegal activity which lead to money laundering, money laundering, types of financial 
activity, compulsory financial monitoring, and local (inside financial monitoring). 
Profit is defined as any economic advantage criminally acquired and is followed by 
legalisation; profit shall mean money or securities, movable and immovable property, 
property rights, any other items covered by property rights. Illegal activity which is 
followed by money laundering shall mean activity which according to the Criminal 
Code will lead to three or more years imprisonment or activity which is considered to 
be criminal according to the criminal code of another country (and the same activity 
is prohibited under the Criminal Code of Ukraine), and as a result of which the profit 
is illegally obtained. Financial transaction shall mean any transaction aimed at 
making or assisting in transaction by means of: bank account transaction; foreign 
currency exchange; assisting in issuing, buying or selling of securities; giving or 
receiving a credit; insurance (reinsurance); giving or receiving financial guarantees; 
managing the securities portfolio; issuing, circulation of a state or other financial 
lottery; assisting in issuing, buying or selling of securities, payments, postal cash 
transaction or other means of payments; opening an account. Section II describes the 
system of financial monitoring in Ukraine. Article 4 of the Section II identifies two 
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levels of the financial monitoring in the country: primary and state. The primary 
financial monitoring units are: commercial banks, insurance and other financial 
institutions, agencies authorised to receive, pay and transfer money; commodity or 
stock or other exchanges; professional players at the securities market; investment 
trusts; commissions shops, gaming houses and organisations which hold lotteries of 
any kind; post offices telegraph offices and legal entities that provide, in conformity 
with the law, services of receiving, paying, conveying, transferring money or 
management of investment funds or non-state pension funds. The state financial 
monitoring units are represented by the governmental agencies and the National Bank 
of Ukraine and authorised under the law to regulate and monitor financial operations. 
Article 5 describes tasks and duties of the primary financial monitoring agencies. 
These duties include identification of the initiator of a financial transaction, detection 
and registration of any doubtful transactions, reporting financial transaction which is 
under the financial monitoring to a special unit (reporting shall occur not later than 
three days from the day of transaction registration); assisting the special financial 
monitoring units in the financial transaction analysis; on request of the financial 
monitoring agencies provide additional information regarding a particular financial 
transaction, even if this information constitutes banking and commercial secret 
(information shall be provided no later than three days after the request is received); 
keep the financial monitoring in secret from the client. The primary financial 
monitoring units shall keep the file of identification of the initiator of a financial 
transaction which is under the financial monitoring for five years. Article 6 states the 
details of the information necessary to obtain to identify the physical and legal entity, 
including residents and non-residents in Ukraine. According to Article 6 identification 
is not necessary in cases when financial transactions initiated by someone who has 
already been identified before. Article 7 gives a right to the financial institutions to 
refuse financial transaction. Article 10 identifies the duties of the state financial 
monitoring agencies, such as the National Bank of Ukraine and the authorised bodies, 
to control the compliance of the primary financial monitoring institutions with the 
obligations prescribed by the law, inform a special unit of discovered violations of 
this law by financial operators. 
Section III describes the financial operations which are under compulsory and inside 
financial monitoring. Article 11states that a financial operation is subject to control if 
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its amount is equal or more than Hrv 300.0008, or its amount in foreign currency is 
equal or more than Hrv 300.000, or in case of a cash transaction, if its amount is equal 
or more than Hrv 100.000, or its amount in foreign currency is equal or more than 
Hrv 100.000 and if the financial transaction has one of the following characteristics: 
payment is due to be made to the anonymous account abroad or is due to be received 
from the anonymous account abroad, and if a payment is due to be made to the 
financial institutions situated in countries listed by the Cabinet of Ministers as off-
shore zones; buying or selling travel cheques or other means of payment; financial 
transactions conducted with the countries which do not co-operate with international 
organisations aimed to tackle money-laundering; transfer of the money abroad with 
the aim to receive money their in cash; opening account to the third person; foreign 
transfers conducted despite the absence of the foreign trade agreement between 
parties involved; cash payments for the securities purchased; lottery or casino 
payments; foreign currency exchange. 
According to Article 12 financial operations shall be monitored if they are 
unnecessary complex, or the information obtained can not be checked (for example, 
changes made by one of the party in regard to the money re-allocation, etc.); if the 
financial operation does not correspond with the business activity of a client 
described in related documentation; if there is a reason to suspect that the client has 
conducted financial operations aimed to avoid financial monitoring. Section IV states 
the tasks, functions and duties of the authorised authority. 
Section V of this law is of particular importance to this research because it aims to 
regulate the international co-operations in regard with the anti-money laundering 
measures. Article 15 identifies the grounds for and forms of international co-
operation for the prevention and counteraction of legalisation (laundering) the 
proceeds of crime and terrorism financing. The article states that international co-
operation for the prevention and counteraction of legalisation (laundering) of the 
proceeds from crime and terrorism finances shall be based on the grounds of the 
Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from 
Crime (1990) and other international treaties of Ukraine, this Law and other 
Ukrainian laws and regulations. Refusal and postponement of co-operation shall be on 
I £1 equals Hrv 8,45 as on December 152002, The National Bank of Ukraine 
exchange rates. 
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the grounds and in the manner prescribed by the Convention on Laundering, Search, 
Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime (1990). 
Article 16 describes the agencies involved in international co-operation. According 
to the Article 16 the central agencies charged to carry out international co-operation 
for the prevention and counteraction of legalisation (laundering) of the proceeds from 
crimes shall be the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine with regard to judicial decisions 
and the Office of Prosecutor General of Ukraine with regard to investigations in 
criminal cases. The information or evidence provided by the said agencies within the 
framework of international co-operation for the prevention and counteraction of 
legalisation (laundering) of the proceeds from crime shall not be used by authorities 
of a foreign state for the purposes of investigations or judicial proceedings not 
mentioned in the judicial request, without a prior consent of the Ministry of Justice of 
Ukraine or the Office of prosecutors General of Ukraine. The authorised agency shall 
co-operate with appropriate authorities of foreign states for the purposes of exchange 
of information on legalisation (laundering) of the profits, shall co-operate with the 
Financial Action Task Force (F ATF) and other international organisations aiming to 
prevent and counteract the legalisation (laundering) of the profits. 
Section VI states the responsibility for breaching this law. 
This law shall enter into force in six month from the date of its official publication 
(published in November 2002). 
The above-described law can be considered as a victory of the international 
organisation, and F ATF in particular. Without the pressure from the international 
community the adoption of this law in Ukraine would not be possible. However, there 
are still deficiencies to be addressed to 'clear' the country's name. 
5.6.3 Financial regulation - tbe new perspective 
It is obvious that functioning of any economy is hardly possible without efficient 
financial system. Norton (2000) names four issues necessary to take into 
consideration when speaking about the international strategy for the development of 
financial stability in emerging markets. The first issue is the development of an 
international consensus on the key elements of a sound financial and regulatory 
system by representatives of the 0-10 and emerging market economies. The second is 
the formulation of sound principles and practices by international grouping of 
national authorities with relevant expertise and experience, such as the Basle 
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Committee on Banking Supervision, the International Accounting Standards 
Committee (lACS), the International Organisation of Securities Commission 
(lOSCO), the International Association ofInsurance Supervisors (lAIS), and the Joint 
Forum on Financial conglomerates. The third strategic issue is the use of market 
discipline and market access channels to provide incentives for the adoption of sound 
supervisory systems, better corporate governance and other key elements of a robust 
financial system. The last issue is the promotion of the adoption and implementation 
of sound principles and practices. The multilateral institutions such as the IMF, the 
World Bank and the regional development bank, such as the EBRD can play an 
essential role (Norton, 2000). Although it is important to consider international 
strategies, they can only achieve results if implemented in collaboration with the 
national governments and financial authorities initiatives in the countries concerned 
(Norton, 2000, Rose-Ackerman, 1999). 
The responsibilities of the national government of the country concerned have been 
mentioned twice already in this chapter. What does it mean in practice and how 
feasible is it to expect the national government to react to the problems of financial 
crime accordingly? Chapter four analyses the experience of Ukraine with regard to 
establishing the sound financial system. The case study on banking showed the 
importance of timely introduced legal framework. It also shows that despite 
difficulties arising during the first years of transition, once the legislation is adopted 
the financial institutions can regulate themselves and follow the rule of law principles. 
The major problem is not in creating the 'specialised' legal framework, which is in 
our case the framework for the financial institutions to operate, but the creation of the 
system known as the rule of law. The case study on corruption showed that despite 
the number of legislative acts and decrees adopted, the problem of corruption and 
corrupt state officials involvement in the financial sphere remains to be acute. The 
specialised legal framework for the financial institutions needs to include adequate 
contract, corporate, bankruptcy and private property laws as a minimum requirement. 
However, even if these requirements are satisfied the development of the financial 
system is far away from being safe. The danger comes not necessarily from 'the 
inside' of the banking system, but from the 'outside' of the system. Enforcement of 
the above mentioned laws presents a biggest challenge, especially in Ukraine- a 
society characterised by the lack of the rule of law principles. 
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In January 2002 the President of Ukraine adopted a decree "On measures to prevent 
legalisation (laundering) illegally obtained income". This decree raised concern 
among the players in the financial market. According to the decree, banks or other 
financial institutions will carry out the primary control of the transactions defined by 
the law as substantial or suspicious. The Cabinet of Ministers is ordered to create a 
special state department inside the Ministry of Finance. The biggest worry of those 
representing the financial market industry is the highly politicised character of this 
new structure. The results of the expert study suggest that big financial scandals can 
be closely related to the high-level state officials. The question is how to insure that 
this new structure is free from being political or under the pressure of corrupt state 
official. Most developed economies have established their own system of control 
through years of experience and learning from their own mistakes. Unfortunately, 
Ukraine does not have time to choose the right policy by means of experimenting. 
With regard banking supervision, there are three alternatives to organising the 
banking supervision in the country: to separate banking supervision from the central 
bank, to conduct supervision as a part of central bank activities, to create a single 
regulator. Each alternative has arguments in favour or against it. In case of the 
separation of banking supervision from the central bank, the immediate concern is the 
conflict of interest between supervision and monetary policy objectives. As it has 
been discussed in Chapter 4, case study on banking, Ukraine had followed the IMP 
recommendations to single out monetary stabilisation as a top priority for the central 
bank. The danger of this situation is that the authorities and central bank can easily 
jeopardise their power and use it to provide assistance to a few selected banks. Norton 
(2000) considers examples of Mexico and Thailand, "where the central banks have 
been forced to abandon stability in the face of threats to the banking system" (Norton, 
2000, p.l 02). The list of countries suffered from such a narrow policy approach 
assigned to the central banks can include Ukraine as well. What happened in Ukraine 
was not a separation of the central bank from banking supervision activities, but 
neglect of these supervisory activities for almost five years, from 1991 to 1996. 
Norton (2000) discusses three fundamental arguments against the separation of the 
central bank from banking supervision activities: "those relating to the central bank's 
lender of last resort function; those involving the payment systems; those advancing 
the need for consistency between monetary policy and banking supervision" (p.l03). 
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Obviously, for the emerging economies it is essential to have consistency between 
monetary policy and banking supervision. 
Early in this chapter we briefly discussed the financial regulation systems in the US 
and the UK. It is rather difficult to suggest what is the best choice for one jurisdiction. 
It is necessary to take into account not only the experience the country has gained in 
the financial services, but legal and social issues as well. Norton (2000) suggests that 
both system models are valid, if they are adequately structured. The Basle Core 
Principles state that the effectiveness of the banking supervision depends on how 
clearly the regulatory responsibilities and objectives are set. 
It is essential to remember the certain characteristics of supervision (Ward, 2002). 
Supervisors tend to use a broad range of information, even of subjective nature. It is 
often the case that supervision depends on incentives of supervisors, and other 
professionals surrounding them, such as bakers, politicians, and auditors. These 
incentives may be affected not only by law, but also by culture and norms presented 
in the country. Ward (2002) writes: "It is easy to build incentive mechanisms that fail 
to achieve regulatory objectives, and difficult to build mechanisms that succeed. 
Organisational structures give even the most public-spirited supervisor reason to 
misbehave" (Ward, 2002, p.13). 
Supervision of financial institutions is a very complex activity which amongst the 
other includes human relationship. It is a big issue for the advanced financial markets 
to monitor the relationship between supervisors and bankers, and to have a judgement 
free from superstition. However, as Ward (2002) notes: "whether supervisory actions 
are effective or entirely superstitious is not known" (Ward, 2002, p.13). 
To understand the problem Ukraine is experiencing now, one has to imagine the 
establishment of the democracy and financial institutions in the economically 
advanced countries such.as the UK and the USA. For decades, if not centuries, these 
countries have been involved in building the market systems, the efficient financial 
mechanisms, the operation of the rule of law principles in the society and the effective 
enforcement mechanisms. And yet, so many questions remain to be answered. For 
example, it took centuries to develop properly regulated securities market in the West, 
and yet, taking into consideration the poor example of Enron and others, it tends to be 
that even mature markets are not a hundred percent insured against abuse. 
Understanding the spread of the corruption in Ukraine, it is argued that it is essential 
to develop a system of clear and simple rules to regulate the financial institutions. As 
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Ward (2002) stated, these rules should be easy to write, communicate, enforce and 
verify. The role of supervisory discretion in countries such as Ukraine should be 
minimised. 
5.6.4. The new international framework and emerging markets: 
recommendations 
Although the importance of the above-described international co-operation can not be 
underestimated, a concern expressed regarding the emerging markets involvement in 
the development of the international policy and the actual co-operation among 
countries. Some researchers (Porter, 2001; Ward, 2002) argue that a common 
tendency can be observed when considering the international organisation dealing 
with financial regulation. These organisations tend to represent a number of 
developed countries who get together and establish new regulatory arrangements, and 
they later spread these arrangements to emerging markets. A concern is also made 
over the democratic principles involved in an international attempt to regulate the 
globalised financial services. There is a tendency to exclude developing countries 
from the international collaboration. Porter argues that the Basle Committee's bank 
regulations do not match the needs of micro finance industry in developing country 
(Ibid., p. 110). Ward (2002) critically considers the new Basel Accord, stresses the 
difference among countries and argues that in case if the New Accord is implemented 
without major adjustments it is 'likely to fail in developing countries' (Ward,2002, 
p.4). Wards provides three reasons for that: greater macroeconomic volatility, greater 
volatility of external flows and greater vulnerability to external stocks, weak 
institutions, and lack of skills in developing markets (Ibid., p.4). 
The need to address the special character, social and cultural traditions in one country 
is important when attempting to impose the regulations or law simply borrowed from 
another country. Discussing this aspect of the international financial regulation Rider 
(2002) writes: 
"There is a real danger that the understandable desire on the part of leaders 
and politicians to come up with a 'solution' to the problem of organised crime, 
has rendered them too willing to seize upon, what is no doubt a good weapon-
when used with others, but in no ways a solution ... as in other areas, the laws 
and legal procedures of one jurisdiction are not always easily transported, 
without adaptation, to the legal system of another, with quite different 
traditions and structures. The need to establish a convincing and workable 
balance is all the more important in the context of small, developing and 
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transitional economies. These highly vulnerable states may well find 
themselves effectively deprived of the advantages and services of those more 
developed and stable countries that are able to espouse the sort of measures 
found in legislation such as the Patriot Act. (p.32) 
The danger of imposing the standards provided by the group of countries with 
advanced economies has been expressed before the attack on America and subsequent 
changes in legislation (Porter, 2001). It seems as if the critical discussion of the role 
of authoritative supranational decision-making has now been postponed until the 
more peaceful future. It is also difficult to provide one-sided answer to the question: 
will such strengthening of the measures lead to the quality-improved response of the 
Ukrainian government to the international standards of financial regulations? There 
are two possible scenarios: the first one is if the fear of being excluded from the 
international financial markets will preoccupy the thoughts of single-minded 
Ukrainian politicians, who will address the issues timely and with great care, when 
the new international requirements will prove to be workable. The second scenario, if 
the Ukrainian politicians would avoid taking this matter seriously, then not only the 
image of the country would be under attack, but the losses the financial services will 
have to overcome would devastate the financial industry in the country. 
However critical the response to the current changes suggested by the USA 
authorities might be, one thing is obvious, for the country where corruption is 
endemic and where the financial institutions have not been supervised on the basis of 
transparent and equal rules, current changes in the international environment can 
provide the opportunity for reforms. 
It is important to understand the complexity of international standards and 
regulations. Developing countries can face themselves with the dilemma, if they do 
not implement the international standards they experience the risk of being punished, 
but if they do, they can face the risk of wasting resources, and sometimes extend the 
roots of corruption. Following the international pressure Ukraine will shortly be 
introducing the new structure for the financial supervision, to stress the role of 
financial supervisors. However, as it has been discussed before, the danger is in 
abusing the supervisory power in a corrupt system. 
There are two issues that need to be addressed as the possible policy 
recommendations9• The first one is the necessity to create effective regulation and 
9 It needs to be said that in one way or another Norton (2000) affecting discusses the similar issues as the policy choice of 
developing economies. 
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supervision of the financial system in the country (this subject has been briefly 
considered in the previous section). As the case study on banking has shown 
effective regulation is among the prevalent problems in Ukraine. We have already 
addressed the issues of legal development in the country, and the importance of the 
foundation of the legal framework. The case study on banking has shown the 
importance of timely introduced bankruptcy procedures. Again, this is where 
financial issues come close to political issues, as many banks in Ukraine remain under 
the 'roof of state budget subsidies. A number of international organisations have 
advised Ukraine that the consolidation of banks technique should be introduced to 
overcome bank failures to fulfil the minimum requirements lO• It is interesting to 
observe the negative reaction expressed by a number of bank directors who early in 
the year 2000 refused to consider the possibility of consolidation. To understand the 
thoughts behind this, one has to be aware of the changes of norms and values in the 
transitional society. Firstly, one has to remember the specific culture of those who are 
rich in a transitional society, it is 'cool' to have your own bank. Secondly, is that it 
has been known for a long time that "the best way to rob a bank is to own one" 
(Calavita, Pontell, Tillman, 1997, p.58). The role of national regulators should also be 
seen in changing the above-mentioned attitude towards banking. An internationally 
recognised norms and regulations should be a helpful tool in this difficult 
transformation. 
National Bank of Ukraine as the main supervisory body of the country should create 
the supervisory practices that will be transparent and will guarantee the equal 
treatment to each financial institution. The Financial Service Intelligence Unit, the 
foundation of which was suggested by the President of Ukraine in January 2002, 
should be an independent body. There is a great danger of creating another corrupt 
unit inside already corrupted structure. If, as suggested, this unit will be created as an 
internal structure managed by the Ministry of Finance, there is potential for direct 
political influence and political supervision of this unit. In this case, the equality of 
treatment of the financial institutions in the country will remain problematic. It is 
essential to establish the Financial Intelligence Unit not as a punitive organisation, but 
10 It should be said, that contrary to this opinion, Mertens and Urga (2001) study of the Ukrainian banks argue that u on 1998 
small banks operate more efficiently in cost terms, but less efficiently in profit terms, and the researchers suggested the existence 
of the monopoly power in Ukrainian financial sector (see the discussion in Chapter 4). 
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as a preventative and capable of providing examples of the best practices. This is a 
question of political will. 
The second issue is the creation of the foundation for corporate governance, meaning 
the creation of transparent business environment. As Norton (2000) argues, policy 
makers must realise that the legal framework of business and finance relationships 
will determine the outcome of the economy's corporate governance. As the expert 
study suggested a lot of illegalities appeared in the financial sector in the 90-s have 
been closely related to the inadequate system of regulation of economic and financial 
life. This issue is closely related to what has already been suggested: the transition 
countries will only benefit from simple and easy to enforce rules. The system of 
taxation is an obvious example of a failure of an ever changing and complex rules, 
difficult to enforce and verify. The general public and the businesspeople have seen 
tax authority as a corrupt and punitive state organisation, often abusing its privileged 
position to the knowledge of the extremely complicated system of tax payment in the 
country. A lot of articles have been written to indicate that to conduct business and to 
pay all the necessary taxes means to be bankrupt the next day (International bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, 2000). So, to avoid the high rate of taxes a lot of 
companies have used the double bookkeeping system to evade money from the 
official turnover. The present official ideology created 'unreal' norms, and when 
framed them within a set of institutions to insure the 'fulfilment' of these norms by 
means of unofficial agreement, exchange of favours or simply to say, corrupt 
practices. Where do we go from here? To make sure the financial system operates 
under the transparent and equal treatment principles, we need to be sure that the 
norms and regulations are 'workable', that they have been understood by the general 
public and the consensus has been reached on such a simple issue such as what is the 
good and the bad practices, what is legal and what is illegal. 
It was suggested earlier that the level of the democratic reforms could be judged 
according to the level of development of the financial institution. It may be argued 
that the concept of corporate governance is another essential step in the way towards 
democracy. A number of issues may arise regarding the introduction of the corporate 
governance practices. Among these issues are lack of transparency and wide spread-
corruption. Both issues can be tackled as from the inside of the system, such as by 
increasing the enforcement standards, and from the outside of the system, as it was 
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suggested earlier, by obliging the country to comply with certain rules and standards 
(although the latter presents a lot of controversy). 
To summarise, last two decades of the 20th century had witnessed an enormous 
advance in technology. This had influenced not only the way the financial market has 
developed, but also the way high profile criminals have conducted their business. 
Adamoli (2001) noticed" ... just as legal businesses are expanding internationally in 
response to the globalisation of market, so are the crime enterprises seeking to 
develop both their structures and crime trade internationally in order to gain access to 
new markets, taking advantage of the discrepancies between the national legal 
system" (Adamoli, 2001, p.187-188). 
If allowed to participate in a modem international financial market system, emerging 
financial markets can find themselves in an advantage position. It means financial and 
technological assistance will be provided by more mature financial markets. 
However, at the same time emerging markets can easily be abused by criminals. That 
is why the primary goal of the government in a country is to assure the transparency 
of the financial institutions and good supervision. Experience suggests this is not 
always the case. That is why it is important to establish international mechanisms to 
control financial institutions in emerging economies. A great number of international 
organisations have already been created and carry out these functions of supervisions, 
by issuing recommendations and warnings to non co-operative jurisdictions. An 
international agreement has been reached as to the policies each country needs to 
adopt to provide laws for the confiscature of the proceeds of serious crime, or at least 
those associated with the illicit trade in drugs, the investigation and interdiction of the 
proceeds of such offences, the criminalisation of money laundering, the reporting of 
suspicious transactions, the imposition of reporting and due diligence requirements on 
those most likely to confront money laundering and facilitation of international 
mutual assistance. What remains to be achieved is to identify the most suitable ways 
of imposing the new rules to the developing and emerging markets, that is, to make 
sure that these markets would not suffer from artificial rules and standards. Stating 
that it is also understood that international co-operation in such issues as financial 
regulations is very complex: by ignoring the problem there is a chance to create a 
financial monster inside the emerging financial system, but in the opposite, by putting 
too much pressure, it is possible not to let the system further develop. As it was 
discussed in case of Ukraine the pressure of international financial community is 
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necessary to put corrupt state officials out of business and to set the framework for the 
good practices. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
The study was carried out in an attempt to reduce the gap in our knowledge about the 
problems experienced by transitional countries during the transformation of their 
financial systems. The 1980s and 1990s have seen dramatic political, economic and 
social changes in all post-communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Many 
countries have been involved in the process of establishing the financial market 
structures. Transitional countries have recognised the importance of finance with 
regard to savings and effective resource allocation. This study has provided many 
examples of the recent empirical and analytical work to suggest that economic growth 
depends on the development of the financial sectors. Transitional countries are not 
alone in their way to build sound and effective financial markets. The almost parallel 
process to the transitional countries development is the process of the 
internationalisation of financial services, which is elimination of discrimination in 
treatment between foreign and domestic financial services providers, removal of 
barriers to the cross-border provision of financial services (Claessens and Jansen, 
2000, p.,3). The benefits many transition countries could gain from this process are 
substantial. Transitional countries can be introduced to the system of international 
standards and practices, improve the quality of financial services, access more sources 
of funds. Unfortunately among at least 15 Eastern and Central European countries not 
many achieved success in building the sound and effective financial institutions. For 
some countries bad performances of the financial sectors can be justified by the small 
size of their economy and substantial costs involved to build up financial system, for 
some economic crises and political instability have become a serious obstacle. 
This study examined the impact of the financial crime on the development of the 
effective financial system in transitional Ukraine. The 24 experts who participated in 
the interviews reported a regular encounter of the financial crime problems. Given the 
fact that among the experts interviewed were those involved into the legislative 
process and working at the high state officials level, the problems is very serious. 
Summing up the results of the expert study, as on the end of the 90-s the two most 
corrupt and prone to criminal activities sectors in Ukrainian financial market are 
foreign exchange market and commerciaV saving banks. The impact of the financial 
crime on the development of the Ukrainian banking industry has been profound: 
allocation of the cheap state subsidies to selected banks, the criminal use of the 
overseas accounts, different illegal methods the loan applicant uses to obtain financial 
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resources from bank, which is often the illegal agreement between the 'big' client of 
the bank and the bank officials. Unsound and not effective banking industry has been 
seen as a direct influence of the grand scale financial crimes. 
The results of the pilot study suggest that Ukrainian financial sectors have not been 
acting as agents to promote the development of the financial system as a whole, but 
rather serving as mediators to provide cover for political mistakes and/or those 
earning 'easy money', as well as being a tool to avoid regulatory obligations 
It has been said before, that the financial crime problems experienced by Ukraine are 
not new to the world, what is new is the immunity of perpetrators and the scale of 
their crimes. 
The expert interviews and the literature study have proved the hypothesis that a grand 
scale financial crimes in the country are associated with the big political figures or 
high level state officials. It is clear now, that during the first years of independence, 
which is the early 90-s, lack of regulatory skills, and most certainly negligence and 
desire to make private profit lead to the foundation of the unsafe banking system 
which allowed substantial flow of the illegally gained capital. The "Ukraine" Bank 
scandal brings the question of the political interference in the financial issues, and as 
the Chairman of the Ukrainian Parliament Ivan Plush said, 
\\ What should the Parliament do in regard to "Ukraine" Bank? .. The 
Parliament has nothing to do with the Bank ... The National Bank of Ukraine 
and the Government have worked with the bank, including the state budget 
subsidies to the bank ... .1 have been saying it more than once, to 'seriously' 
steal money one would need to 'employ' state budget resources ... " (Business, 
2001). 
However difficult it is to tackle the issues of corruption at the macro level of the 
society, to tackle the financial crime problems at the micro level of banking tends to 
be feasible. One of the important finding of the expert study is the contrast of opinion 
of those involved into the legal drafting for the financial market and those players on 
financial market. Eighty percent of respondent involved into the business activity 
think that the regulatory framework needs major restructuring and does not 
correspond with the needs of the emerging markets. The majority of those 
representing official government bodies believed that the legislative framework has 
been developed or is in the process of development and revision. The representatives 
of this group see the major problem in the enforcement of the regulations, and 
connect enforcement problems to the problems of the lack of political will and wide-
spread corruption. 
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The three stages of the development of Ukrainian banking system (chapter 4:case 
study on banking) suggest that with the introduction of the basic principles of the 
transparent banking and the strengthened role of the National Bank of Ukraine as a 
supervisory body, a tendency towards the improved bank performances have been 
observed. That is to suggest that domestic financial regulation and supervision play 
crucial role in the development of the effective banking system and financial system 
in general. Although, in case of Ukraine it may not necessarily means the 
transparency of banking, freedom form political pressure, and the equality in the 
treatment of banks by the main supervisory body. In this case, the international 
organisation, such as Financial Action Task Force can start actions to attract more 
attention to the problematic areas. Case study on corruption presented in Chapter 4 
and Chapter 5 considered corruption and the different ways to tackle it. It is suggested 
that for the country where corruption is endemic neither the quality of law on 
corruption no the enforcement matters. The way forward has been seen in the 
international initiatives, including introduction of some strict regulations and even 
sanctions. At the same time doubts expressed as to the real possibilities of the 
Financial Intelligence Unit which will be created by the Ukrainian Ministry of 
Finance to effectively control and supervise financial organisations on the issues of 
financial crime. The main reason to doubt the possibilities is seen in the political 
pressure and corruption of those responsible at the ministerial level. The international 
response to the problems of corruption in Ukraine is also complex. While such 
initiatives as F ATF black list of the non-eo-operative jurisdictions stimulates the 
debates and provides the country named with the time and experts to tackle the 
problem, the measures proposed by the US Patriot Act can exclude the country from 
the whole spectrum of financial services without a chance to teach and assist the 
country. 
Findings reported in Chapters 4 and 5 provide empirical support for the theoretical 
model explaining the rise of financial crime in Ukraine (Chapter2). The group of 
crime prone high level state officials have being given a historic chance to transform 
the system. However, a number of opportunities have arisen to abuse the fragile 
financial system and to use the temporary absence of the basic legal provisions to 
conduct illegal business. The choice to use these opportunities have been rational and 
supported by the neutralisation technique, which blames the other for doing the same. 
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To ensure the 'safe game' everyone should be in it. If someone is out or refuses to 
play according to the rules, than the new scandal for the press appears. 
Giving the account to all what have been said we approach the general hypothesis that 
the level of the success of the democratic reforms in transition countries can be 
judged according to the advances in transformation of the financial institutions. It 
tends to be that the transformation of the Ukrainian financial system has double 
meaning. The first is that the country has really achieved a lot of progress in 
establishing the new financial institutions. Less than ten banks operated in 1991 just 
before the collapse of the USSR, and a few years later this number would be far more 
than a hundred. The second meaning is the abuse of the newly created financial 
system. At some stage in the mid-90s the numbers of banks in Ukraine reached 200. 
The case study on banking in Chapter 4 discussed the period of the middle 90-s in 
great details, and identifies the absence of the regulations in banking as the biggest 
problem for the development of the industry. As one American researcher said, the 
best way to rob a bank is to own one. 
One of the important lessons learned can be summarised in the following statement: 
political will is a significant element in the establishment of independent financial 
institutions in transitional countries. 
To conclude, it is necessary to stress the importance of studying certain economic and 
financial developments, such as, for example the establishment of the financial 
market, within the general context of the social and cultural traditions of the society. 
The study undertaken presents a first attempt to combine the sociological, 
criminological, economic, legal and even psychological thoughts to analyse the 
development of financial market in transitional countries. The present author believes 
that this combined approach has a great potential, not only in terms of understanding 
current developments, but also in terms of predicting future patterns and creating a 
framework for international collaboration. 
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Appendix I : Anti-Money Laundering situation in Ukraine l • 
I. Criminal law provisions related to money-laundering in Ukraine. 
Criminalization of money laundering Criminal code, part VII, Article 209 
Criminal liability on corporations NO 
Provisions allowing the dissolution of NO 
companies by court order 
Existence of professional secrecy YES 
Provisions of abuse of company assets Not directly 
for non-company goals as criminal 
offense 
Provisions of abuse of company assets Not directly 
for non-company goals as criminal 
offense 
Difficulties with introducing anti-money Lack of political will, and presence of 
laundering legislation personal interests. 
Existence of legal provisions other than NO 
penal, to sanction money laundering 
2. Law enforcement structure in Ukraine with special attention to money 
laundering. 
Specialized police forces State tax police, Ministry of Internal 
Affairs departments on Organized Crime 
and Economic Crime, Security Service. 
Special training for police forces NO 
Financial analysts available to assist scarce 
police officers 
Independence of the police Under supervision of public orosecutor 
Police right to start and lor stop their own Under supervision of public prosecutor 
investigation 
Special forms of cooperation between YES 
the police and the judiciary in 
investigations of economic and financial 
crime 
3. Criminal procedures and anti-money laundering measures. 
I Existence of the reversed burden of the I NO 
I Designed on the basis of the study conducted by Transcrime (2000) "Feasibility study on anti-money 
laundering measures in Russia, Ukraine, and Moldova", Trento: Transcrime, obtained from 
Transcrime web-site (pp.12-20, synoptic table: the Anti-money laundering situation in Russia, Ukraine 
and Moldova, according to the findings of the study). 
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proof in money laundering cases 
Crime proceeds seizure A part of tax authorities responsibilities 
Existence of procedures to appeal a Appeal to the prosecutor 
decision of seizing, issued in the 
investigation period 
Protection for witnesses/ informants in Witness protection 
money laundering cases 
Anonymous report of information to the Possible, but the decision on what to do 
police with the information is on the discretion 
of the police 
Existence of sanctions for illegally During trial evidence is excluded by the 
obtained evidence judge, before trial it can be excluded by 
prosecutor 
Possibility of setting-up government - Possible, but too little experience and 
controlled companies/ banks to be used financial means 
in undercover operations 
Appointment of externaVindependent Possible 
experts for assistance in investigation 
Existence of criminal data base At the Ministry of Internal Affairs 
4 J di . U Clary S tru tur C e 
Authority dealing with financial crimes Prosecutors 
Presence of foreign law firms dealing NO 
with money laundering 
Existence of an ombudsman or similar NO 
official who can investigate financial 
crimes or money laundering cases among 
public officials 
Existence of particular protection for YES 
officials dealing with economic crimes 
5. Civil Law 
Separate system of civil seizure and YES 
confiscation 
Relationship between criminal and YES 
administrative procedures in seizure and 
confiscation 
Necessity of criminal conviction before NO 
the confiscation 
Initiation of the civil seizure and Judges 
confiscation 
Documentation of transactions by public YES 
authorities 
Special control s on unjust enrichment of YES 
politicians 
6. Commercial Law 
No. of companies registered and declared Statistics not available 
bankrupt in last five years 
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Bankruptcy as criminal offense YES 
Most common types of companies Commercial partnerships, joint stock 
companies, limited liability companies 
and accessorial liability companies, 
private enterprises 
Existence of minimum share capital, YES 
debt/equity ratio, issue bearer shares 
Obligation to disclose the beneficial YES 
owner to tax or public authorities 
Existence of control/financial restraint YES 
imposed on companies 
Existence of registered office YES 
Who entitled to control the activities Registration bodies 
undertaken by the registered office? 
Lawyer or bank as registered office YES 
Existence of shareholder register YES 
Obligation to register financial statement Auditors, securities and exchange 
in a public register commission 
Obligation to appoint external financial YES 
auditors, obligation to deposit the annual 
balance by a designed authority 
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Appendix 2: The Questionnaire. Impact of economic crime on financial 
markets: study of emerging markets 
I. Background 
Respondents: 
The general sample consists of the following groups of knowledgeable experts: 
• Association of Entrepreneurs; 
• Corporations! Private business; 
• Enforcement agencies, including police, prosecutor's office, lawyers, concerned departments of the 
National Security Service; 
• Representatives of local and national governments who sit on the committees on financial 
development or related to economic crime matters; 
• Deputies of local and supreme councils who sit on the committees on financial development or 
related to economic crime matters; 
• NGO concerned; 
• To the extent possible, representatives from players in the fmancial sectors, including from 
commercial and savings banks, insurance companies, trust companies and investment funds, money 
market! foreign currency exchange market, stock and bond market, and the central bank. 
Sectors of financial market considered: 
• commercial and savings banks, 
• insurance companies, 
• trust companies and investment funds, 
• money market! foreign exchange market, 
• stock and bond market, 
• central bank 
Types of economic crime considered: 
• tax evasion, 
• corruption, 
• moneylaunderiog 
II. Profile of the interviewed 
1. Please, identify yourself briefly, either among those listed above or other. 
2. Please specify your political platform, if any? 
3. Which of the following types of economic crime do you consider the most common in Ukraine? 
3.1. ~oneylaundering 
3.2. Tax evasion 
3.3. Corruption 
3.4.0ther __________ _ 
4. What is your involvement, if any, in the issues related to this study. How and in what capacity do 
you encounter cases of economic crime? 
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4.1. Illegal actions were suggested by high level officials 
4.2. Illegal actions were suggested by low level officials 
4.3. Other _____________ _ 
III. Economic crime and financial market 
1. Which of the following sectors of the economy do you consider to be most affected by economic 
crime? 
1.1. energy/gas, 
1.2. raw materials, 
1.3. heavy industry, 
1.4. food industry, 
1.5. 10caVcommunai infrastructure, 
1.6. public services, 
1.7.other ______________ _ 
2. Which sector of the financial market do you consider to be most affected by economic crime? 
2.1. CommerciaVsavings banks; 
2.2. Insurance companies; 
2.3. Trust companies/investment funds; 
2.4. Money market/foreign exchange market; 
2.5. Stock and bond market; 
2.6. Central bank 
2.7. Other _____________ _ 
3. Please specify the exact nature of economic crime that occur in the operations of the institutions 
below. 
(Possible examples may include offences like bribing bank officials to get loans on projects that are not 
financially sound, criminalisation of insurance companies, wrong-doing in non-transparent trust 
companies that manage invested assets, unlawful speculations on money and currency exchange 
market and so forth.) 
Possible economic crime 
1. CommerciaVsavings banks; 
2. Insurance companies 
3. Trust companies/investment funds 
4. Money market/foreign exchange market 
S. Stock and bond market· 
6. Central bank 
7. Other 
4. What is the impact of the identified economic crimes on each sector of financial market below? 
Please use the following scale to estimate the impact: 
1. Promote the development of the sector 
2. Prevent the further development 
3. No essential impact 
4. Other (Please specify) 
1. CommerciaVsavings banks; 
2. Insurance companies 
3. Trust companies/investment funds 
178 
4. Money market/foreign exchange market 
5. Stock and bond market; 
6. Central bank 
7. Other 
5. Please, summarise the impact of the identified economic crime on the state of financial market. 
IV. Regulation of financial market 
1. Before we proceed to the issues related to the regulation of financial markets, please answer the 
following: In the cases of economic crime that you have encountered in the last five years which 
has been the underlying motivation what led the perpetrator to commit crime? 
1.1. to make more profits; 
1.2. to cover-up possible mistakes; 
1.3. for political reason 
2. Generally, is the existing regulatory framework adequate? 
2 .1 Yes (go to question 3) 
2.2 No (go to question 4) 
3. If yes, then what is the reason for existence/development of economic crime? (please, prioritise) 
3.1. lack of resources to enforce the regulations; 
3.2. lack of political will; 
3.3. unwanted political and/or other pressure on 
enforcement agencies· 
3.4. corruption of enforcement agencies; 
3.5. other 
4. Generally, does the existing regulatory framework need major restructuring or can it be improved 
by relatively minor adjustments? 
4.1. yes, the existing regulatory framework can be improved with minor adjustments; 
4.2. no, the existing regulatory framework needs major restructuring. 
5. Do you think that the existing regulatory framework is: 
5.1. over-constrained (go to question 6) 
5.2. under-constrained ( go to question 7) 
5.3. optimal 
5.4. other 
6. What relieflliberalisation needs to be implemented to improve the existing regulatory framework? 
7. What additional regulations/strengthening should be introduced into regulatory framework? 
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8. How will the adjustments that you suggested in 6-7 help combat the cases of economic crime and 
improve the operation of fmancial market? Please, refer to each particular type of economic crime 
and relevant part of financial market you specified in section III? 
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Appendix 3: Tax legislation in Ukraine 
Tax evasion. 
The object of this type of crime is defined as the taxation environment within more 
general economic environment, that is produced by the functioning of the state tax 
system. 
According to the Article 6 of the Law of Ukraine "On the system of taxation", the 
object of taxation include revenues (profit), added value of product, services or 
works, value of product, assets of legal entities and natural persons and other objects, 
as defined by the applicable legislation of Ukraine. 
Article 14 of the Law of Ukraine "On the system of taxation" defines central taxes, 
including value added tax, excise tax, enterprises profit tax, taxes on revenues of 
natural persons, land tax, tax for industrial use of natural resources and others. 
TAXES 
The Law of Ukraine "On the System of Taxation", No. 1251-12 of25 June 1991 (Law 
on Taxation) sets" ... the principles of the taxation system in Ukraine, taxes, levies and 
other required payments to budgets and payments to state special purpose funds, and 
the rights, duties and responsibilities of taxpayers. " 
Section 1 of the Law on Taxation states: 
"Establishment and cancellation of taxes, levies and other required payments to . 
budgets and payments to state special purpose funds is done by the Supreme 
Council of Ukraine, ... local Councils of People's Deputies according to this 
Law and other legislative acts of Ukraine on taxation .... Local Councils of 
People's Deputies may establish additional taxation benefits as to sums which 
are directed to their budgets." 
According to Article 7 of the Law on Taxation, the rates of taxes and other required 
payments do not change during a fiscal year unless implied in the relevant Ukrainian 
legislation. 
The procedure of payment of taxes and other required levies and the responsibility of 
taxpayers for violating the laws on taxation are described in Sections 17 and 11, 
respectively, of the Law on Taxation. 
Sections 14 and 15 of the Law on Taxation list, respectively, State taxes and other 
required payments, and local taxes and levies. In addition, local taxes and duties are 
described in the Cabinet of Ministers Decree "On local taxes and levies", No. 56-93 of 
20 May 1993. Of those taxes listed in Sections 14 and 15 of the Law on Taxation and 
in Decree No. 56-93, the following are paid by a state enterprise: 
(i) Profit Tax; 
(ii) Value Added Tax; 
(iii) Land Tax; 
(iv) Communal Tax; 
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(v) Geological Exploration Tax; 
(vi) Transportation Tax; 
(vii) Road Tax; 
(viii) Chemobyl Tax; 
(ix) Payments to: 
(a) Employment Fund; 
(b) Social Insurance Fund; and 
(c) Pension Fund; 
(x) Innovation Tax; and 
(xi) Labor Protection Tax. 
All but the Communal Tax are defined as "General State Taxes", while the Communal 
Tax is a local tax. The Innovation Tax and the Labor Protection Tax are "non-budget 
taxes"; i.e., they are paid to separate Oblast funds (for more details, see this Section 
II(F), below). These taxes are set as follows: 
(i) Profit Tax: According to Section 4 of the Law of Ukraine "On taxation of the profit 
of enterprises", No. 334/94-BP of28 December 1994, the rate of this tax is 30% of the 
enterprise's net profit. 
(ii) Value Added Tax (VAT): The VAT is regulated by the Law of Ukraine "On Value 
Added Taxes", No. 2007-XII of20 December 1991 . The amount of the tax is 20% of 
the enterprise's expenditures and is included in the cost of production. If the amount of 
VAT is larger than Krb. 1 billion per month, it is paid three times a month, of which 
two payments, on the 5th and the 25th of the month, are estimated, advance payments 
toward the current month' s VAT. The third payment, on the 10th of the month, 
reconciles the previous month's estimated payments, based on actual expenditures for 
the previous month. 
(iii) Land Tax; The Land Tax is paid according to norms set by the City Council and 
approved by the Oblast, depending on the location of facilities. Currently, these norms 
are set by the Decree of the City Council of 25 July 1995 . The Law of Ukraine "On 
the State Budget of Ukraine in 1995", No. 126/95-BP of6 April 1995 required a 20-
fold increase in the Land Tax in 1995. 
(iv) Communal Tax: According to Article 18 of the Law "On local taxes and levies", it 
is within the competence of the local City Council to set local taxes and levies within 
approved limits.2 The City Council has set the amount of this tax at 10% (the 
maximum percentage allowed by this Law) of the product of the number of employees 
and the minimum non-taxed salary (currently Krb. 1,400,000). 
(v) Geological Exploration Tax: Equal to the amount of water supplied multiplied by 
the cost of one cubic meter (Le. the "average tariff') divided by 1,000. 
(vi) Transportation Tax: Based on the number of vehicles used and their power. 
(vii) Road Tax: 1.2% of planned revenues. 
2 According to the same Article, local City Councils have the authority to set reduced tax rates, to abolish some 
local taxes and levies, to make exemptions for some categories of taxpayers, and to permit payments to be 
postponed. 
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(viii) Chemobyl Tax: 12% of the Salary Fund. 
(ix)(a) Employment Fund: 2% of the Salary Fund; 
(ix)(b) and (ix)(c) Social Insurance Fund and Pension Fund: An amount equal to 37% 
of the Salary Fund is distributed between the Social Insurance Fund (12%) and the 
Pension Fund (88%). 
(x) Innovation Tax: 1 % of planned revenues, of which 30% goes to the Oblast 
Innovation Fund and 70% is retained by the enterprise; 
(xi) Labor Protection Tax: 1% of planned revenues, of which 40% goes to the Oblast 
Labor Protection Fund and 60% is retained by the enterprise. The table below shows 
the taxes paid by the enterprise for the first half of 1995: 
Category of Tax Total Amount for Jan - Jun 19953 % of total 
VAT Krb. 76,938,000,000 71.70% 
Land Tax 10,650,000,000 9.92% 
Innovation Tax 4,381,203,543 4.08% 
Road Tax 4,248,138,140 3.96% 
Geological Exploration Tax 3,157,735,407 2.94% 
Pension Fund 2,847,703,805 2.65% 
Profit Tax 1,573,000,000 1.47% 
Labor Protection Tax 1,112,000,000 1.04% 
Chernobyl Tax 932,941,526 0.87% 
Communal Tax 568,000,000 0.53% 
Social Insurance Fund 388,323,163 0.36% 
Transportation Tax 359,000,000 0.33% 
Employment Fund 150,827,546 0.14% 
TOTAL 107,306,873,131 100.00% 
Articles 11, 12, and 13 of the Law of Ukraine "On the budget system of Ukraine", No. 
253/95-BP of29 June 1995 (effective 1 January 1996) describe, respectively, how 
State, Oblast, Raion and City budgets are formed; i.e., what portion of each particular 
tax is allocated to the State, Oblast, City and Raion budgets. According to this law, 
some of the allocations of taxes to the State and the Oblast are set out in the budget 
law for the relevant year. The current allocations are set out in the Law "On the State 
Budget of Ukraine in 1995". 
This law also describes the two types of taxes which form the City budget: "fixed" 
taxes, whose allocations to the City are determined by the State, and set out in the law, 
itself, and "regulated" taxes, whose allocations to the City are set by the Oblast (i.e. 
the State delegates authority to the Oblast to set the allocations). In 1995,28% of City 
budget revenues came from "fixed" taxes and 72% from "regulated" taxes. Only 6% 
of total City budget revenues came from locally-controlled taxes. 
3 The amounts of each tax paid are based on the financial statement of the L'viv Water and Wastewater 
Enterprise, kindly provided by the World Bank Consultants. 
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Through the end of 1995, tax allocations among the budgets of different levels of 
government, and some current tax rates, were set out in the Law "On the budget 
system of the Ukrainian SSR" No. 512-12 of5 December 1990 and differed from 
those set in the Law "On the budget system of Ukraine". 
According to the Law "On the budget system of the Ukrainian SSR", which was in 
effect through 31 December 1995, and the Law of Ukraine "On the State Budget of 
Ukraine in 1995", the distribution of the major taxes paid by a State enterprise in 1995 
was as follows: 
Allocation 
Category of Taxes State Oblast City Enterprise 
VAT 6.1% 49.6% 44.3% 0.0% 
Land Tax 30.0% 0.0% 70.0% 0.0% 
Innovation Tax 0.0% 30.0% 0.0% 70.0% 
Road Tax 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Geological Exploration Tax 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 
Pension Fund 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Profit Tax 30.0% 30.0% 40.0% 0.0% 
Labor Protection Tax 0.0% 40.0% 0.0% 60.0% 
Chemobyl Tax 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Communal Tax 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 
Social Insurance Fund 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Transportation Tax 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 
(Raion) 
Employment Fund 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
TOTAL 17.0% 34.58% 47.42% 100% 
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Appendix 4: Banking statistics 
Assets 
01.01.2001. 
Prominvest 
Aval' 
Privatbank 
Ukreksimbank 
Oshadbank 
Ukraina 
Ukrsocbank 
PershijUMB 
Total 
Ukrsibbank 
Brokbisnesbank 
Nadra 
Praveksbank 
Fin ta kredit 
KrediLione Ukr 
Vabank 
Mtbank 
Ukrinbank 
Mriya 
In 
thousand 
HRV 
Total 
assets 
3376995 
3233055 
3129860 
2286688 
2118852 
1961823 
1705932 
1265057 
19078262 
842522 
705742 
635847 
556748 
439892 
365341 
333380 
320551 
257621 
238505 
Monetary 
assets 
126637 
189486 
117870 
44607 
82149 
46042 
63863 
18503 
689157 
9118 
5276 
14763 
23078 
14516 
2645 
8978 
5601 
17525 
6835 
. Bank assets 
NBU corresp accounts deposits and 
resources credits 
Group 1. 
Largest 
banks 
370170 322464 45391 
1146887 83261 366699 
283333 147388 463859 
131366 361133 40665 
319941 245278 150682 
11 19238 20140 
111514 243237 136554 
130856 107109 227836 
2494078 1529108 1451826 
Group 2. 
Assests 
more than 
100 million 
HRV 
55883 24285 90361 
52277 120534 71133 
49021 50875 58163 
65669 15205 187716 
23479 54227 20362 
68161 8711 66375 
24606 46619 41724 
27437 68441 . 12489 
42985 24766 3655 
24464 4530 30327 
Securities 
State Other Investment Credit Capital Other assets 
securities securities [portfolio assets 
0 6725 15537 2028885 442857 18330 
98830 18634 7118 1085893 160761 75486 
0 165646 4752 1610509 123476 213026 
6151 4154 5784 1013970 173872 504985 
154190 106639 23828 538958 301715 195472 
156748 80142 22045 1086251 492095 39111 
40675 22186 383 836724 216124 34673 
44977 559 2582 611316 108919 12400 
501571 404685 82029 8812506 2019819 1093483 
total 52 
banks, 
presented 
27banks) 
0 51556 5580 554588 45841 5310 
0 83920 203 273510 50747 48142 
49875 1957 1414 378266 15345 16168 
651 130 3629 205428 43569 11673 
0 12107 3260 235975 17476 58490 
0 95 0 211728 5866 1760 
0 18863 13 153937 10231 28407 
68 473 50 177422 25858 2711 
6 4620 310 104815 54881 4057 
0 6232 0 148248 132~~ 4623 
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,Megabank 225455 3949 35290 106511 14680 0 1254 6335 44536 9932 2969 
! ukrgazprombank 215013 550 16589 19619 125443 0 515 1070 46795 2428 2005 
iZevs 214449 3456 28312 57613 2955 0 20491 2077 78511 16514 4519 
, Donmisbank 212782 694 11047 436 15385 0 2224 1301 169096 12412 186 
Kuiv 204463 4469 12768 17000 2053 0 783 1616 144292 14571 6911 
Ekspresbank 187868 6614 27055 42031 33693 0 6 0 64884 12620 966 
Inko 160897 0 209 9203 9158 0 115 5534 127931 2020 6726 
Promfinbank 154385 2487 3989 20346 16801 0 16099 75 85909 7670 1009 
Real bank 141034 1556 15546 78919 16189 0 8646 0 17072 2151 954 
Poltavabank 124201 3884 6358 4722 0 0 4223 2382 42708 11572 48352 
Slovjanskij 119706 20 53 142 0 0 59708 185 40992 5324 13281 
Nacionkredit 112518 6654 28698 5599 0 0 0 3 67740 3595 230 
Kuivska Rus' 111892 5300 7879 5075 20141 0 2764 35 61756 5545 3396 
Dnister 104089 1550 5910 3501 18032 0 1068 0 68135 5563 329 
Metalyrg 103923 5130 9442 8662 0 2012 836 9 70594 6349 889 
Sosiete Zhen Ukr 103262 0 46170 31660 22104 0 10 0 453 2242 440 
Group 3. 
Assets more 
than SO min. 
Hrv (total 44 
banks 
presented 18 
banks) 
Kuiv InvestBank 95873 2447 19515 12788 19438 0 15218 0 18009 5843 2615 
AlIonzh 92762 258 665 1347 18710 0 11552 3 49929 773 9526 
Legbank 91241 3789 14766 2515 8380 0 2194 0 52770 3346 3480 
Polikombank 87064 1205 11607 1399 12347 0 2651 7 43935 12261 1652 
Bazis 84642 782 18642 17095 9293 0 2374 11 23691 8994 3760 
Interbank 81454 754 3977 2961 29514 0 281 0 18636 1252 24079 
PromekoIIbank 79478 809 2076 11413 22920 0 63 0 38122 1335 2739 
Person Komp 78735 1087 4276 9533 1212 0 92 0 22083 22674 17777 
Integral 73247 1736 4145 9602 17800 0 1910 52 35889 1791 322 
Prikarpattya 68936 2355 10128 9717 7657 0 123 1 30007 8535 414 
TK Kredit 67164 1232 4257 5092 . 8956 0 9026 0 36571 1678 351 
Grant 65974 2175 7231 4072 5000 0 106 555 36217 10135 484 
OIbank 64725 395 5872 21812 0 0 9380 114 24198 2006 950 
- --
186 
Transbank 63184 1768 13097 2138 13612 0 218 0 28683 3382 286 
Starokuivskuj 60269 3787 6764 2765 7851 1128 85 0 29947 3379 4564 
Ukrainskuj kapitaI 57782 1369 9396 9705 5986 0 4 0 23402 7267 653 
Prichomomorja 56837 1852 3764 1356 3977 0 162 0 44506 640 580 
K1iringowj Dim 55617 214 6055 1796 6350 0 10142 105 18616 2250 100891 
, 
Group 
4.Assets less 
than 50 
mln.Hrv (total 
50 
banks,presen 
ted 23J 
Zoloti Vorota 47046 292 1243 2330 1100 0 0 0 40806 1140 135 
ZemKapital 46643 1723 9738 4586 0 1858 3356 12 22659 895 1816 
CreditSwisFBUkr 45024 0 102 3064 0 0 32260 0 0 1212 8386 
KuivNarodBank 41983 996 686 972 15103 64 82 0 10763 10487 2830 
ChornBankRtR 40506 629 3009 4132 2500 0 6840 54 6469 1190 15684 
Garant 37340 1069 1781 252 4259 0 5444 330 19007 3975 1223 
Slawtich 36655 523 2202 4882 13757 0 0 0 11013 1381 2897 
Investbank 36093 588 1987 1159 3767 6 0 0 24226 2336 2025 
Tehnobank 33261 361 579 2796 0 0 0 0 28598 851 76 
L'viv 31932 644 981 706 5500 0 461 0 12351 11184 106 
Morskii 31913 1260 1043 128 0 0 23 0 22415 6850 195 
Aksi-Bank 30010 537 16033 1 0 0 70 10 2987 2808 7564 
Ukoopspilka 28270 1570 6065 1287 3504 0 772 66 13580 1026 401 
Radabank 21947 196 1411 2894 0 0 5058 0 11980 396 14 
Finbank 21692 432 1235 547 2900 0 0 0 15569 250 760 
OdessaBank 21380 1329 3689 83 2650 0 0 0 12566 833 230 
Evropejskij 20768 2896 217 120 501 0 3497 156 12241 789 351 
.Al'yans 19416 763 3221 494 0 0 0 2 14609 281 47 
KoralBank 18902 116 253 0 3000 0 0 0 14370 800 364 
Bukovina 16763 52 2837 0 1490 22 0 0 10027 2300 37 
Stolichn~_ 14502 44 588 0 2450 0 1353 0 9636 411 20 
K1asik 12638 259 1927 11 0 0 2185 0 6543 300 1413 
FermZemBank 12~ 
'--- -
10 1227 
- -
_ .. -
0, 5048 0 0 0 
--
5873 424 10 
187 
LIabilities 
01.01.2001. 
Prominvest 
Aval' 
Privatbank 
Ukreksimbank 
Oshadbank 
Ukraina 
Ukrsocbank 
PershijUMB 
Total 
Ukrsibbank 
Brokbisnesbank 
Nadra 
Praveksbank 
Fin fa kredit 
KrediLione Ukr 
Vabank 
Mtbank 
Ukrinbank 
Mriya 
Megabank 
Ukrgazprombank 
Zevs 
Donmisbank 
Kuiv 
Ekspresbank 
Inko 
Promfinbank 
----- ----- ------- .. -
Indebted to 
Total liabilities Budgetary est 
2651204 93119 
3057019 688648 
2854301 7317 
2005908 37343 
1969268 13698 
1752465 103779 
1372603 194253 
969186 225 
16631954 1138382 
693143 4317 
643508 5739 
545659 12318 
476942 5811 
400300 5491 
337249 0 
269083 871 
216258 0 
241454 1374 
206551 0 
182000 13512 
172361 0 
164194 0 
120490 455 
155724 7854 
137971 251 
215346 0 
122540 -~ 
Bank 
indebtedness 
NBU Sal on COlT ac 
7305 7503 
20521 12188 
35128 71316 
658653 6650 
69351 437 
577988 4819 
9743 1652 
0 3676 
1378689 108241 
0 13856 
0 90225 
65442 14930 
0 12 
518 41102 
0 163 
53984 463 
0 0 
0 1343 
0 2568 
0 0 
0 147 
0 1246 
0 1223 
0 15165 
0 0 
0 0 
-
0 163tt 
Client 
indebtedness 
Cred&dep Legal pers Physic pers Own securities Otherliabilit 
10980 1645064 681909 118742 86583 
66818 1667895 482291 63156 55503 
185739 794089 794303 107273 859136 
176969 774068 267613 1500 83110 
92749 218240 1325986 8376 240430 
143438 404167 403401 2257 112616 
90803 806767 244373 1669 23344 
263462 515958 148199 5363 32303 
1030958 6826248 4348075 308336 1493025 
114279 219825 101410 18218 222237 
95665 247905 51362 0 152611 
28136 106497 106976 88441 122918 
93456 131464 170782 1738 73680 
27678 134180 150470 19962 20898 
106532 223475 2438 0 4641 
6100 109590 68289 10270 19516 
0 198086 12126 0 6046 
8933 109493 102987 0 17326 
52467 59933 59790 3367 28426 
0 156506 3162 0 8821 
71114 75904 15898 211 9087 
29752 77263 15728 32815 7389 
86562 27870 2042 0 2338 
3103 96617 20424 0 12562 
17506 107389 5478 0 7347 
. 19341 2 1274 0 194729 
- ---
17487 537QQ 
-
15402 340 19300 
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Real bank 115949 0 0 3557 84218 12272 15295 0 606 
Poltavabank 97503 1345 0 0 0 45300 45359 838 4661 
SIo~nskil 212813 0 0 6336 4313 14058 91968 516 95622 
Nacionkredit 90758 0 0 0 2310 64171 16376 0 7928 
I Kuivska Rust 92261 0 0 0 11329 52782 20485 2076 5589 
Dnister 85255 3957 0 2717 22401 14020 29567 3862 8731 
Metalyrg 48559 0 0 8 0 21646 25649 0 1256 
Sosiete Zhen Ukr 63573 0 0 61 0 59997 0 0 3516 
I 
Kuiv InvestBank 51128 0 0 7011 0 25675 5110 12408 924 
Allonzh 48784 0 0 0 34981 8160 0 3454 2189 
Legbank 80032 0 0 0 6524 34481 20475 1898 16655 
Polikombank 58554 17797 0 0 5272 21956 13070 125 333 
Bazis 69363 0 0 0 0 61728 799 18 6818 
Interbank 55345 0 0 1 23142 14513 10111 7097 482 
Promekonbank 56350 0 0 11296 17258 2346 6397 13225 5829 
Person Komp 49853 0 0 120 10200 12022 26771 0 740 
Integral 47651 0 0 10078 0 26977 9960 0 636 
Prikarpattya 48101 24 0 0 7000 10716 28881 0 1480 
TK Kredit 40238 0 0 0 9035 25904 5171 0 128 
Grant 41553 1515 0 0 5000 19789 12489 1894 866 
Olbank 44952 0 0 9 0 34757 8831 0 1356 
Transbank 31649 2004 0 0 5435 19490 3530 0 1191 
Starokuivskuj 47313 0 0 0 0 33182 12745 0 1386 
ukrainskuj kapItaI 39593 0 0 4112 500 26785 1763 0 6432 
Pricho I~ja 38593 0 0 6 3002 7609 15192 3381 9273 
Kliringovuj Dim 30434 0 0 850 3014 18597 857 6650 467 
Zoloti Vorota 26230 0 0 4652 6259 5459 8489 65 1307 
ZemKapital 33915 17483 0 1003 0 4918 3603 0 6907 
CredltSwisFBUkr 96 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 96 
KuivNarodBank 15376 0 0 308 7000 6696 778 0 594 
ChomBankRtR 230~,-----_ _1 ~~7 _ _ 0 0 ___ 902~ 5822 _ _ _ 224._ _ _ _ _ 11 6703 
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Garant 
Slavutich 
Investbank 
Tehnobank 
L'viv 
Morskij 
Aksi-Bank 
Ukoopspilka 
Radabank 
Finbank 
OdessaBank 
Evropejskii 
AI'yans 
KoralBank 
Bukovina 
Stolichnuy 
Klasik 
FennZemBank 
Capital 
01/0112001 
Prominvest 
Avar 
Privatbank 
Ukreksimbank 
Oshadbank 
Ukraina 
Ukrsocbank 
PershijUMB 
Total 
Ukrsibbank 
Brokbisnesbank 
Nadra 
Praveksbank 
21646 
20729 
21360 
21576 
14840 
9185 
18975 
19814 
7320 
6251 
5690 
3237 
4393 
5608 
7018 
7368 
2527 
4772 
Balance capital 
I (total) 
725790 
176035 
275559 
280780 
149583 
209358 
333329 
295871 
2446305 
148379 
62235 
90188 
79806 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
1 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
311 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
ThousHRV 
Statutory capital Reserve funds 
200113 37290 
104000 3880 
140000 31414 
108000 27000 
100000 9197 
68895 15403 
48522 14733 
112869 5411 
882399 144328 
90000 3566 
16826 2422 
50449 2940 
60672 1818 
0 9282 6421 5744 0 199 
0 4519 6652 2426 0 7132 
0 3750 10012 3143 0 4455 
2700 0 6920 3394 0 8562 
0 5750 3746 4930 0 412 
26 0 5891 2505 544 219 
0 1700 6261 5 0 11009 
0 0 12783 3629 0 3402 
2700 0 1504 274 0 2531 
0 2900 3184 1 0 166 
0 2650 2807 108 0 124 
0 600 1063 979 0 594 
0 0 3964 199 0 230 
0 3500 1220 0 0 888 
0 1000 1158 0 0 4861 
0 2500 1134 0 0 3734 
0 0 1753 0 0 3019 
0 0 1753 0 0 3019 
Prev years rests Current year results Other 
~ital 
355628 58946 73814 
56687 3641 7828 
48858 29430 25857 
83604 32675 29501 
33206 -26994 34174 
2952 -97152 219259 
235998 4840 29238 
121348 15912 40332 
938281 21298 460003 
29129 7424 18260 
22250 5359 15378 
22033 14363 403 
9048 7881 ~_386 
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Fin ta kredit 39592 20000 1400 13445 4748 0 
KrediLione Ukr 28092 22261 2072 3328 430 0 
Vabank 64297 40696 7502 8069 8030 0 
iMtbank 104293 50150 23995 14552 15596 0 
Ukrinbank 16167 19207 5000 -8390 -23135 23485 
Mriya 31954 13565 3253 5498 8681 656 
Meaabank 43454 26392 960 11485 4593 25 
Ukrgazprombank 42652 18200 1452 10143 12857 0 
Zevs 50256 30168 5751 6290 7958 88 
Donmisbank 92292 58132 4269 748 29143 0 
Kuiv 48739 29404 6123 0 12918 293 
Eksoresbank 49987 27621 1369 6190 14707 10 
Inko -54449 995 4596 -64756 10 4706 
Promfinbank 31845 28209 747 0 2888 0 
Real bank 25084 17602 1814 4353 1259 56 
Poltavabank 26698 13112 268 3406 2769 7144 
Siovianskii -93107 22500 6682 202891 -325441 261 
Nacionkredit 21733 9964 572 3959 7239 0 
Kuivska Rus' 19631 13030 2209 1559 672 2160 
Dnister 18835 16657 47 902 1228 0 
MetalYm 55364 9611 2906 33645 8542 660 
Sosiete Zhen Ukr 39688 23311 3254 7943 5180 0 
Kuiv InvestBank 44745 44494 183 29 35 4 
Allonzh 43978 43001 339 158 480 0 
Leabank 11209 8000 500 2374 182 153 
Polikombank 28510 12678 1386 2766 732 10947 
Bazis 15279 7500 3781 1115 2802 81 
Interbank 26109 22624 304 2391 403 386 
Promekonbank 23128 20179 606 98 2244 0 
PersonKomp 28882 15000 2150 4083 552 7098 
Integral 25595 22414 360 2614 207 0 
PrikarpattYa 20835 16000 295 889 1035 2616 
TK Kredit 26925 21834 235 1841 3015 0 
Grant 24421 9007 2893 4124 1095 7302 
191 
Olbank 19773 9174 642 9357 601 0 
Transbank 31535 20135 2941 4439 3981 102 
Starokuivskuj 12956 5603 1363 620 2809 2562 
Ukralnskuj kapitaI 18189 14285 352 229 694 2629 
Prichomomorja 18374 14667 1124 519 2048 16 
i Kliringowj Dim 25183 24130 322 31 700 0 
! 
Zoloti Vorota 20871 19800 218 637 160 1 
ZemKapital 12727 8150 432 1921 2224 1 
CreditSwisFBUkr 44928 28275 958 15745 -49 0 
KuivNarodBank 26607 20321 1920 266 157 3942 
ChomBankRtR 17481 15332 164 1916 70 0 
Garant 15694 12000 248 2253 87 1107 
Slawtich 15926 13177 1806 715 228 0 
Investbank 14733 12388 790 914 641 1 
Tehnobank 11684 11026 212 241 174 31 
L'viv 17092 7449 201 1213 302 7928 
Morskij 22728 14852 265 1225 803 5583 
Aksi-Bank 11035 9000 342 283 6 1404 
Ukoopspilka 8457 8879 439 1744 -2606 0 
Radabank 14627 13550 877 168 33 0 
Finbank 15441 14547 318 360 216 0 
OdessaBank 15690 15000 374 297 9 11 
E Y I VV""j.,kij 17531 15307 326 1689 209 0 
AI'yans 15023 14183 118 192 529 1 
KoralBank 13294 7959 248 4437 83 567 
Bukovina 9745 7500 1694 0 551 0 
Stolichnuy 7134 6268 248 168 444 5 
Klasik 10111 9404 372 334 1 0 
FermZemBank 7820 7356 100 321 43 1 
-
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Retumon 
assets 
Prominvest 
Aval' 
Privatbank 
Ukreksimbank 
Oshadbank 
Ukraina 
Ukrsocbank 
PershijUMB 
Total 
Ukrsibbank 
Brokbisnesbank 
Nadra 
Praveksbank 
Fin ta kredit 
KrediLione Ukr 
Vabank 
Mtbank 
Ukrinbank 
Mriya 
Megabank 
Ukrgazprombank 
Zevs 
Oonmisbank 
Kuiv 
Ekspresbank 
Inko 
Promfinbank 
Real bank 
Poltavabank 
Thousan 
Assets(01.0 Assets 01.07.2001 
1.20011 
3376995 4008594 
3233055 3903839 
3129860 4013939 
2286688 2814342 
2118852 2729108 
1961823 1963411 
1705932 2173511 
1265057 1381554 
1907826 22988298 
2 
842522 1090156 
705742 860582 
635847 831118 
556748 623571 
439892 574525 
365341 332362 
333380 396603 
320551 347928 
257621 342575 
238505 287910 
225455 213666 
215013 272374 
214449 
212782 276975 
204463 274364 
187868 230994 
160897 154196 
154385 190504 
141034 150551 
124201 178310 
Average net income 0107.2001 Retum on assets ROA(%) 
3692794,5 14201 0,384559715 0,77 
3568447 5458 0,001529517 0,31 
3571899,5 15199 0,004255159 0,85 
2550515 4650 0,001823161 0,36 
2423980 835 3,44475E-04 0,07 
1962617 -60933 -0,031046811 -6,21 
1939721,5 307 1,58270E-04 0,03 
1323305,5 20940 0,01582401 3,16 
21033280 657 
966339 4890 0,005060336 1,01 
783162 722 9,21904E-04 0,18 
733482,5 3360 0,004580886 0,92 
590159,5 7021 0,011896784 2,38 
507208,5 4517 0,008905608 1,78 
348851,5 817 0,002341971 0,47 
364991,5 1076 0,002948014 0,59 
334239,5 15257 0,045646909 9,13 
300098 1104 0,003678798 0,74 
263207,5 5813 0,022085237 4,42 
219560,5 780 0,003552552 0,71 
243693,5 6079 0,024945269 4,99 
214449 no data no data no data 
244878,5 18421 0,075225061 15,05 
239413,5 428 0,001787702 0,36 
209431 12522 0,059790575 11,96 
157546,5 11 6,98207E-Q5 0,01 
172444,5 3276 0,018997417 3,80 
145792,5 811 0,0055627 1,11 
151255,5 2264 0,014968051 2,99 
193 
Slovjanskij 119706 119706 no data no data no data 
Nacionkredit 112518 144461 128489,5 4299 0,033457987 6,69 
Kuivska Rus' 111892 210838 161365 233 0,001443931 0,29 
Dnister 104089 173402 138745,5 1231 0,00887236 1,77 
Metalyrg 103923 151443 127683 3970 0,031092628 6,22 
Sosiete Zhen Ukr 103262 27928 65595 -599 -0,009131794 -1,83 
Kuiv InvestBank 95873 95873 no data no data no data 
A1lonzh 92762 129391 111076,5 2 1,80056E-05 0,00 
Legbank 91241 115208 103224,5 16 1,55002E-04 0,03 
Polikombank 87064 113338 100201 163 0,00162673 0,33 
Bazis 84642 108480 96561 663 0,006866126 1,37 
Interbank 81454 81348 81401 199 0,002444687 0,49 
Promekonbank 79478 117144 98311 6 6,10308E-05 0,01 
Person Komp 78735 83141 80938 353 0,004361363 0,87 
Integral 73247 92399 82823 396 0,004781281 0,96 
Prikarpattya 68936 71350 70143 284 0,004048872 0,81 
TK Kredit 67164 96405 81784,5 745 0,009109306 1,82 
Grant 65974 79429 72701,5 156 0,00214576 0,43 
Olbank 64725 75268 69996,5 87 0,001242919 0,25 
Transbank 63184 73239 68211,5 1915 0,028074445 5,61 
Starokuivskuj 60269 54014 57141,5 2423 0,042403507 8,48 
Ukrainskuj kapitaI 57782 61760 59771 836 0,013986716 2,80 
Prichomomorja 56837 65340 61088,5 720 0,011786179 2,36 
Kliringowj Dim 55617 56672 56144,5 210 0,003740349 0,75 
Zoloti Vorota 47046 53428 50237 100 0,001990565 0,40 
ZemKapital 46643 50510 48576,5 494 0,010169526 2,03 
CreditSwisFBUkr 45024 42187 43605,5 -2745 -0,062950775 -12,59 
KuivNarodBank 41983 52161 47072 128 0,002719239 0,54 
ChomBankRtR 40506 49583 45044,5 117 0,002597431 0,52 
Garant 37340 40303 38821,5 48 0,001236428 0,25 
Slavutich 36655 54269 45462 157 0,003453434 0,69 
194 
Investbank 36093 44152 40122,5 122 0,003040688 0,61 
Tehnobank 33261 55991 44626 77 0,001725452 0,35 
L'viv 31932 41912 36922 398 0,010779481 2,16 
Morskij 31913 43219 37566 770 0,020497258 4,10 
Aksi-Bank 30010 36931 33470,5 114 0,003405984 0,68 
Ukoopspilka 28270 29987 29128,5 925 0,03175584 6,35 
Radabank 21947 25519 23733 56 0,002359584 0,47 
Finbank 21692 28333 25012,5 242 0,009675162 1,94 
OdessaBank 21380 28068 24724 91 0,003680634 0,74 
Evrooeiskii 20768 26189 23478,5 120 0,005111059 1,02 
[Aryans 19416 24215 21815,5 341 0,015631088 3,13 
KoralBank 18902 24395 21648,5 48 0,002217244 0,44 
Bukovina 16763 24558 20660,5 683 0,033058251 6,61 
Slolichnuy 14502 17361 15931,5 27 0,001694756 0,34 
Klasik 12638 16631 14634,5 1 6,83317E-05 0,01 
FennZemBank _ 125~2 10007 '-___ ~1299,5 -920 -Q,Q8141953_2 -16,28 
-
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Retumon 
Equity 01.07 
2001 
Prom invest 
Aval' 
. Privatbank 
I Ukreksimbank 
Oshadbank 
Ukraina 
Ukrsocbank 
PershijUMB 
Total 
Ukrsibbank 
Brokbisnesbank 
Nadra 
Praveksbank 
Fin ta kredit 
KrediLione Ukr 
Vabank 
Mtbank 
Ukrinbank 
Mriya 
Megabank 
Ukrgazprombank 
Zevs 
Donmisbank 
Kuiv 
Ekspresbank 
Inko 
Prornfinbank 
Real bank 
Poltavabank 
Slovjanskij 
Nacionkredit 
Bal cap (totaI)01.01.2001 Bal cap 01.07 2001 
725790 705919 
176035 237240 
275559 290758 
280780 285430 
149583 237551 
209358 147197 
333j29 333458 
295871 316811 
2446305 2554364 
148379 152796 
62235 61361 
90188 93463 
79806 86557 
39592 44110 
28092 28908 
64297 65368 
104293 116668 
16167 7946 
31954 32698 
43454 44422 
42652 46715 
50256 n/a 
92292 110638 
48739 n/aa 
49987 62457 
-54449 54446 
31845 35121 
25084 25937 
26698 29392 
-93107 n/a 
21733 24219 
. --- .-
Average net income 01 07.2001 Return on Equity 
715854,5 14201 3,97 
206637,5 5458 5,28 
283158,5 15199 10,74 
283105 4650 3,29 
193567 835 0,86· 
178277,5 -60933 -68,36 
333393,5 307 0,18 
306341 20940 13,67 
2500334,5 657 
150587,5 4890 6,49 
61798 722 2,34 
91825,5 3360 7,32 
83181,5 7021 16,88 
41851 4517 21,59 
28500 817 5,73 
64832,5 1076 3,32 
110480,5 15257 27,62 
12056,5 1104 18,31 
32326 5813 35,96 
43938 780 3,55 
44683,5 6079 27,21 
50256 no data no data 
101465 18421 36,31 
48739 428 1,76 
56222 12522 44,54 
-1,5 11 -1466,67 
33483 3276 19,57 
25510,5 811 6,36 
28045 2264 16,15 
-93107 no data no data 
22976 4299 37,42 
196 
Kuivska Rus' 19631 22864 21247,5 233 2,19 
Dnister 18835 25409 22122 1231 11,13 
Metalyrg 55364 61132 58248 3970 13,63 
Sosiete Zhen Ukr 39688 26225 32956,5 -599 -3,64 
KuivlnvestBank 44745 nJa 44745 no data no data 
Allonzh 43978 43980 43979 2 0,01 
Legbank 11209 21392 16300,5 16 0,20 
Polikombank 28510 28407 28458,5 163 1,15 
!Bazis 15279 15942 15610,5 663 8,49 
Interbank 26109 26351 26230 199 1,52 
Promekonbank 23128 24036 23582 6 0,05 
Person KomD 28882 29235 29058,5 353 2,43 
Integral 25595 28074 26834,5 396 2,95 
Prikaroattva 20835 12056 16445,5 284 3,45 
TK Kredit 26925 26995 26960 745 5,53 
Grant 24421 24577 24499 156 1,27 
Olbank 19773 19860 19816,5 87 0,88 
Transbank 31535 30976 31255,5 1915 12,25 
Starokuivskui 12956 15199 14077,5 2423 34,42 
Ukrainskuj kapital 18189 18454 18321,5 836 9,13 
Prichomomoria 18374 19094 18734 720 7,69 
K1irinaowi Dim 25183 30943 28063 210 1,50 
Zoloti Voreta 20871 23609 22240 100 0,90 
ZemKaDital 12727 13249 12988 494 7,61 
CreditSwisFBUkr 44928 42183 43555,5 -2745 -12,60 
KuivNarodBan 26607 26735 26671 128 0,96 
k 
ChomBankRtR 17481 17598 17539,5 117 1,33 
Garant 15694 15742 15718 48 0,61 
Slavutich 15926 15854 15890 157 1,98 
Investbank 14733 14838 14785,~ 
--
122 _~_1,6~ 
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Tehnobank 11684 20760 16222 77 0,95 
L'viv 17092 17075 17083,5 398 4,66 
Morskij 22728 23498 23113 770 6,66 
Aksi-Bank 11035 25745 18390 114 1,24 
Ukoopspilka 8457 9382 8919,5 925 20,74 
Radabank 14627 15933 15280 56 0,73 
Finbank 15441 16077 15759 242 3,07 
OdessaBank 15690 15782 15736 91 1,16 
Evropejskij 17531 18078 17804,5 120 1,35 
AI'yans 15023 15754 15388,5 341 4,43 
KoralBank 13294 13342 13318 48 0,72 
Bukovina 9745 10428 10086,5 683 13,54 
Slolichnuy 7134 7160 7147 27 0,76 
Klasik 10111 12390 11250,5 1 0,02 
FermZemBank 7820 6900 7360 -920 -25,00 
198 
